Starnes v. United States

Citation: 14 F. App'x 569Docket: No. 99-5144

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 17, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Douglas R. Starnes, a pro se federal prisoner, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The district court found that Starnes missed the filing deadline for such petitions and ruled that the time was not tolled during his pending motion for a new trial under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, which he argued was based on a Fourth Amendment violation related to evidence used in his conviction for marijuana possession with intent to distribute. 

Starnes was indicted on November 16, 1992, for conspiracy to distribute marijuana and possession with intent to distribute, convicted after a jury trial, and sentenced to 78 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. His conviction was upheld on appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. On March 5, 1996, he filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the district court as untimely and frivolous, as it was filed nearly three years post-conviction without newly discovered evidence. This denial was also affirmed on appeal. 

While the appeal of his Rule 33 motion was pending, Starnes filed for an extension of time to submit a § 2255 motion, which the district court denied, stating the motion was either untimely or not properly tolled. Starnes did not appeal this denial and later submitted his § 2255 motion on July 15, 1998, which was received by the court on July 17, 1998. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

The district court rejected the Petitioner’s 2255 motion due to untimeliness and also denied a certificate of appealability, suggesting that any appeal would not be pursued in good faith. The Petitioner subsequently filed a timely appeal, which was interpreted by this Court as an application for a certificate of appealability under FED. R. APP. P. 22(B). On August 27, 1999, this Court granted the certificate, focusing on the issue of whether the statute of limitations in 2255 should be tolled. The Court typically reviews legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, but it reviews decisions on equitable tolling for abuse of discretion.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a one-year statute of limitations for habeas corpus motions, which begins from one of several specified dates related to the finality of the conviction or the discovery of facts supporting the claim. The Court referenced its prior decision in Capaldi v. Pontesso, which stated that a district court cannot consider a 2255 application while a direct appeal is pending, unless extraordinary circumstances exist. This principle is based on the notion that a 2255 motion should not replace a direct appeal and that a decision on appeal may eliminate the need for a collateral attack. However, this concern does not apply once a conviction is final. 

The Court concurred with the district court's view that extending the Capaldi ruling to prohibit 2255 motions during the appeal of Rule 33 new trial motions is inappropriate. Instead, it noted that other benchmarks should be considered to determine finality in the criminal process. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have determined that a conviction is considered final for 2255 purposes when the court of appeals issues its mandate, particularly in cases where the defendant chose not to file a petition for writ of certiorari.

The Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have established that a conviction is considered final, and the one-year limitation period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari begins, once the deadline for such a petition has lapsed. A recent district court decision within this Circuit aligned with this view, stating that it is illogical to require a prisoner to contemplate a 2255 motion while still having the option for direct Supreme Court review. Consequently, the Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 31, 1994, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Since his direct appeal concluded before the AEDPA was enacted, the one-year filing window for his 2255 petition commenced on April 24, 1996, and expired on April 24, 1997. The Petitioner filed his 2255 petition on August 15, 1998, exceeding the limitations period. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the petition was justified unless equitable tolling applies. This Circuit has not previously determined the applicability of equitable tolling in 2255 cases, nor established a standard for its application. However, the court opted not to address these issues as the Petitioner did not convincingly argue for equitable tolling based on any standard. The government contends that equitable tolling is unavailable in 2255 cases due to statutory text, while most courts have treated the one-year limitation as a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling. Nevertheless, the government argues that even if applicable, the Petitioner has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances that would justify its application in this case.

The Court has not established a specific standard for applying equitable tolling to habeas petitions, but previous cases suggest it is limited to "rare and exceptional circumstances." In Doran v. Birkett, the Court indicated that equitable tolling might only be applicable under certain stringent conditions, referencing other circuits that similarly restrict its application. Some cases have utilized a five-factor test from the Title VII context, but there is inconsistency in the standards used for habeas petitions. In the current case, the Petitioner argues that the pendency of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial and its appeal should toll the one-year limitations period for a 2255 motion. However, the Court finds that the Petitioner’s conviction was final before the Rule 33 motion was filed, rendering it insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Additionally, there is no evidence that the appeal of the Rule 33 motion hindered the Petitioner’s ability to file a 2255 motion. The Court notes the Petitioner was aware of the one-year limitations period prior to its expiration, as he filed a motion for an extension, and ignorance of the law does not excuse the failure to file promptly. Consequently, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the circumstances presented.

Ignorance of the law does not exempt incarcerated pro se petitioners from late filing requirements. In the case at hand, the application of equitable tolling would unfairly prejudice the government and extend litigation unnecessarily, as the petitioner delayed filing a habeas petition despite being aware of the deadline. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the petitioner's 2255 motion as untimely, stating that while the statute allows for challenges to a sentence on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds, the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1) is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling. However, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in not applying this doctrine. Furthermore, the courts lack jurisdiction to extend the time for filing 2255 motions unless the petition is filed, which the petitioner did not do within the required timeframe, as the limitations period had already expired before his extension request.