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Jordan v. Olsten Corp.
Citation: 25 F. App'x 45Docket: Docket No. 00-9222
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 19, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York is affirmed in the case of Angela Jordan, who alleged racial discrimination under Title VII after being fired by Olsten Corporation and Olsten Health Services. The district court found that Jordan established a prima facie case of discrimination, which Olsten did not dispute for the purposes of summary judgment. Olsten provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Jordan's termination, stating that she was fired for allegedly disclosing salary information of other employees. The court concluded that Jordan failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Olsten's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. On appeal, Jordan contends that the district court ignored evidence of discriminatory animus from Mary Martha Russell, a subordinate to the local branch director, Joyce Markiewicz. Jordan asserted that Russell's remarks and behavior indicated bias against her as an African American, but the court found that the evidence presented was ambiguous and did not establish a clear discriminatory motive. Additionally, Jordan could not prove that Russell played a significant role in the decision to terminate her, as Markiewicz was identified as the primary decision-maker. The court emphasized that a combination of a prima facie case and evidence disproving the employer’s justification could allow for a finding of unlawful discrimination. However, Jordan's claims did not meet this threshold, leading to the affirmation of the summary judgment in favor of Olsten. Markiewicz asserted that her decision to terminate Jordan was made independently and prior to any meeting. Jordan acknowledged that only Markiewicz had the authority to fire her and that Markiewicz signed the termination slip. Jordan's claim that Russell influenced Markiewicz to terminate her for racial reasons was deemed speculative and insufficient to counter Olsten's motion for summary judgment, as per Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1999). The non-moving party in a summary judgment cannot rely on mere speculation or conclusory allegations but must provide evidence to substantiate their claims. Additionally, Jordan's assertion that her termination was based on weak evidence did not establish a fact issue regarding pretext or discrimination. Evidence showed Markiewicz acted upon advice regarding Jordan's discussions of salary confidentiality, which were mostly accurate except for her own salary. Markiewicz also interviewed at least one employee who corroborated the initial report. Even if Markiewicz's investigation had flaws, there was no indication of pretext or discriminatory intent. Furthermore, Jordan did not provide evidence that progressive discipline was a standard procedure for her violations. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Jordan did not create a factual issue regarding pretext or discriminatory motive. Markiewicz's salary information was not stored on the premises.