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Piotrowski v. State

Citation: 24 N.E.3d 1051Docket: No. 46A03-1306-CR-222

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; February 17, 2014; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Tanner Piotrowski appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to Exclude evidence from the State Department of Toxicology. He contends that the Title 21 Department was legally terminated on July 1, 2011, and argues that the transition to the Title 10 Department rendered any subsequent evidence, particularly certificates related to breath testing, invalid due to a lack of rule-making authority after the expiration of the transition period on July 1, 2012. The trial court, however, ruled against Piotrowski's Motion, asserting that the Title 10 Department is operating under the previously established 260 IAC Rules from the Title 21 Department, and that legislative intent preserves prior regulations until new ones are enacted. The court's decision affirms the validity of the evidence in question.

The rules in question remain effective until amended or repealed by another emergency or permanent rule, as per Indiana Code 9-30-6-5.5(b). On June 12, 2013, Piotrowski filed a motion to certify an interlocutory order, which was granted the same day. He subsequently filed a petition for jurisdiction, granted on July 19, 2013, leading to a stay of all trial court proceedings pending the appeal's resolution.

The primary issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Piotrowski’s motion to exclude evidence. Standard review involves interpreting conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling, while also considering any substantial, uncontested evidence favoring the defendant. The trial court's decision to deny the motion was based on its interpretation of Ind. Code 10-20-2, particularly section 10-20-2-7. Statutory interpretations are reviewed de novo, focusing on the statute's express language and construction rules. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is applied as written. If it allows for multiple interpretations, the court seeks to understand legislative intent to avoid irrational outcomes.

Public Law Number 158-2011 established the Title 10 Department, which includes provisions that treat references to the former state department of toxicology as references to the new department and transferred its properties and obligations. Piotrowski contends that Ind. Code 9-30-6-5(a), as amended, alongside Ind. Code 10-20-2-7(a) and (d), necessitates the reversal of the denial of his motion to exclude evidence. He argues that the legislative intent was to rescind the regulatory authority of the former Title 21 Department, assigning the mandate for toxicology regulations to the Title 10 Department.

Piotrowski asserts that the sunset provision in Ind. Code 10-20-2-7(d) created a deadline for regulations from the Title 21 Department, leading to a lack of legal regulations after July 1, 2012, due to the Title 10 Department's failure to promulgate its own rules. He claims that evidence should be excluded based on this lack of regulations and argues that the court incorrectly referenced Van Allen v. State and Ind. Code 9-30-6-5.5(b) to support the notion that the Title 21 Department's toxicology rules remained effective until replaced. Piotrowski contends that Ind. Code 9-30-6-5.5 is expired and that the legislative intent was for the Title 10 Department to create new rules after July 1, 2012, rather than continuing the old ones. 

The State counters that both parties agree the Title 10 Department began operating under the rules at 260 Ind. Admin. Code 1.1 on July 1, 2011, and that Piotrowski’s argument hinges on the belief that these rules expired with Ind. Code 10-20-2-7. The State contends the legislature intended to transfer control, including existing rules, from the Title 21 Department to the Title 10 Department. It cites Ind. Code 1-1-5-5, which protects the validity of transfers made prior to a statute's expiration, asserting this applies to the transfer of rules to the Title 10 Department. The State argues that if Piotrowski's reading of Section 7 were accurate, it would undermine the validity of other property and obligation transfers made at the same time, which the legislature could not have intended. Overall, the State maintains that the clear legislative intent was to transfer control of the toxicology department from the Indiana University School of Medicine to the State of Indiana. The court agrees with the State's arguments.

Piotrowski's assertion that the sunset provision in Section 7(d) leads to the expiration and unenforceability of rules from the former Title 21 Department is incorrect, as it contradicts Indiana Code 1-1-5-5. This statute clarifies that any repeal or expiration of enabling statutes does not affect the validity of rules transferred prior to such repeal or expiration. Therefore, the rules at 260 IAC 1.1 remain enforceable. The argument implies that if Section 7 expired on July 1, 2012, it would also impact the transfer of toxicology department assets to the Title 10 Department, which the legislature did not intend.

Additionally, Piotrowski incorrectly claims that Ind. Code 9-30-6-5.5 is no longer effective. This statute, added by Public Law 220-2011, remains in force, and its amendments do not alter this analysis. Ind. Code 9-30-6-5.5(a) grants authority for rule adoption to both the Title 21 and Title 10 Department directors, outlining that rules are effective upon filing and will expire only under specific conditions.

The legislature intended for Ind. Code 10-20-2-7 to transfer control of the Department of Toxicology without necessitating new rules for breath testing, allowing the State to rely on previously established rules. Consequently, the court's denial of Piotrowski’s Motion to Exclude was upheld. The State also contended that even if new rules were required, the breath test evidence remains admissible if all procedural requirements were followed, a point the court did not need to address due to its agreement with the interpretation of Ind. Code 10-20-2-7. Piotrowski's claim that the legislature did not extend authority in P.L. 158-2011 is unfounded, as Ind. Code 9-30-6-5.5 had not yet been enacted at that time. The rules under Ind. Code 9-30-6-5.5(b) become effective upon filing and expire under specific conditions, ensuring continuity until new rules are adopted.