United States v. Kelvin Garrard and Bryant Reagor

Citations: 83 F.3d 889; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11218Docket: 95-3389, 95-3391

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 10, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves Kelvin Garrard and Bryant Reagor, who appealed their convictions related to crack cocaine trafficking in Illinois. Reagor pled guilty and was sentenced based on an offense level of 38, corresponding to accountability for over 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, leading to a sentence of 27 years without parole, which was at the lower end of the guideline range of 324 to 405 months. 

Reagor's primary argument on appeal centers on the district court's refusal to allow him to produce Alan Woods, the alleged leader of the drug trafficking conspiracy, at his sentencing. Reagor contended that Woods’ testimony would have clarified his lesser role in the conspiracy, supported his claim of acceptance of responsibility, and potentially reduced the drug quantity attributed to him. At the time of sentencing, Woods was in federal custody for separate drug offenses, which prevented his presence in court. The appellate court noted that the evolution of sentencing proceedings under federal guidelines has led to longer hearings, especially in guilty plea cases where the prosecution and defense disagree on the application of the guidelines. The court recognized that such disagreements often necessitate witness testimonies to address the defendant's involvement and relevant conduct in the offense.

Alan Woods operated a drug distribution business from Bakersfield, California, and in late 1991 sought to expand into the Quad Cities area of Rock Island and Moline, Illinois. He dispatched crews to manage operations locally, using women couriers to transport regular and crack cocaine from California to Davenport, Iowa, where sales proceeds were returned to him. The initial crew, Sheldon Price and Frank Wright, arrived in late 1991, aided by local resident Nate Jones, who stored cocaine and introduced them to customers. Their operation ceased after a shooting incident in March 1992.

In April 1992, a second crew consisting of Dewayne Crompton and Reagor (alias "Fats") took over, operating from an apartment leased by Tony Barnes in East Moline. They stored and distributed cocaine, with Barnes purchasing increasing quantities over time. Jones testified to three shipments of cocaine made to Crompton and Reagor, delivered by Julie Scott and Sonya Haynes. Their operation faced setbacks when Nate Jones orchestrated the theft of cocaine from their car, prompting Woods to recall them to California.

Crompton later resumed drug sales in Hammond, Indiana, and Barnes continued to buy drugs from him until Crompton's arrest during a transport of drugs to Minnesota. Afterward, Barnes contacted Reagor, who delivered crack cocaine to him in Rock Island. The operation thrived until late 1993 when Jones provided information to law enforcement, leading to the interception of drug money shipments and a large crack cocaine shipment. Subsequent search warrants executed in April 1994 resulted in the seizure of additional cocaine, effectively dismantling Woods' drug organization in the Quad Cities.

Reagor moved for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to produce Woods as a witness for his sentencing hearing, asserting Woods was necessary under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The government objected, arguing Reagor did not demonstrate Woods' necessity, leading the district court to deny the writ. Woods, who had previously pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack and cooperated with the government, had provided information that was disclosed to Reagor prior to sentencing.

During the sentencing, the government presented three witnesses, including Jones and Barnes, who detailed their drug transactions with Reagor. FBI Special Agent Mike Spencer also testified about the investigation. Reagor denied involvement in drug distribution, claiming he only accompanied Woods and pled guilty to reduce his sentence. The district judge found Reagor's claims incredible and ruled he had not accepted responsibility, resulting in the denial of potential sentencing points under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1.

Reagor contested the presentence report's assertion of his accountability for distributing 108 ounces of cocaine base. The judge found him responsible for 98 ounces, based on witness testimony about purchase quantities and additional amounts related to stolen drugs and deliveries. Reagor also argued against being classified as anything other than a minimal or minor participant in the conspiracy. The judge, however, determined that Reagor played a significant role, supported by witness accounts of repeated transactions and his involvement in pricing and storage.

Reagor contended that had Woods testified, it would have altered the outcome, potentially reducing his accountability and supporting his claims of a limited role. The sentencing hearing extended over three days, with Reagor's request for Woods renewed after initial testimonies, but was ultimately denied by Judge McDade, raising the question of the appropriateness of that denial.

A writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is distinct from a standard witness subpoena, as it commands the custodian of a potential witness to transport the witness to court, making it more complex and burdensome. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(5), judges have discretion to issue this writ for state or federal prisoners to appear as witnesses in federal court, while also considering constitutional and procedural aspects related to Rule 17(b) during criminal proceedings. Most legal standards regarding such requests arise during trials, where the stakes are high regarding guilt or innocence, and procedural rules differ from those applicable in sentencing. 

In the sentencing context, significant impacts can arise from the testimony; for instance, in Reagor's case, his potential sentencing reduction could have been substantial based on the acceptance of his views. It is suggested that district judges should weigh the relevance of proposed testimony against the logistics and costs of transporting witnesses. A strong case for necessity and relevance is required if the witness is far from the courthouse and the expected testimony would yield only a minor sentencing benefit. Conversely, if the witness's testimony could lead to a significant reduction in the sentencing range, the burden of proof for relevance and necessity is lessened. Additionally, alternative methods for obtaining testimony should be considered before issuing the writ.

The district judge's discretion is upheld, as Woods' testimony was deemed unlikely to impact Reagor's sentencing under the guidelines due to his absence during the events in question and the defense's insufficient efforts to secure Woods' appearance. The possibility that Woods could have contradicted Barnes and Jones is considered extremely remote. The court emphasizes that Reagor is entitled to a sentence based on reliable information, and confirms that the district judge based the sentence on such information, concluding that Woods' absence did not violate Reagor's rights. Additional factors supporting the district judge's findings include Reagor's significant involvement in drug trafficking, his denial of responsibility during sentencing, and his role in the conspiracy. 

The excerpt also addresses codefendant Kelvin Garrard, who pled guilty to drug charges and received a 210-month sentence. Garrard's attorney filed a motion to withdraw, citing the appeal as lacking legal merit, and Garrard did not respond to this motion. After reviewing the case, the court found no viable issues for Garrard's appeal, leading to the dismissal of his case and affirmation of the district court's judgment on Reagor's appeal.