Kelly Thomason Randy Thomason v. Scan Volunteer Services, Inc. Lynn Sims, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as County Director of Scan Volunteer Services, Inc. Geneva Wordlaw, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as a Case Worker for Scan Volunteer Service, Inc. Dr. Russell Steele

Citations: 85 F.3d 1365; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 13795Docket: 95-1908

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; June 11, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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Kelly and Randy Thomason appeal a judgment from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which dismissed their due process claim against SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., and its employees, Lynn Sims and Geneva Wordlaw, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Thomasons argue that the district court incorrectly determined that their constitutional rights were not violated and that even if a violation occurred, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit, consisting of Judges McMillian, Floyd R. Gibson, and Loken, reviewed the case. SCAN, a not-for-profit organization, had the authority under Arkansas law to investigate child abuse allegations, refer cases to the prosecutor, remove children from suspected abusive situations, and seek protective custody through the Juvenile Court. On December 19, 1990, SCAN’s director received documents about the Thomasons' eight-month-old son, Anthony, from the Arkansas Department of Human Services. These documents, faxed from Dr. William R. Collie, included letters and an article discussing Munchausen by Proxy syndrome, which involves parents inflicting harm on their children to gain attention. The court ultimately affirmed the dismissal of the claim based on the reasons articulated in its decision.

Dr. DiSessa's December 14, 1990, letter details his treatment of Anthony, who was referred to him for a second opinion after being treated for tachycardia at Little Rock Children's Hospital. Anthony's mother, Thomason, reported episodes of apnea and recurrent symptoms including paleness and sweating, prompting Anthony's hospitalization from November 5 to November 9, 1990, during which no concerning symptoms were observed. Following discharge, Thomason reported eight separate events to Dr. DiSessa, with an event recorder showing normal heart rates without arrhythmias.

On December 13, Thomason called with renewed concerns about Anthony's fast heart rate and a severe apnea episode that occurred a week to ten days prior, which she did not seek medical attention for. This lack of action raised alarms for Dr. DiSessa and other physicians, who described Thomason as dysfunctional. Dr. DiSessa expressed concern that Anthony might be at risk for suffocation incidents similar to those reported in a medical journal involving infants experiencing recurrent apnea and sudden infant death. He recommended that the case be referred to Arkansas Social Services for investigation.

Goin’s deposition indicated that during a call with Wilfong, she filled out a child abuse reporting form, stating Dr. DiSessa reported suspicions of Thomason intermittently smothering the baby. Consequently, SCAN personnel decided to remove Anthony from the home for a medical evaluation, assigning Wordlaw to carry out the task with limited information about the case. Wordlaw was instructed to proceed to the plaintiffs' home immediately.

Wordlaw, an evaluator from the Pulaski County SCAN office, visited Thomason's home following a report alleging that her child, Anthony, was being smothered and that Thomason was the perpetrator. Upset by the accusation, Thomason contacted her mother-in-law. Wordlaw then informed Thomason that SCAN decided to take Anthony to Arkansas Children's Hospital. Two days later, SCAN submitted an ex parte application to the Pulaski County Chancery Court, including an affidavit by Wordlaw, which asserted that medical records indicated Anthony showed signs of "intermittent smothering." The court issued an ex parte order removing Anthony from his parents' custody and placing him in protective custody. Anthony remained in state custody until a hearing on January 2, 1991, during which the court quashed the order and returned him to his parents under specific conditions, including further hospitalization and counseling for Thomason. On January 29, 1991, the court dismissed SCAN's petition due to insufficient evidence of abuse. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming their substantive due process rights were violated by Anthony's removal and their separation from him. They sued SCAN, Wordlaw, and Sims in both individual and official capacities, also asserting a state tort claim. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that their actions did not constitute state action under § 1983 and that they were immune from suit. The district court granted the motion, concluding that even if there was state action, there was no deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, and the defendants were likely protected by qualified immunity. The court subsequently entered judgment for the defendants, prompting the plaintiffs to appeal.

Summary judgment is reviewed de novo, focusing on whether the evidence, viewed favorably for the non-moving party, shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, the district court determined that the plaintiffs were not deprived of their constitutional rights, leading to no liability for SCAN or its employees. Specifically regarding defendant Lynn Sims, who was sued both individually and in her official capacity, the plaintiffs failed to present any specific facts indicating that she was involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Her name was not included in the plaintiffs' statement of facts on appeal, and there was no evidence to suggest her direct involvement or supervisory knowledge of any unlawful conduct. As a result, the district court's grant of summary judgment in her favor was upheld. 

The analysis continued with the claims against SCAN and Wordlaw, referencing the established constitutional rights of parents regarding the care and custody of their children. While this right is recognized, it is not absolute and can be limited by the government's compelling interest in protecting minor children, particularly when necessary against parental actions.

The First Circuit has established that the constitutional right to family integrity does not encompass immunity from child abuse investigations. This necessitates a balancing test weighing parental rights against the interests of the child and the state, complicating the qualified immunity defense. Moreover, the requirement for a clearly established right at the time of the alleged violation poses significant challenges. While the court acknowledges that parents may hold some substantive due process rights in child abuse investigations, defining those rights remains problematic. 

In child abuse cases, the interplay between constitutional violation analysis and the assessment of clearly established rights is intricate. Precedent indicates that state officials conducting child abuse investigations are entitled to qualified immunity when actions are based on reasonable suspicion of abuse. In this instance, Dr. DiSessa expressed a suspicion of life-threatening child abuse based on circumstantial evidence, including Anthony’s medical history and concerns raised by other physicians. The defendants could reasonably view Dr. DiSessa as credible and knowledgeable, bolstered by a relevant medical journal article.

The central issue is whether the defendants' actions, resulting in disruption of the familial relationship, constituted a constitutional deprivation. Evidence suggests that, after receiving a call and documentation from Dr. DiSessa, Wordlaw, following instructions, proceeded to the plaintiffs' home intending to remove Anthony without verification from the doctors or reviewing existing evidence. Wordlaw inaccurately informed Thomason of a report alleging she was smothering her child, raising questions about the proportionality of the response to the suspicion of abuse.

Wordlaw obtained an ex parte protective custody order from state court, supported by an affidavit that misrepresented Dr. DiSessa's letters and overstated evidence of abuse. Despite acknowledging that the plaintiffs were justified in their concerns about the adequacy of the investigation and Wordlaw's professionalism, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not violated by the removal of their eight-month-old child, Anthony. The court applied a balancing test between the parents' right to familial integrity and the state's interest in protecting the child from a potentially abusive environment. It emphasized the critical nature of parental rights but concluded that when a physician reasonably suspects life-threatening abuse, the state's duty to protect the child supersedes parental interests.

Additionally, Wordlaw and SCAN were found to be absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their actions related to the protective custody proceedings, equating Wordlaw's role to that of a prosecutor, which grants them immunity for initiating neglect proceedings. Furthermore, any potentially false statements made by Wordlaw in her affidavit were protected by absolute witness immunity, preventing claims based on alleged perjury or misrepresentation in her testimony. The court's decision is limited to the specific facts of this case, highlighting the importance of protecting children while also cautioning against excessive intervention that could deter parents from seeking medical help.

The district court's judgment is affirmed. The defendants claim that Thomason consented to the removal of her child, Anthony, based on Wordlaw's deposition, which suggested Thomason was in agreement when informed about taking the child to the hospital. They also noted that Thomason provided a car seat to Wordlaw. However, the court found that defendants did not conclusively demonstrate that Thomason voluntarily consented to the removal. Evidence indicated that Wordlaw did not give Thomason an option regarding the child's removal. Thomason's insistence on a car seat does not imply consent, as Wordlaw had already decided to take the child to the hospital upon arriving at Thomason's home. Additionally, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against three doctors without prejudice, and the plaintiffs did not appeal that decision. The court also referenced a letter from Dr. DiSessa, indicating he sent evaluation traces to Dr. Paul Gillett, suggesting that SCAN personnel could have contacted Dr. DiSessa for further information regarding Dr. Gillett's opinion.

The affidavit indicates that multiple medical professionals believed Anthony Thomason exhibited signs of "intermittent smothering." Defendants assert that by the time the affidavit was created on December 21, the Children At Risk team from Arkansas Children's Hospital supported this view, suggesting a reasonable belief that Anthony was being smothered and that his mother, Mrs. Thomason, might have Munchausen by Proxy. 

However, deposition testimony from Andrea Goin reveals that no doctor definitively stated that Mrs. Thomason was smothering the child. Goin recalled that the doctors agreed the only way to confirm such behavior would be to observe the child in a neutral setting. She noted that while the potential for Munchausen by Proxy was discussed, no doctor explicitly offered a medical opinion confirming it. 

Additionally, the document addresses the legal protection of Wordlaw under qualified immunity regarding the decision to remove Anthony from the plaintiffs' home, referencing the case Myers v. Morris. The court in that case affirmed that officials acting on a reasonable belief of endangerment to children are not required to wait for further investigation before taking action.