96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3752, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6115 Jeanette Reynolds, as Administrator of the Estate of Paul Reynolds, Deceased, and Individually v. County of San Diego Jeffrey Jackson, Jim Roache, Sheriff, Denise Reynolds v. County of San Diego Jeffrey Jackson, Jim Roache, Sheriff

Citation: 84 F.3d 1162Docket: 94-56262

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 28, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

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Paul Reynolds was shot and killed by Deputy Jeffrey Jackson during an incident at a gas station on February 18, 1992. The plaintiffs, Jeanette and Denise Reynolds (Paul's wife and mother), appealed the district court's ruling that granted Jackson summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which protects him from liability for civil rights claims. They also contested the court's finding that there was no liability under California Civil Code Section 52.1 or for state tort claims of negligence and wrongful death. The Ninth Circuit Court, with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 1294, affirmed part of the district court's decision and remanded other aspects. 

The incident began when gas station attendant Joseph Kirchevel observed Reynolds acting erratically, leading him to call the Sheriff's department for assistance after Reynolds brandished a knife. Deputy Jackson, responding to a report of unusual behavior and armed threats, encountered Reynolds at the gas station. After a series of commands, Reynolds complied by raising his hands and eventually dropped the knife. However, as Jackson approached, Reynolds suddenly seized the knife again, prompting the shooting. The court's decision addresses the complex issues of law enforcement liability and the application of qualified immunity in the context of this shooting incident.

Deputy Jackson attempted to disarm Reynolds by kicking him but missed, an action not witnessed by Wapnowski and omitted from Jackson's initial report. Jackson then moved behind Reynolds, placing his knee in Reynolds's back and his gun against his neck, repeatedly ordering him to drop the knife. Reynolds responded by twisting and swinging the knife at Jackson, prompting Jackson to fear for his life. He attempted to fire his weapon twice; the first attempt failed, allegedly due to the gun being pressed too hard against Reynolds's neck, and the second shot, fired from approximately six inches away, resulted in Reynolds's death from a gunshot wound to the neck.

Following the incident, Reynolds's wife and mother filed a civil rights action against Deputy Jackson, Sheriff Jim Roach, and San Diego County, claiming Jackson's use of force was unreasonable and that Roach and the County were liable for failing to enforce regulations on deadly force. They also raised various state law claims, including wrongful death and excessive force. The district court consolidated the actions and granted Deputy Jackson’s motion for summary judgment on all allegations against him, finding him immune from liability due to reasonable actions under the circumstances. The court denied summary judgment for the County and Roach due to insufficient specification of legal arguments. Additionally, Denise Reynolds was found to lack standing for a wrongful death action under California law, and Jeanette Reynolds's claim under California Civil Code Section 52.1 was also dismissed. The district court's summary judgment ruling is subject to de novo review, allowing affirmation on any record-supported ground.

Appellants are contesting the district court's summary judgment in favor of Jackson on federal civil rights claims, arguing that genuine material facts exist regarding the reasonableness of Jackson’s conduct, which should preclude qualified immunity. Jeanette Reynolds claims the court erred in ruling she had no cause of action under California Civil Code Section 52.1. Additionally, appellants challenge the court's summary judgment on their negligence and wrongful death claims but do not contest the finding that Denise Reynolds lacks standing to pursue a wrongful death claim, which the court deems waived. 

Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing it only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view evidence favorably towards the nonmoving party, while also considering the substantive evidentiary burden. Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must present specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue exists.

For civil rights claims, the Supreme Court stipulates that officials can only be held liable if the right is clearly established such that a reasonable official would understand their actions to be a violation. Qualified immunity shields officials from liability if they could reasonably believe their actions were lawful based on clearly established law and the information available to them. The unlawfulness of an official’s actions must be apparent in light of existing law for liability to attach. The Supreme Court emphasizes resolving immunity issues early in litigation.

Immunity issues in litigation should be resolved by the district court as early as possible, particularly through motions for summary judgment when facts are undisputed. The determination of qualified immunity involves three inquiries: identifying the allegedly violated right, assessing whether the law governing the official's conduct is clearly established, and evaluating if a reasonable officer could have believed their conduct was lawful. In this case, Appellants claim Deputy Jackson violated constitutional rights by using deadly force against Reynolds, which constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The dispute centers on whether a reasonable officer in Jackson's position would have believed the use of deadly force was lawful.

The objective reasonableness standard must be applied to analyze the officer's belief, balancing the intrusion's nature against governmental interests. The court assesses the totality of circumstances, including the severity of the crime, the suspect's threat level, and behaviors such as resisting arrest. An officer's use of deadly force is justified if there is probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat. Given Reynolds's erratic behavior and possession of a weapon, Deputy Jackson's actions were deemed reasonable. Witnesses observed Reynolds's threatening behavior, and Jackson attempted to disarm him while giving clear commands. When Reynolds swung a knife at Jackson, it constituted a threat to Jackson's life, legitimizing the use of deadly force. Consequently, the district court ruled that Jackson was immune from liability.

Appellants argue that the trial court incorrectly applied the doctrine of qualified immunity by determining that immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest stage of litigation. They reference Sloman v. Tadlock, which questions whether the reasonableness of an officer's actions should be assessed by a judge or jury, emphasizing that while the court noted juries could assess reasonableness, it was within the context of disputed facts requiring a trial, not for motions for summary judgment. Appellants assert that summary judgment for Jackson was inappropriate due to genuine material fact disputes regarding his conduct, supported by expert testimonies from criminologist Richard Whalley and police tactics expert Lou Reiter. Whalley's deposition indicated that Jackson's gun pressure caused Reynolds to move suddenly, contradicting Jackson's claim of distance between the gun and Reynolds' neck at the time of the shooting. However, appellants acknowledge that Whalley's conclusions about the cause of Reynolds' movement are speculative and lack scientific foundation, failing to raise a factual issue regarding Jackson's reasonableness. The standards for summary judgment require expert opinions to be supported by specific facts, and Whalley's speculative assertions do not meet this criterion.

Claims of excessive force by police officers are assessed under a reasonableness standard, particularly in light of the Fourth Amendment. An officer's conduct is considered unreasonable if it does not align with the facts and circumstances they face, as established in Graham v. Connor. In the case of Alexander v. City of San Francisco, a factual dispute arose concerning whether officers used excessive force against a mentally ill, elderly man who posed a threat. The court recognized that officers must make split-second decisions in tense situations and cannot predict every possible reaction from a suspect. 

In this context, even if Deputy Jackson applied pressure to Reynolds's neck with his gun, it may still be deemed reasonable, given the rapidly evolving circumstances and Reynolds's threatening behavior. Appellants argue that discrepancies in Jackson's account regarding the shooting distance could lead a jury to reject his testimony. However, this inconsistency does not raise a genuine issue of material fact about the reasonableness of Jackson's actions, especially since two independent eyewitnesses corroborated his account that Reynolds attacked him.

The court emphasizes that simply highlighting minor inconsistencies is insufficient to contest a summary judgment motion. Furthermore, expert testimony from police tactics expert Lou Reiter, who criticized Jackson's approach, does not create a genuine factual dispute about the reasonableness of the use of deadly force, as it lacks the significant probative value required to oppose summary judgment.

Reiter's testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of Jackson's use of force, as expert disagreement alone does not establish unreasonableness. The key inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could believe their actions were justified, regardless of differing opinions among officers. In this case, Jackson's actions were deemed reasonable given Reynolds' erratic behavior and the threat posed by his knife, which justified Jackson's attempt to confine and disarm him. Jackson's response with deadly force was also reasonable due to the immediate threat of serious harm to himself and others.

Regarding claims under California Civil Code Section 52.1, the court upheld the summary judgment ruling, stating that the statute allows individuals to seek damages for constitutional violations but does not provide substantive protections. The appellants failed to identify any distinct violations of state constitutional rights separate from federal rights, leading to the conclusion that there was no basis for a claim under Section 52.1.

The court also affirmed the summary judgment favoring Jackson on state tort law claims, referencing the principle of pendent jurisdiction as articulated in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, which allows but does not require federal courts to hear related state law claims.

If federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, state claims should also be dismissed due to lack of federal jurisdiction. In Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co., the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on federal claims and remanded state law claims for dismissal. More recently, in Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., the court vacated a district court's judgment, clarifying that dismissal of pendent state claims should be without prejudice. The court reiterated that when federal claims are eliminated, it is generally appropriate to dismiss remaining state claims, especially if state issues predominate.

In the case at hand, following the summary judgment on federal civil rights claims, the district court should have dismissed state law claims without prejudice. Thus, the state tort claims are remanded for dismissal without prejudice. 

In a dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Pregerson raised concerns about whether Deputy Jackson was entitled to qualified immunity for using deadly force against Paul Reynolds. He argued that the reasonableness of this action, based on the totality of circumstances, should be determined by a jury. Judge Pregerson emphasized that while courts should avoid hindsight judgments on police actions, qualified immunity is not guaranteed; it requires an assessment of whether the use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. He noted that determining the threat level posed by Reynolds is typically a factual question for the jury, expressing concern that the majority opinion did not sufficiently address this issue.

Deputy Jackson employed lethal force against Reynolds after subduing him with a knee in his back and the barrel of his gun on his neck. When Reynolds twisted and swung a three-inch marlin spike, Jackson's gun initially misfired before he stepped back and fired at Reynolds' neck. A jury could reasonably determine that Jackson had non-lethal options available, such as using a billy club or negotiating for Reynolds' compliance, suggesting that Reynolds did not pose an immediate threat to the public or the officer. The facts indicate that Reynolds appeared disoriented and potentially in need of medical help rather than being a dangerous individual. Therefore, a reasonable jury might conclude that Jackson's use of deadly force was excessive, which could negate the possibility of qualified immunity for Jackson. The district court's discussion included references to both federal and state claims, noting the need for a constitutional rights violation to establish municipal liability. The issue of Denise Reynolds's standing under California Civil Code Section 52.1 was not adequately addressed, leading to a potential waiver of the argument. The court also found that summary judgment in favor of Jackson was appropriate regarding claims of assault, battery, excessive force, and a violation of the California Public Records Act. The legal standards for qualified immunity were highlighted, emphasizing the necessity of assessing whether the use of deadly force was reasonable in excessive force cases.