Bremer v. Community Hospitals of Indianapolis, Inc.
Docket: No. 49A02-9105-CV-222
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 29, 1991; Indiana; State Appellate Court
The Estate of Paul and Ann Bremer appeals the dismissal of its claim against Community Hospital of Indianapolis, alleging misrepresentation of medical services quality and substandard care leading to Paul Bremer's death. The case was initiated on March 30, 1990, with Ann Bremer as the personal representative of the estate. Key facts include Paul Bremer's admission to Community Hospital on March 30, 1988, for treatment of large cell lymphoma and respiratory illness, and his subsequent death on May 9, 1988, while still hospitalized.
Community Hospital moved to dismiss the complaint on October 25, 1990, asserting that the Estate had not complied with Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act since no medical review panel had been convened to assess the complaint. The Estate contended its claim was based on the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, not medical negligence. However, the trial court determined that the allegations were fundamentally about medical negligence and dismissed the case due to noncompliance with the Medical Malpractice Act's procedural requirements.
On appeal, the Estate argues the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint, claiming it met the Deceptive Sales Act's criteria, which does not exclude healthcare service providers. Community Hospital argues that the complaint is rooted in negligence, justifying the dismissal due to the lack of a medical review panel's opinion. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, concluding that the Estate's claims fell within the scope of the Medical Malpractice Act, necessitating compliance with its provisions before bringing a lawsuit.
The Estate's complaint primarily alleges medical malpractice against Community Hospital, asserting that the hospital provided substandard care to Paul Bremer, which directly resulted in his death on May 9, 1988. These allegations align with the statutory definition of "malpractice" according to the Malpractice Act, which encompasses torts or breaches of contract related to healthcare services. Community Hospital has not contested the claim regarding misrepresentation of care quality, leading to its acceptance as true in reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the Estate's claim.
The complaint meets the criteria for proceeding under both the Deceptive Sales Act and the Malpractice Act, as Community Hospital qualifies as both a "supplier" of consumer services and a "health care provider." Paul is recognized as both a "consumer" and a "patient" under the relevant laws. The hospital's alleged actions constitute a "deceptive act" and fit the definition of malpractice. While the Malpractice Act does not apply to every situation involving healthcare providers, the Estate cites several cases where claims against medical providers proceeded without Malpractice Act compliance. However, those cases are distinguishable because they did not involve conduct classified as "malpractice" under the Act.
The key issue arises as to whether a malpractice claim can alternatively be pursued under the Deceptive Sales Act to circumvent the Malpractice Act's procedural requirements. The court has previously indicated that the legislative intent behind the Malpractice Act includes the establishment of a medical review panel to assess complaints before proceeding with litigation.
The establishment of a medical review panel by the legislature aims to assess whether healthcare providers adhered to the appropriate standard of care, indicating that the scope of the Act is limited to cases involving professional judgment. In the case of Collins, it was determined that allegations against a doctor for performing an illegal abortion without consent did not question their professional skill, allowing for jury resolution based on ordinary negligence principles. The current case involves allegations against Community Hospital, claiming it failed to meet the required standard of care in treating Paul R. Bremer, resulting in his death. These allegations necessitate expert medical testimony to evaluate the standard of care in the community, making the claims subject to the Malpractice Act due to their basis in the nature of healthcare provided. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of the complaint was justified, and the judgment was affirmed. The court's treatment of the hospital's motion as one for summary judgment was appropriate, as both parties had the opportunity to present additional evidence without prejudice. Additionally, the procedural requirements for claims under the Deceptive Sales Act differ significantly from those under the Malpractice Act, with the latter necessitating an initial complaint to the Insurance Commissioner and review by a medical panel before any court action can be initiated.
