Court: Court of Appeals of Kansas; December 7, 1995; Kansas; State Appellate Court
Carlyle Walton, the natural father of five children (R.C., D.C., M.C., S.C., and C.C.), appeals the district court's denial of his custody motion, arguing that the trial court improperly prioritized the best interests of the child over the parental preference doctrine in a child in need of care case. The court upheld the denial. Carlyle and Viola, the children's mother, married in 1978 and separated in 1989, with the children remaining in Viola's custody until court intervention in 1990. The court declared R.C. a child in need of care due to allegations of abuse by a man living with Viola. The paternal grandparents received temporary custody of R.C. and later of the other children after the court found them also to be in need of care due to inadequate parental support. Both Carlyle and Viola acknowledged the children's needs. The court mandated that the children stay with their grandparents, agreeing it was in their best interests. A court services officer was directed to create a reintegration plan, which required the parents to complete parenting classes, counseling, obtain employment, and provide a safe home. By 1992, the court determined that neither parent could care for the children. Viola was granted limited visitation, which was later restricted due to her boyfriend's allegations of involvement in another child's abuse.
On December 15, 1993, Carlyle filed a motion to gain custody of his five minor children, stating he had never voluntarily surrendered custody, had not been deemed unfit, and aimed to reintegrate the children into the family. He criticized Viola for her negligence regarding the children's interests, highlighted his consistent visitation since April 1990, and noted their completion of parenting and anger management programs. He also affirmed his employment and housing suitability for the children's care.
During the March 8, 1994, hearing, the court reviewed evidence regarding the children's best interests, including testimonies from Carlyle, the paternal grandmother, social workers, and teachers. The court decided to continue proceedings to assess a home study and evaluations. On March 17, 1994, the court ruled that the hearing functioned as a review under K.S.A. 38-1565b and acknowledged prior findings of parental unfitness, deeming the original reintegration goals unviable, thereby favoring long-term foster care with the grandparents.
Carlyle contested the ruling, referencing the Kansas Supreme Court case In re Guardianship of Williams, arguing that it established a parental preference doctrine for custody disputes involving non-unfit parents against nonparents. He asserted that the court misinterpreted findings of unfitness and failed to apply the criteria per K.S.A. 38-1585, claiming the foster care placement effectively terminated his parental rights without due process. Conversely, the guardian ad litem and the State maintained that the child's best interests supersede other considerations in cases of need for care, distinguishing Williams as applicable only in domestic settings and asserting that exceptional circumstances justified disregarding the parental preference doctrine. The district court's prioritization of the children's best interests over parental rights was deemed a legal conclusion.
The court has unlimited authority to review legal conclusions. The parental preference doctrine, as established in Christlieb v. Christlieb, asserts that a parent able and willing to care for their child, who has not been deemed unfit, is entitled to custody over non-parents, including grandparents, even if those non-parents have provided suitable care. The balancing of parental rights with the child’s best interests is emphasized, with the state's role in protecting children highlighted. While the best interests of the child are paramount, parental rights are also considered, though they must yield when in conflict with the child's welfare.
In Carlyle's case, the parental preference doctrine is claimed to apply, referencing Williams, where a mother's petition to terminate a guardianship was contested by the guardian on the basis of the child's best interests. The trial court ruled that the mother needed to prove the change would materially benefit the child, relying on In re Marriage of Criqui. However, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed this decision, reaffirming the parental preference doctrine and overruling Criqui, stating that the doctrine should apply unless extraordinary circumstances exist, and that the best interests standard applies in disputes between parents.
The guardian ad litem and the State reference the court's decision in *In re Baby Boy N.*, which addresses the termination of parental rights despite the natural father's objections. The court evaluated K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 59-2136(h)(4) and (5), which permits termination for a father's failure to support the mother during the six months before the child's birth or for abandoning her upon learning of the pregnancy. The father contended that his parental rights were terminated without a determination of unfitness. The court noted that prior cases, *In re Guardianship of* Williams and *Sheppard v. Sheppard*, require a finding of unfitness before custody can be denied to a parent in favor of a nonparent. However, the court clarified that the parental preference doctrine does not need to apply in every case involving disputes between natural parents and third parties, particularly in adoption contexts where consent may not be required. The *Baby Boy N.* decision restricts the application of the parental preference doctrine, asserting it is preempted by statutes like 59-2136(h) that safeguard due process rights and necessitate a "clear and convincing" burden of proof for terminating parental rights.
The court distinguished the *Williams* case, noting it primarily concerns voluntary custody agreements and is not applicable when children are involuntarily removed and deemed in need of care. In such circumstances, the children's best interests take precedence. Carlyle’s children have been adjudicated as children in need of care, implying his current unfitness for custody, but this does not automatically equate to a termination of parental rights as required under K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 38-1583. The court emphasized that ordering long-term foster care does not terminate parental rights without necessary findings. Lastly, it was noted that Carlyle has been involved in proceedings and acknowledged the children’s need for care, with the court previously finding both parents incapable of caring for the children.
The trial court determined that the Williams case and the parental preference doctrine do not apply under the Kansas Code for Care of Children (K.S.A. 38-1501 et seq.). Although Carlyle sought custody, the court viewed the hearing as a review of the reintegration plan, emphasizing that the real test for custody decisions is the best interests of the children rather than parental preference. The court acknowledged findings of parental unfitness throughout the case, distinguishing between levels of unfitness: a lower standard for preventing custody changes and a higher standard for terminating parental rights.
In termination proceedings, the court must establish unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, indicating a parent's inability to care for the child, which is unlikely to change soon. The finding that a child is in need of care implies parental unfitness, as it encompasses traits associated with being unfit. The Supreme Court has defined 'unfit' as unsuitable or incompetent in the parental role, encompassing behaviors such as cruelty, neglect, abandonment, and incapacity to fulfill parental obligations. The Kansas Code outlines 12 circumstances under which a child can be deemed 'in need of care,' reinforcing the connection between a child's status and parental unfitness.
The excerpt outlines the definition of a "child in need of care," encompassing three criteria: lack of adequate parental care not solely due to financial means, absence of necessary care for the child's well-being, and instances of abuse or neglect. It references the legal precedent set in Williams, which emphasizes parental preference except in extraordinary circumstances, arguing that the adjudication of the children as in need of care constitutes such circumstances, prioritizing the children's best interests. The guardian ad litem presents evidence indicating the father's, Carlyle's, violent history, his potential inability to care for a household of seven children—including his wife with psychosocial issues and two developmentally disabled children—supports this claim. The guardian argues that the children's welfare would be adversely affected if custody were granted to Carlyle. The case of In re Shelton is referenced to illustrate a previous application of the parental preference doctrine within a child in need of care context, highlighting the serious repercussions of neglect and abuse, as demonstrated by a child's experience of being burned and subsequently removed from parental custody.
SRS notified the foster family about the plan to return the child to his mother. In response, the foster family filed a motion to intervene and sought a hearing to assess the child's best interests. The court established that the foster parents had standing and examined the mother's claim regarding the parental preference doctrine. While acknowledging the general preference for keeping children with their natural parents, the court emphasized that this preference does not override the state's primary obligation to prioritize the child's welfare. The ruling in Shelton affirmed that the best interests of children take precedence over parental preference in cases adjudicated as children in need of care. The court found that the Williams case was not applicable, as it presupposed parental unfitness in such proceedings, a point not contested by Carlyle. The court also noted that Carlyle did not challenge the evidence supporting the district court's determination that the children were in need of care. The review standard focused on whether substantial competent evidence existed for the ruling, and the court confirmed that sufficient evidence was presented during the hearing on March 8, 1994, leading to the affirmation of the trial court’s decision.
