J.A.C. ex rel. Colter v. Koenig
Docket: No. 49A04-9912-JV-567
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; August 16, 2000; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Dennis Colter appeals an order that granted visitation rights to his son J.C.'s maternal aunt, Judy Koenig. The central issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering this visitation. The appellate court reverses the trial court's decision. Colter and Janetta Barkdull began a relationship in 1994, during which Barkdull moved in with Colter and had a son, J.C. Following Barkdull's cancer diagnosis, she appointed Koenig as J.C.'s guardian shortly before her death. Afterward, Colter filed for paternity and sought to dismiss the guardianship. The trial court ultimately awarded Colter custody of J.C. while granting Koenig visitation of one weekend per month. The court determined that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were inadequate to support the visitation order. The findings primarily addressed custody and did not adequately discuss visitation. The appellate review standard requires evidence to support the findings, which must in turn support the judgment. Since the trial court's findings did not address visitation until the judgment section—where custody was awarded to Colter and the guardianship dissolved—the appellate court found the order to be clearly erroneous. Despite Koenig's argument that the trial court’s decisions should be given deference, the lack of sufficient findings to justify visitation led to the reversal of the order. Koenig argues for the application of the legal principle from **Mitchell v. Mitchell**, which allows affirming a judgment based on any legal theory supported by the findings, particularly in family law cases where trial courts have broad discretion. However, Indiana law mandates a two-part test from **Collins v. Gilbreath** for granting visitation to non-parent third parties: the third party must demonstrate both a custodial and parental relationship and that visitation serves the children's best interests. The trial court failed to apply this test when considering visitation with Koenig, as it did not adequately determine whether her relationship with J.C. was "custodial and parental" nor did it evaluate the best interests of the child regarding visitation. Consequently, the court's order for visitation is deemed clearly erroneous and unsupported by the findings, leading to a reversal of that judgment. Colter also raises concerns regarding the legality of the visitation order and its violation of his constitutional rights to family privacy. He cites that Indiana courts have not recognized standing for third parties seeking visitation unless they are stepparents, referencing several cases that support this view. Colter further cites the **Troxel v. Granville** decision, which found unconstitutional a state statute allowing broad visitation rights. Koenig contends that her situation meets Indiana's criteria for third-party visitation, arguing against the relevance of **Troxel**. However, since the trial court's order is reversed due to insufficient findings and conclusions, the court does not address the broader implications regarding third-party visitation rights and the **Troxel** ruling. Additionally, Indiana law has a specific statutory framework for grandparent visitation.