Walter McMillian v. W.E. Johnson, Tommy Herring, Tom Allen, in Their Individual Capacities, Thomas Tate, Simon Benson, Larry Ikner, in Their Individual Capacities, Association of County Commissions of Alabama Liability Self Insurance Fund, Intervenor-Defendant
Docket: 95-6123
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; December 2, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Walter McMillian was wrongfully convicted of murdering Ronda Morrison and sentenced to death, spending nearly six years on Alabama's death row, including over a year pre-trial. His conviction was eventually overturned by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals due to the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Following the dismissal of charges, McMillian filed a 1983 action against various officials involved in his case, alleging they knowingly prosecuted him for a crime he did not commit.
This appeal arises from the district court's denial of several defendants' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, a legal shield for government officials against liability for civil damages. At this point, the truth of McMillian's allegations regarding official misconduct remains undetermined. The court's role is to assess whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if McMillian's claims are substantiated.
Key events include the investigation of Morrison's murder by Sheriff Thomas Tate, investigator Larry Ikner, and Alabama Bureau of Investigation agent Simon Benson. They interviewed Ralph Myers, who had been arrested for another murder and initially denied involvement in Morrison's case. However, evidence suggests that Tate, Ikner, and Benson coerced Myers into falsely accusing McMillian of sodomy to facilitate his arrest and build a case against him for the Morrison murder. Consequently, a warrant for McMillian's arrest on sodomy charges was issued.
Tate, Ikner, and Benson were called to the Conecuh County Jail by Bill Hooks, who had previously reported seeing a white male with a scar and a black male, known as 'John Dozier,' leaving Jackson Cleaners around the time of the Morrison murder. Hooks later identified Myers as the white male after seeing his photograph in a newspaper. Following this, McMillian was arrested for an unrelated charge and, during an interview, his girlfriend Karen Kelly disclosed that McMillian confessed to her about killing the girl at Jackson Cleaners. Kelly subsequently signed a sworn statement detailing her account.
Based on Hooks' and Kelly's statements, capital murder warrants were issued for McMillian and Myers in connection with the Morrison murder. Myers later stated that he met McMillian on the day of the murder and claimed McMillian confessed to him about the killing. McMillian contended that these statements were false and coerced.
Both men were moved to the Conecuh County Jail for a preliminary hearing, which was postponed. Following an incident where armed men threatened Myers in jail, the District Attorney sought to transfer both men to the Alabama Department of Corrections for safety. A judge approved this motion, leading to their incarceration on death row at Holman Correctional Facility. McMillian alleged that the transfer was part of a conspiracy to punish and intimidate him, rather than for safety reasons.
During their time on death row, McMillian asserted that Myers was moved back and forth depending on his cooperation with law enforcement regarding the framing of McMillian. At trial, Myers served as the key witness for the prosecution, while Kelly was not called to testify. McMillian was ultimately convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
Myers and several witnesses later recanted their trial testimonies, revealing that the state had withheld exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Following McMillian’s petition for post-conviction relief under Ala.R.Crim. P. 32, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals overturned his conviction, leading to the dismissal of the murder charge and his release from prison. McMillian subsequently filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Tate, Ikner, Benson, and other defendants not involved in the appeal, alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights along with state constitutional and tort claims. The district court dismissed Monroe County, Alabama, and all official capacity claims, as well as many individual claims against various defendants. While summary judgment was granted for several defendants on many claims, the court denied it for some claims against Tate, Ikner, and Benson, which are central to the appeal.
In Count One, McMillian claims that his pretrial detention on death row violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He alleges a conspiracy by Tate, Ikner, and Benson with Department of Corrections (DOC) officials to detain him there for punitive reasons rather than safety. The district court found a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the defendants conspired to punish McMillian, especially given conflicting statements about threats made against him. The court also noted that there was evidence indicating Tate's intent to punish rather than protect McMillian, particularly since the transfer of pretrial detainees to death row was against both Alabama law and DOC policy. The court concluded that the evidence surrounding the transfers supported the claim of a conspiracy involving Tate, Ikner, and Benson, suggesting their actions were not genuinely motivated by safety concerns.
Transferring Myers between Monroe County Jail and Holman's Death Row, without written court orders, indicates that Monroe County law enforcement and D.O.C. Defendants had a mutual understanding regarding the reasons for these transfers and the circumstances under which McMillian and Myers were held on Death Row. Myers’ statement suggests that Defendants were using Death Row to punish and intimidate him into testifying against McMillian, implying that McMillian may also have been subjected to similar punitive measures.
In Count Two, McMillian alleges that Defendants Tate, Ikner, and Benson suppressed exculpatory and impeachment evidence, violating his due process rights. The district court determined that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether these Defendants intentionally withheld three key pieces of evidence from the prosecutor: Myers' June 3, 1987 statement, a statement from Isaac Daily, and a statement from Miles Jackson. The court rejected the Defendants' claims of qualified immunity, asserting that withholding such evidence from the prosecutor without justifiable reason contravened established legal principles.
The district court found that Myers' June 3, 1987 statement was exculpatory as it denied his involvement in the Morrison murder and contradicted his trial testimony against McMillian. The statement was not provided to the Morrison murder prosecutor because it ended up in the Pittman murder file, suggesting that Tate, Ikner, and Benson may have intended to conceal it.
Isaac Daily’s statement, which indicated that he overheard Myers confessing to the Pittman murder and plotting to frame McMillian, was also deemed exculpatory. The court noted that this statement was similarly withheld from the Morrison prosecutor, with reasonable inference of intent to suppress by Benson. Tate and Ikner were found not to have participated in the suppression of the Daily statement.
The district court found Miles Jackson's statement to an Alabama Bureau of Investigation agent to be exculpatory for McMillian, indicating a genuine issue regarding whether Tate, Ikner, and Benson intentionally withheld this statement from the Morrison prosecutor. Jackson claimed to have seen Ronda Morrison alive at Jackson Cleaners at 10:30 a.m. on the day of the murder, which contradicted the prosecution's timeline of the murder occurring between 10:15 and approximately 10:50 a.m. The court noted that the prosecution's theory became less credible with the introduction of Jackson's statement.
In Count Three, McMillian alleged that Tate, Ikner, and Benson coerced witnesses into providing false testimony and threatened others to suppress exculpatory evidence. The court determined that sufficient evidence existed to support McMillian's claims that these officials pressured witness Myers to testify falsely and that Tate threatened Karen Kelly to influence her testimony. The court emphasized that any interference with Kelly, who initially implicated Myers, violated McMillian's rights.
Regarding state law claims, the district court found enough evidence to proceed to trial on allegations of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and outrage against Tate, Ikner, and Benson, rejecting their claims of state law immunity.
The appeal addresses five main issues: (1) whether the officials are entitled to qualified immunity for actions leading to McMillian's pretrial detention; (2) whether they are immune for withholding exculpatory evidence; (3) whether they knowingly used perjured testimony; (4) whether Tate intimidated Kelly; and (5) whether Tate is entitled to state law sovereign immunity regarding McMillian's claims.
Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from civil liability and trials while performing discretionary functions, except in cases where their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would know. For a legal standard to be considered "clearly established," it must be sufficiently defined in a specific context, making it obvious to reasonable officials that their conduct violates federal law. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to show that a defendant breached clearly established law.
Regarding appellate jurisdiction, a district court's denial of qualified immunity can be appealed if it presents a question of law. The Supreme Court allows immediate appeals of denials based solely on legal determinations concerning what law is clearly established and whether the alleged facts breach that law. However, if a district court's denial is based on factual disputes, such as determining if evidence shows a genuine issue for trial, that decision is not immediately appealable. McMillian argues that many appellate challenges by Tate, Ikner, and Benson relate to factual disputes and thus should not be considered under current appellate rules. While this argument aligns with some interpretations of prior case law, it is not universally applied by the circuit courts, and subsequent rulings have indicated that appellate review of fact-based rulings may still be permissible in certain circumstances.
An appellate court can review a district court's factual determinations when the appeal involves a core qualified immunity issue stemming from a denial of summary judgment. In *Johnson v. Clifton*, the court clarified that such factual issues are integral to evaluating whether a defendant's conduct contravened clearly established law. If an appeal solely raises the issue of evidentiary sufficiency, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction. However, when the core issue of qualified immunity is present, it may challenge the district court's factual findings regarding the defendant's actions. Despite this, the appellate court retains discretion to accept the district court's factual findings if they are sufficiently detailed, as was the case here.
The court accepted the district court's factual determinations for the purposes of the interlocutory appeal but noted that these findings could be reassessed at trial. McMillian's allegations include a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting that his placement on death row as a pretrial detainee was intended to punish and intimidate him. This claim requires establishing whether a constitutional violation occurred before assessing if the right was clearly established. Tate contends that McMillian's claim does not constitute a valid Fourteenth Amendment violation, prompting the need for analysis of McMillian's allegations.
McMillian asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on allegations that his transfer to death row was intended to punish him, rather than serving a legitimate governmental purpose. Tate contends that the transfer was rationally related to McMillian's safety, arguing that a claim only exists if the detention lacks a legitimate non-punitive objective. Due process prohibits punishing pretrial detainees until they are convicted, as established in Bell v. Wolfish. The determination of whether detention conditions amount to punishment hinges on whether they are intended for punishment or serve a legitimate goal. A mere intent to punish, as evidenced by the actions of officials, can indicate unconstitutional treatment, and such intent may be inferred if the conditions are excessive in relation to their purpose.
The district court found sufficient evidence suggesting that Tate, Ikner, and Benson conspired to punish McMillian through his transfer. The defendants' argument that a legitimate reason for confinement could justify punitive conditions was rejected; an express intent to punish constitutes unconstitutional pretrial punishment. The court upheld that McMillian had enough evidence to support his claim for unconstitutional pretrial punishment.
Furthermore, the issue of qualified immunity arises, protecting the defendants from trial unless the transfer violated clearly established law. The defendants argue that the law regarding pretrial punishment was not clearly established at the time of McMillian's transfer.
McMillian's transfer to Holman's death row raises questions about the legality of pretrial detainee treatment under established law, which prohibits punitive conditions. The focus for qualified immunity is whether it was clearly established that such a transfer, intended as punishment, violated due process rights. For law to be "clearly established," it must be recognizable to all reasonable officials as unlawful based on prior similar cases. Existing case law addressing pretrial conditions—like overcrowding and inadequate care—does not directly mirror McMillian's situation. However, the fundamental prohibition against pretrial punishment was well-established, indicating that transferring McMillian to death row for punitive reasons would violate his rights. Therefore, if McMillian's claims are substantiated, the officials involved—Tate, Ikner, and Benson—would not qualify for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. Tate argues that his intent should not affect the qualified immunity analysis, asserting that only a reasonable officer's perspective matters, regardless of intent. He claims that if a reasonable officer could have believed the transfer lawful based on the circumstances, he is entitled to immunity.
Precedent dictates the rejection of Tate's argument, affirming that intent or motivation is critical when assessing constitutional violations, particularly in claims of pretrial punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment. The purpose to punish must be evaluated alongside claims of discriminatory intent in equal protection cases and intent in First Amendment claims. Analysis of Tate, Ikner, and Benson's motivations reveals a violation of established law regarding the alleged misconduct.
In Count Two, McMillian claims that Tate, Ikner, and Benson violated his due process rights by withholding exculpatory and impeachment evidence. The district court determined that McMillian provided sufficient evidence to create genuine disputes regarding the intentional withholding of evidence from the Morrison prosecutor. It ruled against the defendants' qualified immunity claims, citing a breach of established law under Brady v. Maryland, which protects an accused's right to a fair trial by mandating disclosure of material evidence favorable to the defense, regardless of the prosecutor's intent.
Brady's requirements encompass both exculpatory and impeachment evidence, which must be disclosed if their suppression could undermine confidence in the trial outcome. While the Supreme Court has not clarified the disclosure obligations of police and investigators under Brady, this court and others have indicated that investigators fulfill their duties by providing such evidence to the prosecutor. Importantly, investigators are not obliged to disclose evidence if they believe the prosecutor is already aware of it.
On appeal, Tate, Ikner, and Benson do not contest the obligation to forward exculpatory and impeachment evidence to the prosecutor or the classification of the suppressed evidence as Brady material. Tate contends that he believed the prosecutor was informed about the evidence due to Ikner's awareness of it.
Ikner and Benson contend that they were not obligated under Brady to disclose certain evidence to the prosecutor, asserting that they could not have known the evidence would be exculpatory when obtained. Tate argues he had reason to believe the prosecutor was aware of the evidence based on a precedent set in *Kelly v. Curtis*, where it was determined that police officers do not have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence if they believe the prosecutor is already aware of it. In *Kelly*, the police had reason to believe the prosecutor knew of a lab report exonerating the plaintiff because it was sent directly to the prosecutor's office. Tate claims he had even stronger reason to believe the prosecutor was aware since Ikner, an investigator from the prosecutor's office, knew about it. However, Tate's alleged conspiracy with Ikner to withhold the evidence negates any claim of reasonable belief that the prosecutor was informed, rendering *Kelly* inapplicable.
Ikner and Benson also argue that the exculpatory evidence was obtained during the Pittman murder investigation and thus did not need to be shared with the Morrison murder prosecutor. This argument is rejected; both investigations were concurrent, and they had a duty under Brady to disclose any favorable evidence regarding McMillian in the Morrison case. Finally, Tate, Ikner, and Benson could claim qualified immunity unless their actions clearly violated established law at the time. The relevant legal standards from 1987 and 1988 must have made it evident to reasonable agents that withholding exculpatory evidence from the Morrison murder prosecutor was unlawful.
In 1987 and 1988, police officers had a clearly established duty under Brady to refrain from intentionally withholding exculpatory or impeachment evidence from prosecutors. Legal precedents affirm that such concealment violates an accused's due process rights, irrespective of the prosecutor's awareness or intent. The police are considered part of the prosecution, and any nondisclosure by them impacts the trial's integrity, as the state's duty to disclose extends to all its agents. The law established that withholding Brady material from prosecutors constitutes a violation of due process rights.
Further inquiry is necessary to determine whether a reasonable officer in the positions of Tate, Ikner, and Benson would have recognized that the withheld evidence was material—specifically, that it could undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. The standard for determining materiality remains unchanged; evidence is deemed material if its suppression creates a reasonable probability of a different trial result. This evaluation must consider the suppressed evidence collectively rather than individually.
The district court determined that several pieces of withheld evidence were exculpatory, but it failed to assess whether Tate, Ikner, and Benson understood that withholding this evidence could undermine confidence in McMillian's trial outcome. The court analyzed the evidence retrospectively and agreed with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on its materiality, but it did not consider the officials' perspective at the time of the trial. The district court has been directed to reevaluate the materiality of the withheld evidence from that perspective.
Additionally, the district court found sufficient evidence suggesting that Tate, Ikner, and Benson may have coerced Myers into giving false testimony against McMillian, which could result in liability for their role in using perjured testimony. The court rejected the qualified immunity defense of the officials, citing clearly established law that prohibits the use of knowingly false testimony in prosecutions. Tate's argument that his actions did not violate established law was dismissed, as the court maintained that evidence of the state's knowledge of perjury was critical.
Tate, Ikner, and Benson disputed the notion that Myers's testimony was false or that they could have known it was false. However, the district court found genuine issues of fact regarding the coercion of Myers and the truthfulness of his testimony, leaving those factual determinations unaddressed on appeal.
Furthermore, the district court identified a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Tate threatened Karen Kelly, a potential defense witness who initially implicated Myers but not McMillian. The court asserted that it is unlawful for the state to interfere with defense witnesses, regardless of whether Kelly was called to testify. Tate contended that McMillian's claims regarding Kelly did not establish a constitutional violation, disputing the relevance of her potential testimony and the interpretation of her statements.
McMillian acknowledges that the district court misinterpreted Kelly's statement, which initially implicated only Myers in the Pittman murder, but the court mistakenly connected it to the Morrison murder. McMillian does not dispute the misreading nor does he provide evidence to suggest that Kelly was a potential defense witness, as his complaint does not mention Kelly. Consequently, Tate did not infringe on McMillian's established rights by allegedly threatening Kelly. The court erred in denying summary judgment regarding Tate's interference with Kelly's potential testimony.
Regarding sovereign immunity, the district court ruled that McMillian had sufficient evidence to support three state law claims against Tate, Ikner, and Benson: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and outrage. The court found a genuine issue concerning an outrage claim against Tate and the DOC defendants. It rejected Tate's defenses of state law sovereign and discretionary immunity, asserting that such immunity does not protect officials from intentional or malicious wrongdoing in their individual capacities. Tate contends that under Alabama's Constitution, sheriffs have sovereign immunity even when sued individually for malicious acts, and that McMillian's claims do not fit within specified exceptions. However, Alabama appellate court decisions show a lack of consensus on this issue, with some rulings supporting Tate's stance while others indicate that state officials can be liable for willful or malicious actions.
The state is immune from being sued when impleaded as a defendant, but this immunity does not extend to the governor, commissioner of conservation, or state highway director when allegations involve fraudulent actions, bad faith, actions beyond their authority, or misinterpretation of the law. Relevant cases illustrate that state officers or agents are not automatically shielded from individual civil liability. For example, in DeStafney v. University of Alabama, the sovereign immunity defense did not protect an employee whose actions led to a tort claim. Similarly, Lumpkin v. Cofield clarifies that sovereign immunity does not prevent lawsuits against state officers for willful or malicious torts outside their authority.
However, the ruling in Tinney v. Shores established that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are immune from claims based on intentional torts under Alabama law, complicating the interpretation of their individual capacity claims. The court noted that federal law determines if the state is the real party-in-interest, and under federal standards, the claim in Tinney was not against the state. Despite any ambiguity in Tinney's language, the ruling is clear: claims against Alabama sheriffs in their individual capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. The court reversed the district court's denial of the sovereign immunity defense in a case involving claims against Tate, Ikner, and Benson.
The district court's decision to deny summary judgment regarding the alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence was vacated for a reassessment based on the perspective of reasonable officials. The court also reversed the district court's ruling on Tate's alleged threats against Kelly while affirming other aspects. Judge Propst concurred in part and dissented in part, particularly regarding the assessment of evidence materiality. The opinion and concurrence are published as 101 F.3d 1363.
Honorable Robert B. Propst, U.S. District Judge, addresses McMillian's interlocutory appeal regarding the dismissal of Monroe County from the lawsuit. The district court referred to both exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence, as mandated by Brady v. Maryland. However, the court misinterpreted Kelly's statement, which pertained to the Pittman murder rather than the Morrison murder. Tate, Ikner, and Benson claim quasi-judicial and quasi-prosecutorial immunity concerning McMillian's due process rights and allegations of withholding exculpatory evidence. These claims are deemed meritless. Furthermore, the district court's denial of summary judgment on state law tort claims (malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and outrage) is also challenged by the defendants without substantial argument. The court finds that Tate, Ikner, and Benson were performing discretionary functions during the relevant times. A significant error was noted in the district court's finding of Karen Kelly's statement, which was based on a misreading, and this error is corrected. The court also dismisses Ikner and Benson's argument that they had no role in McMillian's death row placement, noting a genuine issue exists regarding their potential conspiracy to place him there. Tate's assertion that death row confinement is no worse than local jail confinement is criticized as frivolous. The legitimacy of conditions of confinement is relevant to determining whether they serve a legitimate governmental purpose or are punitive. Defendants may present their case at trial, but cannot achieve summary judgment when a genuine issue remains regarding the motivation behind McMillian's transfer to death row.
In Siegert v. Gilley, the court acknowledges established precedent on qualified immunity and the standards for summary judgment, confirming that the defendants—Tate, Ikner, and Benson—did not challenge the correctness of the district court's summary judgment standard regarding McMillian's evidence. The court refrains from discussing the required evidence of intent to overcome a qualified immunity defense. While Tate does not dispute the possibility of asserting a Brady violation claim under § 1983, the court notes that other circuits have allowed such claims, affirming that § 1983 can provide a remedy for violations of due process rights related to the withholding of exculpatory evidence. The Second Circuit's rationale is highlighted, emphasizing the prosecutor's role in determining Brady material disclosure, which avoids confusion and recognizes the prosecutor as the defendant's primary point of contact. Additionally, Ikner and Benson contest the district court's finding of a genuine issue regarding their intent to withhold evidence but the appellate court limits its review to the factual rulings of the district court. They also argue that McMillian's attorneys would have pursued the necessary evidence through discovery in related cases.
The district court indicated that evidence exists suggesting Ikner and Benson concealed information from McMillian, as they placed it in the Pittman file. Geter's case does not establish a clear duty for Tate, Ikner, and Benson to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor, due to it being decided in a different circuit. Precedents from the former Fifth Circuit, which are binding, affirm that police can violate Brady by withholding significant evidence. Several cases support the notion that police have an obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence, though Tate, Ikner, and Benson do not argue that their responsibilities under Brady were unclear. The district court referred to "clearly exculpatory" evidence in the context of both exculpatory and impeachment evidence under Brady. The timeline of when McMillian believes the officers should have recognized the materiality of the withheld evidence is ambiguous, necessitating clarification from the district court on remand. Tate's claims regarding the standard for the "knowing use of perjured testimony" in criminal cases are countered by existing case law, which establishes the necessary legal standards. The court has jurisdiction over the appeal concerning state law immunity, with Tate asserting that a sheriff is immune from suit when executing official duties, except in specified circumstances, including actions to compel the performance of duties or to address misconduct.
