Docket: Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1706-MI-1402
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; March 29, 2018; Indiana; State Appellate Court
The Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance appeals a trial court order that reversed the revocation of A.P.'s bail agent license. The case centers on whether the trial court erred in its decision. The Enforcement Division filed a motion to revoke A.P.'s license after he was convicted of battery as a class D felony on September 16, 2015. The Commissioner immediately revoked A.P.'s license, prohibiting reapplication for ten years. A.P. later contested this, claiming his conviction was for a class A misdemeanor. Subsequently, the Enforcement Division sought to modify the revocation to reflect a five-year reapplication restriction. The Commissioner acknowledged A.P.'s conviction as a class A misdemeanor involving violence, thus modifying the revocation order accordingly.
A hearing was held where A.P.'s counsel argued that A.P. did not cause injury; rather, his conviction stemmed from spanking his grandson, which was intended to correct behavior without resulting in visible injury. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) acknowledged the distinction between pain and injury, ultimately determining that A.P.'s actions did involve the use of physical force. Testimony from A.P.'s daughter supported that no visible injuries were present after the incident. The ALJ's findings and the nature of the conviction were crucial in the determination of the license revocation. The court ultimately reversed and remanded the Commissioner’s decision.
A.P. was convicted of battery as a class A misdemeanor related to an incident where he spanked his grandchild. During testimony, the child’s mother confirmed there were no visible marks on the child after the spanking. However, a recorded incident captured the child screaming that he was being choked while A.P. physically restrained him during a meltdown. The recording, which inadvertently activated during a call to a bank, revealed the child crying out in pain and fear, leading bank employees to contact the police. The recording documented A.P. striking the child, who repeatedly yelled "Ow!" and expressed distress, to which A.P. responded sarcastically and with insults.
On April 21, 2016, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended revoking A.P.'s bail agent license for five years based on the misdemeanor conviction. A.P. objected, claiming his actions did not constitute violence and sought to restore his license. The Commissioner upheld the ALJ's recommendation on May 6, 2016. A.P. then filed for judicial review, asserting that the misdemeanor conviction should not preclude his license.
On August 17, 2016, the court affirmed his conviction, noting the physical assault interfered with the child’s breathing and rejected A.P.'s defense of reasonable discipline. Following a hearing on March 6, 2017, the trial court found that Indiana law did not classify the misdemeanor battery as involving violence, thus setting aside the revocation and allowing A.P. to retain his bail agent license.
On May 9, 2017, the Commissioner filed a motion to correct an error, claiming the court's order preventing restrictions on A.P.'s license due to a misdemeanor conviction was inappropriate for judicial review. The Commissioner requested the court to vacate its order regarding future actions and remand the case for further proceedings. On May 30, 2017, the trial court granted this motion, remanding the matter to the Commissioner. The Commissioner filed a notice of appeal on June 29, 2017.
The central issue is whether the trial court erred in reversing the Commissioner's decision to revoke A.P.'s bail agent license. Under the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act, judicial review of agency actions is limited, and an agency's decision can only be reversed if found to be arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with the law. The burden lies on the party challenging the agency's action to demonstrate its invalidity. While courts defer to the agency's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, legal questions are reviewed de novo.
The Commissioner contends that A.P.'s conviction for battery as a class A misdemeanor qualifies as a disqualifying offense under Ind. Code 27-10-1-6, asserting that the nature of the offense, which involved violence, justifies the revocation. A.P. argues that the definition of battery does not necessarily include violence and claims the Commissioner misapplied the relevant statutes, asserting that the interpretation of "element" was erroneous. Relevant statutes include Ind. Code 27-10-2-1, which mandates the Commissioner's administration of bail agent regulations, and Ind. Code 27-10-3, which governs licensure requirements including the necessity of good moral character. Ind. Code 27-10-3-8(d) specifies that a license must be revoked upon conviction of a disqualifying offense, with specific timelines for reapplication based on the type of offense.
Ind. Code 27-10-1-6 defines "disqualifying offense" as either a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty, violence, or a deadly weapon. Ind. Code 35-42-2-1 outlines that battery, committed by knowingly or intentionally touching another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, is a Class B misdemeanor; if it results in bodily injury, it escalates to a Class A misdemeanor. "Bodily injury" is defined as any impairment of physical condition, including pain.
In interpreting these statutes, the intent of the legislature is paramount, and clear language is applied according to its ordinary meaning. Ambiguous statutes are interpreted to ascertain legislative intent, considering the whole act and its provisions. An administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute is given great weight unless inconsistent with the statute itself.
The Commissioner determined that A.P.'s Class A misdemeanor offense of battery against his grandchild constituted a disqualifying offense under Ind. Code 27-10-1-6, justifying the revocation of his bail agent license under Ind. Code 27-10-3-8(d). The interpretation that an offense resulting in bodily injury involves an element of violence is deemed reasonable. A.P.'s conviction stemmed from an incident where he spanked his grandchild, leading to an allegation of bodily injury, which was supported by testimony regarding the child's distress during the event.
The Commissioner reasonably determined that A.P.'s battery of his grandchild, resulting in bodily injury, involved violence, justifying the revocation of A.P.'s bail agent license. The court referenced the precedent set in Fishburn, which affirms deferring to an agency's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Consequently, the trial court's ruling was reversed, and the case was remanded to uphold the Commissioner's May 6, 2016 Final Order.
A.P. contended that the Commissioner's appeal was untimely, asserting that the trial court's order correcting errors did not extend the appeal period. However, Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A) allows for filing a notice of appeal within thirty days of a ruling on a motion to correct error, which was adequately met as the notice was filed within the specified timeframe.
The court clarified that a party does not forfeit the right to raise issues on appeal not included in their motion to correct error, supporting this with precedent. Additionally, the court acknowledged A.P.’s counsel's admission that there were no disputed facts regarding A.P.'s misdemeanor conviction and declined to strike references in the Commissioner's brief to a prior memorandum decision from the court.
The dissent argues that A.P.'s license revocation requires evidence of violence as an element of the offense. However, Indiana Code 27-10-1-6 states that a misdemeanor is disqualifying if it involves violence as an element. In Halligan v. State, the court differentiated between assault and battery, noting that assault requires an intent to commit a violent injury, while battery can result from any unlawful touching. A.P.'s conviction for battery was elevated to a class A misdemeanor due to resulting bodily injury, indicating more than a minor contact. Halligan did not address the "bodily injury" aspect of a class A misdemeanor or involve administrative agency interpretations. Thus, Halligan does not undermine the Board's application of the statute in revoking A.P.'s license. A.P.'s references to Flores v. Ashcroft and Szucz-Toldy v. Gonzales, which involved the Board of Immigration Appeals' determinations on "crimes of violence," are not applicable here as Indiana law specifically defines disqualifying misdemeanors involving violence. The Commissioner’s decision to revoke A.P.'s license is deemed reasonable given the circumstances.
