Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 9, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiff Kimberly Buckmaster appeals the district court’s remand of her application for Social Security disability benefits to the Commissioner for further review, seeking a reversal of the order and a grant of benefits. Buckmaster, a male-to-female transsexual, claims disability due to psychological disorders. Her application was initially denied and remained so after reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Buckmaster was not disabled, a decision upheld by the Appeals Council and later by the district court, except for the failure to consider Dr. Sally J. Grosscup’s diagnosis of major depressive disorder. The district court remanded for reconsideration of Dr. Grosscup’s findings.
On appeal, Buckmaster argues that the ALJ did not adequately address the medical opinions of Drs. Grosscup, Kurlycheck, and Rogers, and misapplied disability duration requirements. The standard for rejecting a treating physician’s uncontradicted opinion requires "clear and convincing" reasons, or "specific and legitimate" reasons if contradicted by another opinion. If the ALJ fails to provide adequate justification for rejecting a medical opinion, it must be credited as true.
Dr. Grosscup diagnosed Buckmaster with major depressive disorder, transvestite fetish, and schizotypal personality disorder, asserting she cannot maintain normal employment due to severe discomfort and bizarre presentation. The ALJ’s rejection of Grosscup's opinion was found to be legally erroneous, warranting acceptance of Grosscup’s conclusions on remand.
Dr. Diane E. Rogers, Buckmaster’s treating psychologist, diagnosed her with a personality disorder, major depression, anxiety disorder, and gender identity disorder, asserting that Buckmaster had been disabled throughout her treatment period. As Rogers is a treating physician, her opinion can only be dismissed for "clear and convincing" reasons, which must be demonstrated by the ALJ.
The ALJ rejected Dr. Rogers’ opinion based on two main points: inconsistency with her counseling records and mischaracterization of Dr. Kurlycheck’s findings. The ALJ claimed Dr. Rogers' February 20, 1997 letter was inconsistent with her May 16, 1996 mental status report, which noted Buckmaster's capabilities but also highlighted significant mental health issues. However, no actual inconsistency exists between these documents. The ALJ also asserted that Dr. Rogers misrepresented Dr. Kurlycheck’s diagnosis of major depression, though Dr. Rogers only concurred with Dr. Kurlycheck’s overall conclusions, listing major depression among her separate diagnoses. The ALJ did not provide sufficient justification for rejecting Dr. Rogers’ opinion; therefore, it must be accepted as true upon remand.
Dr. Kurlycheck diagnosed Buckmaster with several disorders and noted marked limitations in her ability to work and interact with others. While the ALJ acknowledged Kurlycheck’s opinion regarding Buckmaster’s compromised employment capabilities, the ALJ failed to incorporate Kurlycheck’s assessments into the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert, thereby overlooking his findings without explanation. As the ALJ did not give clear reasons for disregarding Kurlycheck’s opinion, this too must be credited upon remand.
Regarding the durational requirement for disability, the ALJ concluded that Buckmaster did not meet the criterion of having limitations for a continuous 12-month period. This conclusion misapplied the law, as the requirement can be satisfied if a disability is expected to last for 12 continuous months, regardless of prior duration. The ALJ also overlooked the opinions of Drs. Grosscup, Kurlycheck, and Rogers, all of whom indicated that Buckmaster’s limitations had lasted or were expected to last for at least 12 continuous months.
The ALJ misapplied the legal standard by disregarding the medical opinions of Drs. Grosscup, Kurlycheck, and Rogers without providing clear and convincing reasons, leading to a remand with instructions to accept those opinions and determine that Buckmaster meets the 12-month durational requirement. Buckmaster's argument regarding the legal deficiencies in the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert is upheld, as these questions failed to incorporate significant limitations identified by Drs. Grosscup and Kurlycheck, such as issues with coordination, work consistency, public interaction, and maintaining appropriate behavior. On remand, the ALJ must include these limitations in questioning the vocational expert.
Although Buckmaster sought an immediate payment of benefits due to the ALJ's errors, the request was denied because the record does not conclusively show that Buckmaster is entitled to benefits if the discredited evidence were credited. The criteria for immediate benefits were not fully met, particularly regarding unresolved issues that must be addressed. Thus, the case is remanded for further proceedings rather than for immediate benefits, with Buckmaster entitled to recover costs on appeal. The district court judge has adopted the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. This decision is not to be published or cited except as allowed by the Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
