Tracy J. Martinez, Appellee/cross v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, Appellant/cross
Docket: 17-3602
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; April 25, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Tracy J. Martinez, a former employee of Union Pacific Railroad Company, filed a lawsuit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) after sustaining injuries from a fall off a ramp while directing a locomotive. The jury awarded Martinez $260,000, attributing 25% of the fault to him, resulting in a net judgment of $195,000. Martinez's accident occurred shortly after a disciplinary hearing that led to his termination. The ramp lacked proper safety features, such as warning markings or a protective rail at the end, despite having handrails on the sides. Union Pacific's attempts to file post-trial motions were initially dismissed as untimely due to an incorrect calculation of deadlines by the district court, but the court later acknowledged its mistake and denied the motions on their merits. Union Pacific appealed, but Martinez argued that the appeal was filed beyond the allowable thirty-day period under Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, claiming that the tolling period had expired with the initial ruling. The court disagreed with Martinez's interpretation regarding the filing deadline.
The district court's implicit vacating of its October 19 order during reconsideration revived Union Pacific's original motions, which the court then considered on November 2, 1994, leading to a denial of those motions. This denial established a new thirty-day appeal period, making Union Pacific's November 30 appeal timely. The court addressed substantive issues, including Union Pacific's challenge to the exclusion of two witnesses not listed in the pretrial order. During trial, Union Pacific called Martinez, who admitted discussing self-injury for job insurance but denied intent to orchestrate an accident. The court sustained objections to calling the two witnesses, citing Nebraska Local Rule 16.2, which prohibits testimony from unlisted witnesses unless good cause is shown. Consequently, the court instructed the jury to disregard Martinez's prior statements and denied a motion for a continuance to allow further development of the case, asserting that it would disrupt the jury’s retention of information. Union Pacific contended that the witness exclusion was in error and argued that the impeachment exception to the local rule should apply.
The trial court possesses broad discretion regarding the admission of witness testimony not disclosed prior to trial, as established in Citizens Bank v. Ford Motor Co. Factors influencing the court's decision to exclude such witnesses include: (1) the actual prejudice or surprise faced by the opposing party, (2) the ability of that party to address the prejudice, (3) potential disruption to the trial's efficiency, and (4) any bad faith or willfulness in failing to follow court orders. The district court has significant latitude in applying local rules, with appellate review limited to cases of manifest error or abuse of discretion.
In the current case, the characterization of witness testimony as either impeachment or rebuttal is critical. Impeachment challenges a witness's credibility, while rebuttal aims to counter opposing evidence. The pretrial witness disclosure rule serves to prevent unfair surprise at trial by notifying parties of who will testify. The court determined that Union Pacific's testimony was rebuttal, intended to prove fraud against Martinez rather than merely attacking his credibility. This fraud issue was not included in prior pleadings or the pretrial order, and Union Pacific had knowledge of the witnesses before trial, creating an unfair surprise for Martinez who could not prepare a defense. Thus, the district court correctly excluded the testimony.
Union Pacific also contested the denial of its motion to exclude evidence regarding Martinez's lost wages and earning capacity. The court permitted the jury to evaluate Martinez's damages based on the disparity between his previous salary at Union Pacific and his current income as a paralegal. Union Pacific argued that the economic expert's calculations were flawed, presuming Martinez would have remained a trainman until age 67, and that it was unable to counter this expert testimony due to the exclusion of evidence regarding Martinez's job termination.
Evidence of Martinez's prior earnings at Union Pacific was appropriately admitted, as an economic expert testified that Martinez could have earned a similar wage at an automotive body repair business prior to his injury. The court limited evidence regarding Martinez's dismissal from Union Pacific, determining it was irrelevant and prejudicial. Union Pacific's claim that Martinez's lost earning capacity was speculative was rejected; medical testimony confirmed the permanence of his injuries and their direct connection to the January 10, 1990 accident.
Union Pacific argued it was not negligent, citing Martinez's familiarity with the platform and lack of prior complaints from other employees. However, to establish negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), Martinez needed to demonstrate that Union Pacific failed to provide a safe workplace. FELA does not require the highest degree of care, only that of a reasonable person. Evidence indicated Union Pacific did not install end rails on a high platform and failed to mark its edge, creating a foreseeable risk of injury to distracted employees. A jury could reasonably conclude that Union Pacific's negligence contributed, even slightly, to Martinez's injury, thus the court correctly denied Union Pacific’s motions for directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law.
In Martinez's cross-appeal, he contested the sufficiency of evidence supporting the instruction on his contributory negligence. Under FELA, the burden of proof lies with the defendant, who can receive a jury instruction on contributory negligence if any supporting evidence exists.
Union Pacific presented evidence indicating that Martinez sustained an injury after falling from a ramp he used frequently during his employment. He was aware of the ramp's dimensions and the absence of end rails. Martinez acknowledged that his fall resulted from misjudging his position on the ramp. Although he had a responsibility to direct locomotive movement, he also had an obligation to remain alert and exercise reasonable care for his safety. Consequently, the jury could reasonably determine that Martinez failed to exercise due care, justifying Union Pacific's entitlement to submit this theory for jury consideration.
The district court's judgment is affirmed. The court concluded that Union Pacific was not negligent since it could not foresee the injury to Martinez, as no other employees had complained or been injured on the platform. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), to prove negligence, Martinez needed to show that Union Pacific breached its duty to provide a safe workplace. While FELA does not require the highest degree of care, it mandates reasonable care. Evidence indicated that Union Pacific failed to install end rails on a high platform and did not mark the platform's end, creating a foreseeable risk of injury. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine Union Pacific's negligence contributed to Martinez's injury, thus denying motions for a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law.
In a cross-appeal, Martinez contested the evidence supporting the jury instruction on his contributory negligence. Union Pacific argued that Martinez was familiar with the unsafe ramp and misjudged his position, indicating a lack of due care. The court agreed that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider Martinez's contributory negligence, allowing this theory to be presented.
