State ex rel. Secretary of Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services v. Cook

Citations: 29 Kan. App. 2d 292; 26 P.3d 76; 2001 Kan. App. LEXIS 546Docket: No. 85,478

Court: Court of Appeals of Kansas; June 15, 2001; Kansas; State Appellate Court

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Willie Cook appeals a district court order requiring him to repay $3,453.80 to the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) for assistance provided to his minor child, D.C. The central issue on appeal is whether Cook was denied due process when the district court declined to consider his equitable defenses related to his age, life circumstances, and financial inability to pay. The appellate court reverses the decision and remands for further evaluation of these defenses based on the evidentiary transcript from the January 6, 2000 hearing.

The facts are largely undisputed: Cook was 16 when D.C. was born, and SRS provided aid totaling $2,177.99 and medical expenses of $2,875.29 for D.C. SRS sought repayment under K.S.A. 39-718b. An expedited hearing led to a judgment against Cook, but the hearing officer reduced the amount due and stated that Cook's circumstances could not be considered in the judgment. The district court upheld this decision, referencing a prior ruling that equitable defenses cannot be considered in K.S.A. 39-718b proceedings.

The statute, K.S.A. 39-718b, establishes that a parent is liable to repay any assistance provided for their child, and the appellate court highlighted that interpreting this statute is a question of law subject to unlimited review. The court emphasized the duty to uphold the constitutionality of the statute, referencing its enactment in 1988 and its similarity to a previous statute. The case raises significant questions about the rights of obligors to present equitable defenses in repayment actions.

The Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Secretary of SRS v. Castro, 235 Kan. 704 (1984), examined the constitutionality of K.S.A. 39-718a. Chief Justice Prager articulated that once child support rights are assigned to the Secretary of SRS, any subsequent civil action to recover those payments from the absent parent reflects the original cause of action held by the custodial parent. Consequently, the absent parent may assert any defenses available against the initial claim in actions initiated by SRS.

The court addressed a due process challenge raised by the absent parent, asserting that K.S.A. 39-718a violated his rights by allowing recovery without a hearing or consideration of his financial circumstances. The court upheld the trial court's ruling that the absent parent could present defenses in the SRS action, ensuring a full hearing before any judgment against him.

The ruling established that in actions under K.S.A. 39-718b, defendants must be given the opportunity to assert defenses analogous to those in actions brought by custodial parents. The court rejected the lower court's reliance on Morgan, which incorrectly limited the absent parent's liability, clarifying that K.S.A. 39-718b allows for joint and several liability.

Cook's argument that the 1998 Kansas Child Support Guidelines should apply was also dismissed, as the action under K.S.A. 39-718b pertains to recovering public assistance, not establishing child support. The court noted the confusion regarding the hearing officer's decision to allow SRS to recover only half of the medical reimbursement, which appeared inconsistent with K.S.A. 39-718b and the ruling in Morgan. The case was reversed and remanded, allowing the district court to consider the reduced medical reimbursement in its decision on further relief for Cook.