Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; August 25, 2011; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Argonaut Insurance Company appeals a trial court's summary judgment and declaratory judgment favoring Christopher T. Jones, both individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Monroe County Sheriff’s Deputy Sarah I. Jones. The case arises from Deputy Jones's death after being struck by a vehicle driven by Bree Myers while she was on duty directing traffic at an accident scene on Indiana State Road 45.
The court affirms the trial court's decision, addressing several key issues:
1. Whether Deputy Jones qualifies as an 'insured' under the Monroe County Sheriff Department’s automobile insurance policy, thus entitling her to coverage under the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UIM) endorsement.
2. Whether the accident that resulted in her death was connected to her use of a police vehicle as defined by the insurance policy and Indiana law.
3. Whether her death is covered by the policy despite a general exclusion for injuries occurring in the course of employment.
On October 17, 2008, while on duty, Deputy Jones responded to a vehicle slide-off, parked her cruiser in a nearby store's lot, and was instructed by tow-truck driver Stephen Sims to block a lane for safety. She engaged her emergency lights and began directing traffic. Approximately fifteen minutes later, while she was actively directing traffic, Myers’s Jeep struck her at a high speed. Following the incident, Deputy Jones sustained severe injuries and, after being transported to two hospitals, passed away on October 19, 2008, without regaining consciousness.
Myers had automotive insurance with bodily injury limits of $50,000, which her insurer, State Farm, agreed to pay to Deputy Jones. The Monroe County Board of Commissioners insured Deputy Jones's vehicle with Argonaut, which included a UIM endorsement with limits of $1,000,000 per incident. On March 25, 2009, Deputy Jones filed a lawsuit against Myers, State Farm, Argonaut, and Lexington National Insurance Corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment that Argonaut was liable under the UIM endorsement for losses related to the collision caused by Myers. Jones requested a jury trial.
After discovery, Jones filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Argonaut on July 27, 2009, asserting that Deputy Jones was covered under Argonaut's UIM endorsement. Supporting evidence included Argonaut’s policy, an affidavit from Sims, and a crash reconstruction report. Following additional discovery, Jones amended his motion on February 2, 2010, introducing new evidence such as deposition testimony and an affirmation from Police Chief Joseph Pitcher regarding the circumstances of the collision.
On March 30, 2010, Argonaut moved for summary judgment on all issues while also responding to Jones's motion. After reviewing the cross-motions on June 30, 2010, the trial court granted Jones’s motion for Deputy Jones’s estate and denied Argonaut’s motion, concluding there were no material facts in dispute regarding UIM coverage and Deputy Jones’s use of her police vehicle at the time of the collision. However, the court granted summary judgment for Argonaut regarding Jones's individual claims.
On November 17, 2010, Jones and Argonaut agreed to waive a jury trial, allowing the trial court to determine whether Deputy Jones’s injuries were caused by her use of the police car, based on the previously submitted evidence. The court issued a Declaratory Judgment Order on December 1, 2010, reaffirming that Deputy Jones's injuries and death were due to her police car use while directing traffic on October 17, 2008. A nunc pro tunc order on February 22, 2011, amended the judgment to include Trial Rule 54(B) language, indicating no just reason for delay in entering judgment for Deputy Jones’s estate against Argonaut. An appeal followed.
Argonaut appeals the trial court's summary judgment ruling against it and the related Declaratory Judgment Order, specifically questioning whether Deputy Jones was covered under Argonaut’s Underinsured Motorist (UIM) endorsement and if she was using her police vehicle as defined by the policy's liability provisions. The standard for reviewing summary judgment requires determining if a “genuine issue as to any material fact” exists and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, favoring the non-moving party in factual interpretations. The moving party must demonstrate no genuine issues exist, after which the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show otherwise. Legal interpretations of insurance policies are typically suitable for summary judgment. A trial court's summary judgment decision carries a presumption of validity, and the appellant must prove the judgment was erroneous. The review process remains unchanged even with opposing summary judgment motions, which are assessed independently.
Additionally, Argonaut disputes the trial court's finding that Deputy Jones's injuries were tied to her use of the police vehicle, claiming the court's failure to specify facts in this determination. Under Trial Rule 52, a trial court must provide specific findings and conclusions when deciding without a jury, and appellate reversal of such findings is only possible if deemed clearly erroneous. Findings are classified as clearly erroneous if unsupported by evidence or reasonable inferences, with appellate review focused solely on evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment, without re-evaluating credibility or evidence weight. However, legal determinations by the trial court are reviewed de novo, without deference.
The standard of review for judgments under Trial Rule 52 varies based on whether specific findings and conclusions are entered sua sponte or upon a motion by a party. When findings are made on motion, the usual review standard applies. However, if findings are made sua sponte, those findings govern the review only for the specific issues they address. In cases with no specific findings, a general judgment standard applies, allowing affirmation on any legal theory supported by trial evidence. In this instance, Argonaut argues that the trial court did not make specific findings regarding Deputy Jones's use of her patrol car and its relevance to her injuries and death. The court ruled on summary judgment motions based on evidence provided by the parties and later received a stipulation requesting judgment without a jury, relying solely on that evidence. Consequently, the court's review standard for this case is based on sua sponte findings.
Regarding the construction of Argonaut's insurance policy, it follows the same rules applicable to other contracts. The interpretation aims to reflect the parties' intent as expressed in the contract, considering the entire policy rather than isolated terms. Clear and unambiguous language is interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, while ambiguities allow for multiple interpretations without creating ambiguity solely due to differing party views. When interpreting, efforts are made to harmonize conflicting provisions. Generally, ambiguities favor the insured. Argonaut argues that Deputy Jones is not a named insured under the UIM policy, suggesting a neutral construction of ambiguities since she is a third party. Prior cases indicate that a neutral stance is applied when the claimant is not a party to the contract.
In the discussed cases, claimants were not connected to the policyholders, highlighting the importance of the relationship between insured individuals and the insurance policy. Specifically, Lumbermens involved a subrogation claim by a homeowner's insurance against an employer's auto insurance. American Family sought compensation for its insured from a separate auto insurance policy, while Burkett involved a claim against a policy owned by a tortfeasor's relative. Barga's claim was similarly denied due to ambiguities not favoring her. Importantly, Deputy Jones is not a stranger to the policyholder; she is an employee and an unnamed insured under the policy, which aims to provide liability and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Argonaut does not dispute her status as an insured but claims she is not covered for the current incident. The ruling emphasizes that UIM insurance is designed to protect insured individuals as if the other party had met the statutory insurance requirements, and any attempt to limit this coverage against public policy is disallowed. Courts have ruled that if someone is insured under the liability section, they must also be covered under the UIM section to comply with public policy. Argonaut contests that Deputy Jones was not occupying her patrol car at the time of the incident, claiming she does not qualify for coverage under the UIM endorsement. Jones counters that she was indeed occupying the vehicle as stipulated by the policy terms. Each argument regarding Deputy Jones's coverage status is to be examined in detail.
Argonaut acknowledges that if an individual qualifies as an insured under the liability policy related to the underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement, UIM coverage and limits are applicable, regardless of direct coverage under the UIM endorsement itself. The trial court's judgment favoring Deputy Jones was based on this premise, rather than an interpretation of the UIM endorsement's terms. The primary issue at hand is whether Deputy Jones was using her patrol car in accordance with the liability policy's terms. Argonaut argues that the trial court inaccurately granted summary judgment, asserting that Deputy Jones was not legally using her patrol car under the policy, thus negating her entitlement to UIM coverage. The insurance policy stipulates coverage for damages resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered auto by an insured, defining "insured" to include the Monroe County Board of Commissioners or anyone using a covered auto with permission. The term "use" is not explicitly defined in the policy; therefore, it is interpreted according to its ordinary meaning within the context of the entire policy. Deputy Jones's operation of her patrol car for traffic control and accident site safety, including positioning the vehicle with emergency lights on, is deemed to align with the ordinary meaning of "use." The court referenced a precedent from Lumbermens, where the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that an injury not directly resulting from the use of a vehicle did not fall under the coverage of that vehicle's insurance policy, emphasizing the necessity for the use of the vehicle to be the efficient and predominant cause of the injury for coverage to apply.
The court distinguishes between "use" and causation in interpreting insurance coverage, emphasizing the purpose of the vehicle's use and the intent of the insurance parties. In Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Campos, the court affirmed that a tow-truck operator was covered under the term "use" when engaged in activities related to towing, even if not physically by the vehicle. The court also recognized that activities like pulling a bus in a contest constituted "use" due to the vehicle's designed purpose. Conversely, in cases like Moons v. Keith, coverage was denied when a car was merely a site for an unrelated criminal act, and in Estate of Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. Co., no coverage existed for a passenger not actively using the vehicle. The determination of coverage hinges on the claimant's active relationship with the vehicle and the reasonable expectations of the insurance parties. The trial court ruled correctly that Deputy Jones was using her patrol car appropriately for traffic control and accident scene security during an incident, supported by testimonies confirming that her vehicle's deployment was essential and consistent with the agreed purpose of its use.
Argonaut failed to provide evidence showing that Deputy Jones's actions regarding her patrol car were inconsistent with its use for traffic control at the slide-off site. Instead, Argonaut emphasized factors such as Deputy Jones’s distance from her car, the car's positioning, and the time spent directing traffic. However, the critical issue is whether Deputy Jones maintained an active relationship with her vehicle at the time of the collision. The time spent directing traffic and the specific distance from the patrol car are not determinative as long as she was engaged with the vehicle's purpose.
Testimony from Trooper Fitzgerald and accident reconstruction evidence indicated that Deputy Jones's patrol car was positioned correctly to provide traffic control and safety, countering Argonaut's claims. Photographs and diagrams supported that the patrol car was not obscured by other vehicles, contrary to assertions made by witnesses. Consequently, Deputy Jones's active relationship with her patrol car was firmly established, demonstrating that the car was in "use."
Furthermore, the insurance policy with Argonaut explicitly covered vehicles used by law enforcement officers for traffic control during accidents, aligning with the expected duties of such officers. The nature of Deputy Jones's use of the patrol car in this context fell within the reasonable scope of the policy, confirming that her actions while directing traffic constituted a valid use of the vehicle as per the insurance agreement.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Jones regarding the use of the patrol car under Argonaut’s insurance policy while denying Argonaut's request for summary judgment on the same issue. Argonaut argues that even if Deputy Jones was using the patrol car, her injuries and death did not arise from that use, thus excluding recovery under the liability provisions of the policy. Argonaut emphasizes that insured injuries must be 'caused by an accident' resulting from the use of a covered 'auto,' with the term 'resulting from' remaining undefined in the policy. The court must interpret whether Jones's injuries and death align with the reasonable expectations of the parties involved. Argonaut cites the Lumbermens case, asserting that coverage applies only if the use of the insured vehicle is the proximate cause of the injuries. In Lumbermens, the injured party's activity was not deemed within the policy's scope, unlike the situation here. The court notes that while no local precedent specifically interprets 'resulting from' in the Argonaut policy, other jurisdictions have addressed similar language with varying conclusions. Cases such as Spencer, Tobel, and McMichael suggest that injuries related to the use of specialized vehicles or while engaged in activities essential to the vehicle's use may fall within the policy's coverage. Ultimately, the court finds that cases favoring coverage present stronger reasoning, particularly referencing McMichael, where a worker's injuries while using their truck as protection were covered.
McMichael’s claim was distinguished from cases where a vehicle was only the accident's location. The Colorado court determined that McMichael's injuries were connected to his use of a truck as a barricade and warning device, as he took precautions to alert passing cars before beginning work, making the truck integral to his job and causally linked to the accident. Similarly, for the Board of Commissioners and Argonaut, using specialized patrol cars for traffic control and safety at accident sites aligns with reasonable expectations. Deputy Jones’s injuries and death occurred while she directed traffic on State Road 45 using her patrol car with emergency lights activated, which was deemed an appropriate use of the vehicle. Argonaut did not dispute the trial court's factual findings but argued that it misapplied the law regarding the connection between the injuries and the use of the patrol car. The court found no legal error, emphasizing that Deputy Jones’s use of the vehicle was essential for her duties. The fact that her patrol car failed to provide protection did not affect the determination that her injuries were a result of her active use of the vehicle for its intended purpose. Argonaut's concern about being liable for all officer injuries on duty was dismissed, as Deputy Jones's situation was not analogous to instances where officers did not actively use their vehicles. The court upheld the trial court's conclusion that her injuries arose from her use of the patrol car.
Argonaut argues that Deputy Jones is not entitled to coverage under its UIM endorsement and liability terms due to an exclusion in its insurance policy, which states that coverage does not apply to bodily injury sustained by an employee in the course of their employment. Argonaut contends that, while directing traffic, Deputy Jones was engaged in employment-related conduct, thus invoking the exclusion. Insurers are generally permitted to limit liability as long as their exclusions are consistent with public policy and clearly expressed in the policy. Exclusionary clauses must unmistakably indicate the acts that trigger them, with any ambiguity construed against the insurer to uphold the indemnity purpose of the policy. Indiana case law does not provide a direct precedent for Argonaut's claim regarding the employment exclusion's applicability to Deputy Jones, although several other states have upheld similar provisions, particularly in contexts involving employee claims against employers or co-employees where worker's compensation is available.
The court upheld the validity of a holding provision in light of Michigan’s worker’s compensation and automobile insurance statutes. In the case, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. North River Insurance Company, the court determined that an employment exclusion was not applicable when an employee’s estate sued the employer and the employer’s insurance carrier for negligence related to an accident. The insurer, Argonaut, argued that Deputy Jones's activities directing traffic on duty fell under the employment exclusion. However, the court found that the exclusion did not apply based on the reasonable expectations of all parties involved. It noted that vehicles are essential to law enforcement duties, and any interpretation that excludes coverage for such use would render the insurance policy virtually meaningless. Deputy Jones sought coverage under an underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement purchased by her employer to protect against losses from uninsured drivers, which aligned with the intended purpose of the endorsement. The court concluded that Argonaut's exclusion interpretation would undermine the UIM endorsement's effectiveness, which is contrary to public policy. It affirmed that Deputy Jones was using her patrol car at the time of the accident, thus supporting her claim for coverage under the UIM endorsement. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Deputy Jones was upheld, confirming that her injuries were indeed a result of her use of the patrol car, consistent with the expectations of the insurance agreement.
The employment exception does not apply in this case, as it contradicts the reasonable expectations of the parties and would create an illusory insurance policy, violating established public policies favoring coverage. The decision is affirmed by Judges Friedlander and Brown. There was a factual dispute regarding distance measurements related to an incident, which the trial court considered while favoring the non-moving party in summary judgment motions. Argonaut claimed that statements from Chief Pitcher, a police chief, were inadmissible as they constituted legal conclusions rather than expert opinions; however, no trial court ruling on this issue appears in the record, and it was not raised on appeal, making Pitcher's statements admissible for review. The trial court also identified a material fact regarding whether Deputy Jones’s injuries were a result of using her police car and addressed this in the Declaratory Judgment Order. The court will review the phrase "resulting from" concerning the Declaratory Judgment Order. Factors influencing this determination include the distance from the accident to the vehicle, the time elapsed since leaving the vehicle, the injured person's chance to reach safety, and their intentions regarding the automobile. Argonaut's arguments lack citations to legal authority, violating court rules that require all contentions to be supported by applicable statutes or precedents. Bald assertions without legal backing do not satisfy the requirements outlined in Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
