United States v. Stanley J. Marshall

Citations: 83 F.3d 866; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10863; 1996 WL 234376Docket: 95-2006

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 8, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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Stanley J. Marshall appealed a district court's decision regarding his motion to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), following an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines that changed how the weight of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is calculated for sentencing purposes. The key legal issue was whether the district court could consider Marshall's eligibility under the "safety valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which was enacted after his original sentencing. The court determined it could not address this question due to Marshall's ineligibility under § 3553(f), leading to an affirmation of the district court's judgment based on different reasoning than the lower court provided.

Marshall was originally convicted on July 5, 1989, for conspiring to distribute over ten grams of LSD, receiving a sentence of twenty years in prison and five years of supervised release, which was based on the combined weight of the LSD and its carrier. This conviction was upheld by the Seventh Circuit and later by the Supreme Court.

In his November 3, 1994 motion for sentence modification, Marshall cited amendment 488 to the guidelines, which adjusted the method of calculating LSD's weight by establishing a weight per dose of 0.4 milligram for LSD contained in carrier media. This amendment aimed to reduce sentencing disparities by excluding variable carrier weights from the calculations and was made retroactive. The amendment aligned with the Supreme Court's interpretation in Chapman v. United States, confirming that the term "mixture or substance" includes the carrier medium in the context of sentencing.

Amendment 488 and the Court's interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) establish a dual system for calculating LSD weight for sentencing. Amendment 488 explicitly allows for a 0.4 milligram calculation without affecting the "mixture or substance" definition for mandatory minimum sentences. This interpretation was reinforced in United States v. Neal, where the Seventh Circuit ruled that the 0.4 milligram presumption does not negate the method sanctioned by Chapman. The Supreme Court later unanimously affirmed this dual calculation system.

Marshall argued in the district court that Amendment 488 entitled him to a sentence reduction, a position the government supported. He contended that the Neal decision was incorrect and sought to apply the 0.4 milligram calculation under § 841(b)(1). Additionally, he requested a review of his eligibility for "safety valve" provisions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), as outlined in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. 

The district court ordered a presentence report, determining Marshall's base offense level to be thirty, with a two-point increase due to his role in the offense. This calculation led to a guideline incarceration range of 97-121 months, while § 841(b)(1)(A)(v) mandated a minimum sentence of ten years based on the total weight of the LSD and carrier medium. The report recommended the statutory minimum sentence, but also classified Marshall as an organizer of the conspiracy, preventing eligibility for the safety valve since one criterion is that the defendant cannot be an organizer.

On April 12, 1995, the district court reduced Marshall's sentence to the statutory minimum of 120 months, adhering to the Neal ruling. However, it determined he was not eligible for § 3553(f) considerations, as that provision only applies to sentences imposed after September 23, 1994, while his original sentence was from July 5, 1989.

The district court determined that a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) is not equivalent to a new sentencing that would allow for the invocation of § 3553(f). It relied on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, noting that amendment 509, effective September 23, 1994, is not retroactive, unlike amendment 488. The court had previously classified Marshall as an organizer under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) in 1989. On appeal, Marshall argues for reconsideration of the decision in Neal regarding the calculation of statutory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) and claims the district court erred by not considering his eligibility for a guideline sentence range under § 3553(f) and not ordering a revised presentence report. The appellate court dismissed the first argument, affirming that Neal remains valid and supported by the Supreme Court. 

Regarding the second argument, the district court concluded it lacked the authority to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum set by § 841(b)(1), based on its interpretation of relevant guidelines. While legal interpretations are usually reviewed de novo, the case facts warranted a more restrained review since Marshall's situation does not allow him to benefit from the provisions he claims. The appellate court found no need to explore whether a sentence reduction under § 3582(c) triggers § 3553(f) applicability, as Marshall could not qualify for the safety valve due to the district court's existing finding of him being an organizer, which the appellate court had previously affirmed. Marshall's objections to this classification were to be reviewed for clear error.

Marshall argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman undermines the conclusion that he was an organizer due to his actions of spraying LSD solution on blotter paper. He interprets the Court’s statement regarding LSD's potency and its distribution on a carrier medium as a rule that disqualifies him from being classified as a manager or supervisor. He likens his role to that of a house painter supervised by a homeowner, a comparison deemed unpersuasive. The court finds no inconsistency between Chapman's ruling and the determination that Marshall acted as an organizer under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). 

Marshall also asserts that subsequent case law requires mid-level traffickers to perform more than merely refine drug packaging to be considered organizers or managers. This argument fails on two counts: first, he is not categorized as a mid-level trafficker, as his 11,751 doses of LSD warrant a minimum ten-year sentence; second, his actions constituted the essential step of packaging, not just fine-tuning. 

The district court's ruling in 1989 that Marshall was an organizer was correct, and this would still hold true in 1995. Even if § 3553(f) applied to his case, his status as an organizer would prevent him from benefiting from it. The court refrains from discussing how § 3582(c)(2) might interact with sentence modifications for cases prior to September 23, 1994. Consequently, the district court's judgment against Marshall is affirmed.