Charles Merriman v. Shirley S. Chater, 1 Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Docket: 95-7080
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; April 12, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Unpublished opinions may be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue and are attached to the citing document or provided to the Court and all parties in oral argument. Charles Merriman appealed the district court's affirmation of the Secretary's decision denying his claim for Social Security benefits based on alleged disabilities including illiteracy, mental retardation, obesity, diabetes, and sleep apnea. The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded at step four that Merriman could still perform his past job as a dishwasher. Merriman raised various arguments on appeal, particularly regarding his mental impairment and illiteracy, alleging that the ALJ improperly completed the Psychiatric Review Technique form without professional assistance, failed to consider his impairments collectively, discriminated against him due to his inability to afford medical treatment, posed an inadequate hypothetical to the vocational expert, and disregarded the expert’s testimony.
The court reviews the Secretary's decision for substantial evidence and correct legal standards. Merriman bears the burden to demonstrate an inability to perform past relevant work. He contended that his mental impairment inhibited his ability to waive counsel intelligently, but the court noted a lack of established higher standards for ALJs in such situations. Even assuming a heightened duty existed, the court determined that the absence of counsel alone was not grounds for remand, provided the record was adequately developed and no prejudice occurred. Merriman argued that a more recent psychological evaluation reflecting lower IQ scores was necessary, asserting it would have influenced the ALJ’s assessment of his mental capacity in relation to disability listings.
Section 12.05 mandates proof of subaverage intellectual functioning that appears before age 22. Mr. Merriman has consistently tested above the required threshold until a recent test, and no new tests demonstrate his compliance with the criteria. Consequently, there was no prejudice from his waiver of counsel, and a remand is unnecessary. Although Mr. Merriman claims illiteracy hindered his ability to review and object to file exhibits, he fails to identify any errors in those exhibits. He also contends he could not adequately respond to the administrative law judge's (ALJ) questions regarding vocational counseling; however, the record reflects he acknowledged being fired from two jobs for being too slow and had worked with multiple job coaches, indicating he responded competently.
The ALJ recognized Mr. Merriman's mental impairment and illiteracy, rendering his claims about needing more information on his mental state or deficiencies in the identification of his literacy issues unwarranted. Mr. Merriman's assertion that the ALJ improperly completed the Psychiatric Review Technique form without professional assistance is incorrect, as regulations permit the ALJ to do so. He further alleged discrimination due to financial inability to obtain medical treatment, specifically for a C-PAP machine, but did not demonstrate that he sought help elsewhere or was denied care due to poverty, which undermines his claim.
Mr. Merriman criticized the ALJ for posing an improper hypothetical to the vocational expert; however, no vocational expert testimony is required at step four, meaning the ALJ had no obligation to seek such input. Lastly, Mr. Merriman argued that the ALJ failed to consider his impairments collectively, but evidence shows he had previously maintained employment despite his mental challenges and illiteracy. His obesity and diabetes were not deemed disabling, and while sleep apnea may contribute to daytime fatigue, a medical assessment indicated he does not require a C-PAP machine during those hours, suggesting he is capable of working. The court affirms the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.
As of March 31, 1995, the responsibilities of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security, specifically Shirley S. Chater, who is now substituted as the defendant in this action. Although the caption reflects this substitution, references in the text continue to use the title of Secretary to acknowledge the appropriate party at the time of the original decision. The order and judgment issued are not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court typically discourages the citation of orders and judgments but allows it under specific conditions outlined in 10th Cir. R. 36.3. A magistrate judge reviewed the case and provided recommendations; however, the recommendation did not adequately demonstrate a thorough review of the record. Although detailed findings are not required, enough evidence must be recited to ensure a complete review. It has been established that if the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) fails to obtain a valid waiver of counsel, the Secretary must demonstrate that the record was sufficiently developed. In this instance, the court does not need to address the burden of proof or the Secretary's heightened duty, as the record indicates that the evidence was fully and fairly developed.
