United States v. Depace

Citations: 120 F.3d 233; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22640; 1997 WL 450144Docket: 94-4854, 94-5308

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; August 25, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Steven and Carlton DePace appeal their convictions on guilty pleas for using and carrying a handgun during a drug trafficking crime, arguing that their pleas were not knowing and intelligent due to the district court's failure to adequately inform them of the charge's nature as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c). They also contend that the court's inquiry into the factual basis of their pleas was insufficient under Rule 11(f). Additionally, both appellants and the government acknowledge that the district court violated due process by imposing an upward sentencing departure without prior notice, contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Burns v. United States. Consequently, while the court affirms the convictions, it vacates the sentences and remands for resentencing.

The case stems from an attempted theft of marijuana from undercover DEA agents, where the DePace brothers and co-defendants engaged in a scheme involving deception and force. Steven DePace answered the door to the agents and allowed them entry, while his co-defendants, posing as law enforcement, attempted to subdue one of the agents. Carlton DePace was arrested in a van outside, where he admitted to acting as a lookout. The court also addresses the appellants' argument that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) unconstitutionally regulates intrastate, non-economic activity, aligning with other circuits that have rejected this claim.

An appellate court reviews the entire record of a Rule 11 hearing, applying the clearly erroneous standard to the district court's implicit factual findings regarding the acceptance of guilty pleas. Rule 11(c)(1) mandates that the district court conduct a thorough inquiry into the voluntariness of a defendant's plea, focusing on three key concerns: (1) absence of coercion, (2) understanding of the charges, and (3) awareness of the plea's consequences. If any of these are not adequately addressed, it results in automatic reversal. In this case, appellants contended that the district court failed to ensure they understood the charge of using and carrying a handgun during a drug trafficking crime. Although the appellants did not personally possess handguns, they were charged with aiding and abetting co-defendants who did. The government argued that the plea colloquy met Rule 11 requirements and claimed any violation was harmless. The district court had confirmed the appellants' educational backgrounds, ensuring they were capable of understanding the charges, and verified their receipt and comprehension of the indictment and plea agreement. However, the court did not explicitly discuss the aiding and abetting theory linking the appellants to the firearms, which was not a necessary element of the offense in this case. Ultimately, the court's verification of the DePaces' understanding of the charges was deemed sufficient, despite the lack of detailed discussion on aiding and abetting liability.

The inquiry into a defendant's understanding of charges varies based on the complexity of the charges and the defendant's sophistication. For simple charges, reading the indictment and allowing questions is often sufficient, while more complex charges may require detailed explanations, including elements akin to jury instructions. The charge of using and carrying a handgun during drug trafficking is typically straightforward for individuals of the DePaces' intelligence. 

In Steven's case, the aiding and abetting theory does not substantially complicate the charge; his actions—opening a hotel room door for a DEA agent and observing an assault—are easily understood. Thus, the district court's finding that he comprehended the charges is upheld. 

Conversely, Carlton's situation is more complex since he was outside during the assault with no direct link to the firearms. The aiding and abetting concept may not be clear to a layperson without explanation. However, the district court concluded that Carlton understood the charges, supported by his high school graduation, college credits, review of the indictment, and counsel's confirmation. Carlton expressed no confusion or objections during proceedings. Although a brief explanation of aiding and abetting would have been ideal, its absence did not undermine the validity of his guilty plea acceptance.

The district court's finding that Carlton understood the charges against him was upheld as not clearly erroneous. The DePace brothers did not demonstrate any lack of understanding regarding the charges. They argued that the court failed to establish a factual basis for their guilty pleas, claiming the government’s proffer did not prove their guilt for aiding and abetting the use of firearms in connection with drug trafficking. The court clarified that to establish guilt by aiding and abetting, it must be shown that an offense was committed, the defendants contributed to it, and they intended to assist in its commission. The DePaces’ presence at the crime scene and their involvement in the division of labor among co-defendants were sufficient to demonstrate their contribution to the offense, affirming the factual basis for their guilty pleas. Additionally, the court found that the district court's upward sentencing departure was unconstitutional due to lack of notice, agreeing with the appellants on this point. Consequently, the convictions of Steven and Carlton DePace were affirmed, their sentences vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court's ruling in Bailey v. U.S. clarified that "use" of a firearm involves active employment, which was met by the actions of the DePaces’ co-defendants, and did not restrict aiding and abetting liability, thus providing no support for the DePaces’ claims about the sufficiency of the factual basis for their pleas.