Smith v. Elo

Citation: 23 F. App'x 310Docket: No. 99-2078

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; October 5, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Petitioner-Appellant Roy Lee Smith, a Michigan inmate representing himself, appeals the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition and requests appellate counsel. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on whether Smith's rights under Article 111(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) were violated when Michigan officials failed to notify him of a detainer while he was incarcerated in Florida. The court concluded that Smith did not demonstrate that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, resulting in an affirmation of the district court's judgment.

The district court outlined the case background: Smith was charged on May 13, 1991, with first-degree criminal sexual conduct and unarmed robbery. He was bound over to trial but failed to appear at a pretrial conference, leading to a bench warrant. Smith was later detained in Florida on a larceny conviction, which resulted in a probation violation. During his detention, communications between Florida and Michigan officials occurred regarding his status. In April 1992, it was reported that Smith refused extradition. Governor Engler issued a Requisition for Rendition in May 1992, which was processed in June. Smith requested information on his Michigan charges in August, only to be told no detainer had been placed. Subsequently, a detainer was requested in late August, acknowledged in October, and Smith waived extradition in November, leading to his arraignment. He later moved to dismiss based on the IAD's 180-day speedy trial rule, which was denied, and he was convicted on January 13, 1993.

Petitioner pled guilty to being a habitual offender, fourth offense, under M.C.L. 769.12, and received a sentence of fifteen to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, claiming a violation of his rights under Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) due to prison officials not informing him of a detainer placed by Michigan authorities while he was in Florida. The court rejected this claim, stating that the IAD did not apply to him as a pretrial detainee or parolee, and thus his rights under the IAD only attached after he began serving his prison term on July 7, 1992. Consequently, the relevant communications between Michigan and Florida occurred before this date, and there was no formal detainer lodged against him prior to September 9, 1992, which meant Florida officials had no obligation to inform him about the detainer or his rights. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied his appeal on May 30, 1997, leading Smith to file a habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on May 14, 1998. This petition was denied on August 27, 1999, but Smith was granted a certificate of appealability. In his appeal, he reiterated his claim regarding the alleged violation of his IAD rights. The review of the district court's decision is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which establishes conditions under which habeas relief may be granted, emphasizing that the federal court must presume state court factual determinations as correct unless convincingly rebutted by the petitioner. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo, and the Supreme Court clarified the analysis required under the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if it either extends a legal principle to an inappropriate context or fails to extend it to a suitable context. A federal habeas court cannot overturn a state court's decision solely based on perceived incorrect application; the application must also be unreasonable. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) facilitates the transfer of prisoners between states to resolve outstanding criminal charges and establishes a process for prisoners to request disposition of detainers against them. Under Article III of the IAD, the warden must inform the prisoner of any detainers and their right to request a final disposition. If requested, the receiving state must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days, barring any continuance. The IAD is considered federal law and is subject to federal interpretation. Federal habeas review of IAD violations is restricted to fundamental defects leading to a miscarriage of justice or procedural inconsistencies. Smith claims he was not notified of a Michigan detainer as required, thus inhibiting his ability to request a final disposition within 180 days. However, the district court concluded that Smith's rights under the IAD did not arise until he began serving his Florida sentence on July 7, 1992, which undermines his argument.

The court affirmed the district court's ruling regarding Smith's claim under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Key points include:

1. The IAD does not apply to individuals in custody awaiting trial, as established in United States v. Roberts and further affirmed in United States v. Glasgow. Smith, while awaiting sentencing for a parole violation, was not considered to be serving a term of imprisonment under the IAD until he started his Florida prison sentence on July 7, 1992.

2. Prior to this date, Smith was not entitled to notification of a detainer lodged against him. The district court referenced Supreme Court precedent, indicating that a detainer can only be filed against someone who is already serving a sentence in a correctional facility.

3. Florida officials received the formal Michigan detainer on September 9, 1992, at which point they were required to notify Smith. However, even if this notification obligation was not fulfilled, the violation was deemed harmless as Smith was brought to trial within the IAD's required timeframe of 180 days.

4. Smith did not demonstrate any “fundamental defect” that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Michigan court's decision concerning Smith's IAD claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

5. The court concluded that even considering Smith’s August 8, 1992, request for a "final disposition" under the IAD, he was still tried within the required 180 days, negating any claims of violation.

In summary, Smith's habeas relief was denied, and the district court's judgment was affirmed.