Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; November 29, 2016; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Appellants Kent W. Abernathy, Commissioner of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), and Bernard Carter, Prosecuting Attorney for Lake County, appeal the trial court's denial of their motions to correct errors related to the court’s upholding of the petitions for judicial review filed by five Appellees: Eric C. Gulden, Jeremy Crawford, David J. Klahn, John P. Martin, and James M. Panozzo. The primary issue on appeal is whether Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4(e), which mandates that the BMV utilize the dates of offenses rather than the dates of judgments to determine an individual's status as a habitual traffic violator (HTV), infringes upon the ex post facto clauses of the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions. This concern arises particularly for those who committed their third HTV-qualifying offense before the provision's effective date, yet whose third judgment occurred afterward.
The facts reveal that each Appellee accumulated multiple offenses leading to their classifications as HTVs. Gulden received his HTV notification on May 1, 2014, after a series of offenses dating back to 2003. Crawford was notified on September 9, 2014, following his last qualifying judgment. Klahn’s HTV status was communicated to him on October 19, 2013, after his offenses from 2002 to 2011. Martin was informed of his HTV status on May 14, 2014, after incidents spanning from 2004 to 2008. Each Appellee subsequently filed petitions for judicial review of their HTV determinations.
On February 7, 2004, Panozzo was found guilty of reckless driving, with judgment entered on March 15, 2004. He was later convicted of operating while intoxicated on April 21, 2007, with judgment on October 19, 2007, and for operating while intoxicated endangering a person on December 23, 2011, with judgment on April 28, 2014. Following these offenses, on May 14, 2014, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) notified him of his Habitual Traffic Violator (HTV) status, resulting in a ten-year license suspension. Panozzo requested an administrative review of this determination, which the BMV upheld on June 25, 2014. Subsequently, he filed a petition for judicial review.
The trial court granted judicial review for Panozzo and other Appellees based on Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4, which defines HTV status. The court highlighted that a legislative amendment effective July 1, 2012, shifted the determination from judgment dates to the dates of offense for calculating the ten-year limitation for HTV status. Despite the time between the first and third qualifying convictions exceeding ten years, judgments were entered after the amendment. Consequently, the BMV's application of the new statute retroactively was deemed to violate the ex post facto clauses of both the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions.
In response, the BMV filed motions for correction of error and relief from judgment, arguing that the HTV statute's purpose was public safety rather than punishment, thus claiming the ex post facto clause did not apply. The trial court denied these motions. The BMV subsequently appealed the trial court's decision concerning five cases, which were consolidated for appeal.
The standard of review for the denial of a new trial is for abuse of discretion, while a constitutional challenge to a statute is reviewed de novo, maintaining a presumption of constitutionality until proven otherwise. The burden of proof lies with the party challenging the statute's constitutionality, and reasonable interpretations favoring the statute's validity will be preferred. The reviewing court can only declare a statute unconstitutional based on the specific facts of a case.
Ind.Code 9-30-10-4 establishes that an individual is classified as a habitual violator of traffic laws if they accumulate three judgments for specific violations (including operating a vehicle while intoxicated and reckless driving) within a ten-year period. The statute was amended in 2012 to include subsection 4(e), which specifies that the offense date is used to determine judgments accrued within this timeframe.
The court found that all appellees—Gulden, Crawford, Klahn, Martin, and Panozzo—qualified as habitual violators based on their offenses and corresponding judgments. Although the time elapsed between each appellee’s first and third qualifying judgment exceeded ten years, at least one judgment for each was issued after the effective date of the 2012 amendment. Consequently, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) suspended their driving privileges for ten years, as mandated by the statute.
However, the trial court ruled that subsection 4(e) violated the ex post facto clause of both the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions because it retroactively classified the appellees as habitual violators based on the dates of their offenses rather than the dates of their judgments, which had been entered before the amendment. The BMV is contesting this ruling, arguing against the trial court’s interpretation of the ex post facto implications.
Both the U.S. Constitution and the Indiana Constitution prohibit ex post facto laws, which are laws that retroactively impose penalties for actions that were not punishable at the time they were committed or that increase the penalties for an offense. The ex post facto clause aims to ensure individuals have fair warning of potential criminal penalties. Although Indiana's constitutional language is similar to the federal version, state courts apply an independent analysis, potentially leading to different interpretations based on Indiana's legal context.
In the case at hand, it is acknowledged that the application of a specific statutory provision (subsection 4(e)) has an ex post facto effect on the Appellees, who committed their offenses prior to the relevant statutory amendment but were judged under the new law. The Indiana Constitution mandates that criminal proceedings should follow the law that was in effect at the time of the offense. However, the ex post facto clause does not guarantee that all aspects of the law at the time of the crime must apply; it is limited to substantive laws and does not restrict legislative changes to procedural matters. Thus, while procedural modifications that negatively affect a defendant are not considered ex post facto, any substantive changes that retroactively enhance penalties are subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Determining whether the amendment of I.C. 9-30-10-4(e) by the General Assembly is procedural or substantive is essential for applying ex post facto provisions under Indiana and U.S. law. Procedural law pertains to the methods of enforcing rights, while substantive law defines and regulates those rights. An amendment is classified as procedural if it does not alter the crime's elements or increase punishment for crimes committed before the amendment's effective date.
In Ramon v. State, the court ruled that an amendment changing felony charges from Class B to Class A did not violate ex post facto provisions because the amendment was procedural, as it did not create new crimes or modify sentencing laws. Similarly, in Hurst v. State, the court noted that the legislature's rapid amendment of I.C. 35-34-1-5(b) in response to the Fajardo decision reflected a legislative intent to restore prior practices regarding substantive amendments. Although the amendment did not explicitly allow retroactive application, the court inferred this intent from the urgency of the legislative action. Further, prior to Fajardo, case law permitted substantive amendments at any time if the defendant's rights were not prejudiced. The quick legislative response demonstrates a clear intent to negate the effects of the Fajardo ruling.
The Indiana legislature clarified the enforcement method for habitual traffic violator (HTV) determinations with the addition of subsection 4(e) to I.C. 9-30-10-4 in 2012. This amendment specifies that the HTV status is not triggered by the commission of the third qualifying offense but rather by the judgment for that offense. Prior to the amendment, a person with three qualifying judgments within ten years faced a ten-year administrative suspension of driving privileges. Subsection 4(e) established that while the HTV application is based on the judgment, the dates of the offenses must be considered to determine if they occurred within the ten-year timeframe. The amendment did not alter the elements or penalties of the offense, thus it is not considered an ex post facto law. The HTV statute serves to regulate dangerous driving behavior and protect public safety. Since the amendment merely clarifies procedural aspects without affecting the substantive rights or penalties of defendants, it does not violate ex post facto clauses. The trial court's judgment is reversed. Additionally, Justice Brown dissents, noting that while the trial court did not provide reasons for granting Crawford's petition, it raised similar ex post facto arguments as others. The Fajardo case is referenced regarding the timing of substantive amendments to charges, emphasizing that amendments should not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights.
