United States v. Wayne Robert Haggerty, Also Known as Robert Wayne Haggarty, Also Known as Travis Cody
Docket: 95-3684
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 15, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Wayne Robert Haggerty, a Canadian citizen, appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment for illegal reentry into the United States after deportation due to a prior aggravated felony, specifically the possession of methamphetamine. Following a series of drug-related convictions in California in 1994, Haggerty was deported on November 17, 1994. He reentered the U.S. on December 31, 1994, without permission and was subsequently arrested in South Dakota. The indictment charged him with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and § 1326(b)(2), citing his prior felony conviction.
Haggerty argued that the indictment was invalid because it did not mention a prior conviction from January 26, 1994. However, the magistrate judge found that the June 29, 1994, conviction constituted an aggravated felony, and the omission of the earlier conviction did not render the indictment fatally flawed. The district court adopted this recommendation, denied Haggerty’s motion to dismiss, and he entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal. Ultimately, the court upheld the validity of the indictment, affirming that the requirement to allege a prior aggravated felony under § 1326(b)(2) was not necessary for the indictment’s validity. Haggerty was sentenced to 66 months in prison and two years of supervised release.
Section 1326 of Title 8 outlines the legal repercussions for aliens who reenter the United States after being deported. Subsection (a) establishes that any deported alien who reenters, attempts to enter, or is found in the U.S. can face penalties of up to two years in prison, a fine, or both. Subsection (b) escalates the penalties for aliens deported following a conviction for an aggravated felony, allowing for imprisonment of up to 20 years, a fine, or both.
A key legal question arises regarding whether a prior aggravated felony conviction is an element of subsection (b) or merely a condition for enhanced penalties. Courts in various circuits have debated this issue. Most have concluded that subsection (b) serves as a sentence enhancement rather than a separate offense, based on the statute's language and structure. This interpretation suggests that subsection (b) identifies a specific group of offenders (those with aggravated felony convictions) for harsher punishment without constituting a distinct crime. The Ninth Circuit is an exception, viewing it as a separate offense based on its comparison to other statutes.
Ultimately, the consensus among the circuits that have addressed the matter is that Section 1326(b) functions as a sentence enhancement, as it relies on the underlying offense defined in subsection (a) for its applicability.
Subsection (b) is characterized as a sentence-enhancement provision, as it explicitly references convictions under subsection (a), links its penalties directly to those in subsection (a), and is titled as a sentencing provision. The absence of sentencing hearing guidelines does not diminish its classification as such. Consequently, since subsection (b)(2) specifies an enhancement rather than a distinct offense, the indictment against Haggerty did not require a charge for an aggravated felony. Haggerty argues his prior conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony under section 1326(b)(2), which defines an 'aggravated felony' to include illicit trafficking in controlled substances under both federal and state law. Haggerty concedes that his conviction falls under the Controlled Substances Act, which categorizes it as a felony, meeting the criteria that (1) it is punishable under the Act and (2) is classified as a felony. Under federal law, a felony is defined as an offense punishable by more than one year. Haggerty's conviction, being punishable as a felony due to prior drug convictions, aligns with this definition. Additionally, under California law, possession of methamphetamine is also classified as a felony, as it is punishable by imprisonment in state prison for various terms. Haggerty contends that his second California conviction should be considered a misdemeanor due to a suspended imposition of sentence. However, California Penal Code section 17(b) indicates that a conviction is treated as a misdemeanor if the court opts for a non-imprisonment sentence or grants probation without imposing a sentence at that time.
Haggerty fails to satisfy the criteria outlined in the relevant legal subsections. He does not fulfill subsection (1) since an order granting probation is not considered a judgment, as established in United States v. Robinson and People v. Smith. Additionally, he does not meet subsection (3) because the California court has not classified his conviction as a misdemeanor. California courts view offenses punishable as either felonies or misdemeanors as felonies until judgment, as demonstrated in People v. Banks. Consequently, Haggerty's conviction from June 29, 1994, is classified as a felony under California law. There is no justification for Haggerty's claim that the California court must revoke his probation prior to facing federal charges. Haggerty's reference to Taylor v. United States, asserting that state laws are arbitrary for interpreting federal statutes, is irrelevant as his conviction qualifies as a felony under both state and federal law. The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
