Tam v. Desjardins

Citation: 110 N.E.3d 1218Docket: 17-P-923

Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court; August 1, 2018; Massachusetts; State Appellate Court

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Siew-Mey Tam appeals a Superior Court judgment that granted summary judgment to her former employer, Federal Management Company, regarding her claims of employment discrimination under G. L. c. 151B and intentional interference with advantageous business relations. Tam was terminated from her role as property manager, with the defendants asserting her dismissal was due to her failure to obtain original tenant signatures on HUD recertification forms, a violation of company policy. Tam contends this reason was pretextual, alleging unlawful discrimination. The defendants maintain that Tam did not provide sufficient evidence of pretext or discriminatory intent. 

The background includes an incident on March 27, 2012, when Tam's supervisor, John Desjardins, reprimanded a maintenance technician and learned about unoccupied apartments listed as rented. Tam, employed since May 2005, had responsibilities including compliance with HUD regulations, knowing that failure to secure tenant signatures could lead to termination. Following an investigation, Desjardins and company vice president Peter Lewis concluded Tam had violated these regulations. On April 18, 2012, they provided her with a termination letter citing a violation of company policy.

Post-termination, the company sought a replacement who spoke Mandarin and Cantonese. They encountered difficulties finding a qualified candidate, temporarily filling the role with Rob Vreeland, a 45-year-old white male who did not speak the required languages, before permanently assigning him to the position in June 2012 after ceasing the search for a suitable replacement. The court affirmed the defendants' summary judgment based on the reasons articulated in the judge's memorandum.

On April 16, 2015, Tam initiated a lawsuit against the defendants, claiming discrimination based on race, color, age, and gender in violation of G. L. c. 151B (counts I-III) and intentional interference with advantageous business relations (count IV). Following a hearing on April 17, 2017, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The judge recognized that Tam had established a prima facie case but concluded that the defendants provided credible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment. Tam was unable to demonstrate that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

The review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, requiring the court to evaluate if all material facts are established favorably to the nonmoving party. The defendants, as the moving parties, successfully established there were no genuine issues of material fact and were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To prevail under G. L. c. 151B, an employee must show membership in a protected class, an adverse employment action, discriminatory animus from the employer, and causation linking the animus to the action. Tam satisfied the prima facie case but failed to refute the defendants' legitimate reasons for her termination.

The defendants articulated valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for their decision, which shifted the burden back to Tam to prove that these reasons were mere pretexts for discrimination. The court agreed with the motion judge that Tam's evidence failed to counter the defendants' explanations and did not provide reasonable inferences of discriminatory animus or causation. Consequently, as Tam could not prove pretext, summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the defendants.

Tam admitted during her deposition and in the consolidated undisputed statement of facts that the defendants terminated her for failing to secure original tenant signatures on HUD recertification forms, and she was informed of no other reasons for her termination. The defendants consistently asserted that this failure was the sole reason for her dismissal. Tam acknowledged that this failure was a "serious issue" warranting termination. Despite claiming that the defendants provided false reasons for her dismissal, she failed to provide any evidentiary support for this assertion and did not refute her own admissions. Additionally, she did not present evidence to challenge the defendants' belief that certain tenants had not personally signed the forms. The motion judge concluded that Tam's claim of intentional interference with advantageous business relations was merely a rephrased version of her discrimination claims and noted that her arguments lacked sufficient analysis or relevant legal authority, failing to meet the standards set by Mass. R.A.P. 16(a)(4).