Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; May 13, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Sharon Hartleip appealed a district court's summary judgment favoring McNeilab, Inc. in her claims of sexual harassment under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. McNeilab cross-appealed the denial of sanctions under Fed. R.Civ. P. 11. The case, argued on February 2, 1996, and decided on May 13, 1996, involved Hartleip's employment as a sales representative from March 1990 until her resignation on April 4, 1992, after accepting a position at Glaxo, Inc. She cited sexual harassment by McNeil employee Calvan Barnes as a reason for leaving.
Hartleip first met Barnes during a training program in July 1990, where he was a sales trainer. She claimed that, following the training, she received phone messages from Barnes, none of which were inappropriate. After being informed by another trainee that Barnes was upset about her not visiting him for training-related discussions, Hartleip visited his hotel room for guidance, during which no inappropriate behavior occurred. Despite the lack of any explicit sexual harassment, Hartleip’s claims centered on the perceived implications of Barnes’ actions and the context of her working environment. The court ultimately affirmed the district court's decision.
Barnes initially declined a lunch invitation from Hartleip, proposing instead a dinner meeting, which she accepted. During dinner, Barnes discussed Hartleip's personal life and made comments on her appearance, which made her uncomfortable. Despite this discomfort, Hartleip accompanied Barnes to a blues bar after dinner, feeling pressured not to offend him. The following day, they went Christmas shopping, where Barnes spoke about his personal life, which Hartleip found inappropriate; however, she allowed him to drive her to the train station afterward. Their meeting in Chicago was the only personal encounter outside of business meetings, as they worked in different cities.
From January 1991, Barnes began calling Hartleip once or twice a month, expressing that he thought about her often and seemed to probe her romantic interest. They encountered each other briefly at a professional meeting in Palm Springs, after which Barnes sent a postcard complimenting her. In February, he suggested they meet outside of work. By March, Barnes offered to visit Hartleip in Detroit discreetly and made derogatory comments about her district manager, Robert Haas, suggesting she reach out to him if she had issues.
Between April and June 1991, their communication continued regularly, though specifics were vague. At a business meeting in Florida, Barnes invited Hartleip for a drink, which she declined. In June or late summer, after being promoted to district manager, Barnes’ calls became more aggressive. He indicated that he was well-acquainted with Gerald Bruce, a new regional manager, and suggested that Hartleip could receive a promotion if she visited him in St. Louis for the weekend, offering to pay for her ticket.
Hartleip interpreted Barnes' invitation as having sexual undertones, despite Barnes not explicitly mentioning sexual intent. Following her refusal, Barnes expressed anger. Between February and fall 1991, Barnes sent Hartleip four cards, with content emphasizing admiration for her femininity and warmth. In June 1991, Hartleip felt her career was negatively impacted after declining Barnes' invitation, believing that his associate, Gerald Bruce, influenced adverse employment decisions against her. She identified three specific instances: the denial of the S.T.A.R. Award, a $2,000 Stock Award, and the cancellation of a hospital display. Evidence indicated that Hartleip did not meet the objective criteria for the S.T.A.R. Award, as her average retail calls per day fell short at 2.9, and she was later informed she was eligible for the Stock Award. The cancellation of the hospital display was attributed to a lack of funding.
Barnes engaged in limited harassing behavior towards Hartleip during her employment at McNeil, primarily through cards, phone calls, messages, and a visit to Chicago. Hartleip testified that Todd White informed her of Barnes' sexual fantasies about her and another employee and warned her that Barnes might show up at her home, instilling fear in Hartleip. Additionally, Hartleip learned from Caren Bostick, another sales representative, that Barnes had previously harassed Bostick, who feared potential blackmail related to a romantic liaison. Hartleip's complaint noted that Barnes' alleged harassment ceased around the time of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings in 1991.
Hartleip was made aware of McNeil's harassment policies shortly after starting her job, which included reporting harassment to a supervisor or, if the supervisor was involved, to Jim Kuhn, Director of Employee Relations, without retaliation fears. Despite having friendly relationships with her district manager, John Bradley, and another colleague, Haas, Hartleip did not report the harassment to Bradley until after her resignation in April 1992.
On April 13, 1993, Hartleip filed a four-count complaint against McNeil in Oakland County Circuit Court, alleging quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment under the ELCRA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. McNeil successfully removed the case to district court and moved for summary judgment on all claims while also seeking sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted summary judgment to McNeil but denied the sanctions. Hartleip appealed the summary judgment, arguing it was erroneous, while McNeil cross-appealed the denial of sanctions. The case will be reviewed de novo, focusing on whether there is sufficient disagreement over material facts to warrant jury consideration.
Evidence must be adequate for a jury to potentially favor the plaintiff, as established in Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc. Hartleip's sexual harassment claims are anchored in the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), which defines sex discrimination to include unwelcome sexual advances and other sexual conduct. Specifically, the act outlines that such conduct becomes discriminatory when it conditions employment, affects employment decisions, or creates a hostile environment.
Michigan courts interpret the ELCRA using federal guidelines from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although ELCRA explicitly prohibits both hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment. Hartleip's complaint alleges both forms. To prove quid pro quo harassment under ELCRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) exposure to unwelcome sexual conduct, and (2) that the employer or agent used the plaintiff’s response to such conduct in employment decisions. While Hartleip has established a factual issue regarding the first requirement, she has not shown a genuine issue regarding the second.
Quid pro quo harassment necessitates that the perpetrator has the authority to offer job benefits in exchange for sexual favors or to threaten job loss for refusal. Hartleip's claim fails primarily because she did not submit to the advances and conceded that Barnes, who made the advances, lacked supervisory authority over her. Her assertion that Barnes influenced employment decisions through a friendship with Gerald Bruce, who did have authority, is insufficient to substantiate her claim of quid pro quo harassment.
Hartleip's complaints regarding adverse employment decisions include her failure to receive the S.T.A.R. Award, the Stock Award, and the cancellation of a display at Providence Hospital. Evidence indicated that Robert Haas, who recommended Hartleip for the S.T.A.R. Award, acknowledged she did not meet the required criteria, being just short of the average daily retail calls. Although Haas believed the award would be approved due to its low cost, it was ultimately confirmed that Hartleip did not receive it based on objective measures. Regarding the Stock Award, it was not denied; Hartleip demanded it upon giving her notice and it was approved shortly after her departure. The cancellation of the display was attributed to a lack of funding for a promised donation, with Hartleip failing to provide evidence connecting this cancellation to her rejection of Barnes' advances. Consequently, the court found no genuine issue of fact linking these employment decisions to alleged harassment by Barnes.
Hartleip also claimed sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment but failed to meet the fifth element of the prima facie case—respondeat superior. The court noted that McNeil's management had no notice of Barnes' conduct, a requirement for employer liability. Hartleip argued that the burden should be on McNeil to prove lack of awareness; however, the law places the responsibility on the employee to establish this element. Hartleip did not inform her supervisor of the alleged harassment until after her resignation, and her failure to utilize the company's reporting policy significantly undermined her claims against McNeil.
Hartleip's claim for respondeat superior is weakened by her failure to provide timely notice of harassment to her employer, McNeil. Although she later informed McNeil of the harassment, this was after the harassment had ceased and after her resignation, denying the employer the chance to investigate and take corrective action. Hartleip asserts that informing co-workers constituted constructive notice, but her vague deposition testimony about discussing the harassment with unspecified colleagues fails to satisfy legal requirements that complaints should be made to higher management. Therefore, Hartleip did not meet the necessary legal standards for the respondeat superior element of her claim.
Regarding her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hartleip alleges that Barnes' conduct was extreme and outrageous. She cites instances of verbal threats, pressure to engage in unwanted conduct, and inappropriate discussions about her. However, the court finds that Barnes' behavior does not rise to the level of being "outrageous" under legal standards, which require conduct to be beyond all bounds of decency. This conclusion aligns with precedents where similar behaviors were deemed insufficient for such claims. Consequently, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of McNeil on this claim is upheld.
Finally, Hartleip's breach of employment contract claim, based on an implied provision against sexual harassment under the ELCRA, is determined to be preempted by the ELCRA itself. Michigan law stipulates that when a statute establishes new rights or duties, the remedies it provides are exclusive. Thus, Hartleip's claim cannot proceed under common law principles alongside the statutory framework.
Michigan law does not recognize a common law remedy for employment discrimination, as established in Covell v. Spengler and Pompey v. General Motors Corp. Hartleip's contract claim is based on duties acknowledged under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), making her exclusive remedy an action under the ELCRA. McNeil's cross-appeal seeks sanctions against Hartleip for filing a meritless lawsuit. Under the pre-amendment Fed.R.Civ. P. 11, a party's signature certifies that the filing is well-grounded in fact and law, and not for improper purposes. The court can impose sanctions if a filing lacks legal or factual basis, with the reasonableness of conduct being the critical test. McNeil's argument for sanctions was primarily based on claims being frivolous, likening the case to Jackson-Colley v. Department of the Army Corps of Engineers. However, the court found that Hartleip presented evidence of discrimination, distinguishing her case from Jackson-Colley, where no evidence was provided. The court concluded that denying sanctions was not an abuse of discretion, despite Hartleip's legal theories being weakly supported.
McNeil filed a motion to dismiss Hartleip's appeal and sought fees and costs due to Hartleip's noncompliance with Fed. R.App. P. 30(b) by failing to include specific record parts in the joint appendix. Hartleip did not provide an explanation for her improper appendix; however, she did submit a corrected version when required by the court. While the court disapproves of Hartleip's initial filing, it opted not to dismiss the appeal but instead decided the case on its merits. The court ruled that McNeil is entitled to recover attorneys' fees as sanctions for the effort spent on the successful motion to strike the original appendix, which can be claimed in its bill of costs as outlined by Fed. R.App. P. 39(d).
The court affirmed the district court's decision, addressing several key points regarding Hartleip's claims against McNeil. Hartleip argued that McNeil misidentified her in the complaint and claimed harassment by Calvan Barnes, citing various inappropriate comments made by him. While Hartleip initially described Barnes as suggesting she avoid management due to concerns about fraternization, she later acknowledged he did not specifically mention "whistleblowers." Testimony indicated that Hartleip had a complicated relationship with a colleague, White, whom she initially considered a friend but later accused of facilitating Barnes' harassment.
Hartleip also mentioned that Barnes contacted her after she decided to leave the company, but did not classify this communication as harassment. She claimed constructive discharge due to Barnes' behavior, arguing it was severe enough to compel her resignation. However, the court noted that her assertion contradicted her admission that Barnes' conduct ceased around the time of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings, long before her resignation to accept another position. Hartleip's belief that she would not advance at McNeil, influenced by perceived conspiracies against her, was cited as a reason for her departure, but she did not demonstrate that she sought or was denied promotions.
The court found two critical issues dispositive of Hartleip's sexual harassment claims: the lack of connection between adverse employment decisions and Barnes' conduct, and the failure to establish respondeat superior liability. As a result, the court did not address other defenses raised by McNeil. Additionally, McNeil's motion to strike the appendix and dismiss the appeal was mentioned, with a previous panel having granted the motion to strike and referring the dismissal decision to the current panel.
