Marriage of Trackwell v. Trackwell

Citations: 740 N.E.2d 582; 2000 Ind. App. LEXIS 2056; 2000 WL 1858795Docket: No. 84A01-0006-CV-192

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 19, 2000; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Dianne M. Trackwell appeals the dissolution of her marriage to Allan D. Trackwell, focusing on whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the date of their physical separation (November 1995) for valuing marital assets. They married on June 1, 1985, without a prenuptial agreement, and had no children. Allan filed for dissolution in March 1999, with the trial court issuing a decree on May 12, 2000. The court ruled that November 1995 was a fair date for asset valuation, assigning ownership of individual pension and employee investment fund (EIF) accounts to each party. The valuation revealed significant increases in both parties' accounts from marriage to separation, leading to a court order for Allan to transfer $58,988.72 from his EIF to Dianne’s EIF account to equalize their estates.

The appellate court applies a two-tiered standard of review, assessing the support of factual findings and whether they justify the judgment. The trial court's discretion in property valuation is emphasized, with reversals occurring only for clear abuse of discretion. Dianne must overcome a presumption that the trial court adhered to statutory guidelines, specifically Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-41, which mandates a just and reasonable property division prior to final separation. The court clarifies that 'final separation' refers to the date of filing the dissolution petition, with no legal separation having occurred prior to Allan's filing.

An equal division of marital property is presumed just and reasonable by the court. Both parties agree that their pension and EIF accounts are marital assets subject to division. The trial court is mandated to divide all marital property, regardless of when it was acquired, and cannot exclude any property. The sole disagreement between the parties pertains to the valuation date for these accounts. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by not selecting a valuation date between the filing of the dissolution petition and the final hearing date. Precedents establish that the trial court has discretion to choose any date within this range for asset valuation, and multiple cases affirm this principle. No specific finding indicated the property division valuation date in this case. While the trial court could consider the date the parties ceased cohabitation, it was not an abuse of discretion to disregard this date. The trial court's choice of the parties' physical separation date for asset valuation was deemed an abuse of discretion, leading to a reversal and remand for selecting a proper valuation date. The wife claims that an equal division based on the final separation date would have resulted in her receiving at least $86,306 more in assets than allocated by the trial court.

An opinion cited by Husband, Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., was vacated upon transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. The standard for reviewing a trial court's valuation of property is identical to that for reviewing the division of property, though the procedures differ; valuation assesses asset worth, while division allocates specific assets to each party. Since neither party contests the division of marital property or the date of such division, these issues are not addressed on appeal. The Hunter court clarified that the actual separation date and the final separation date hold distinct legal meanings. In this case, actual separation occurred on February 4, 1983, with both parties responsible for their own expenses, while a stipulation set the separation date as February 11, 1983. The final separation date, relevant to the marital property division statute, determines the property included in the "marital pot." Only property acquired after this final separation date is excluded from marital assets, and the "prior to final separation" distinction applies only to property acquired individually by either spouse. Property obtained post-filing for dissolution can still be distributed if it results from joint efforts.