City of Evansville v. Fehrenbacher

Citations: 517 N.E.2d 111; 1987 Ind. App. LEXIS 3408; 1987 WL 30286Docket: No. 82A04-8707-CV-206

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 29, 1987; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs Dennis Fehrenbacher, Robert Fehrenbacher, Alan Powers, and Melvin Fulner (collectively referred to as Owners) initiated legal action in the Vanderburgh Superior Court to compel the Evansville Common Council to approve a variance for constructing a car wash on their property, zoned for multi-family residential use. Defendants included the City of Evansville, the Common Council, Roger Lehman (Building Commissioner), and the Area Plan Commission. 

The trial court ruled that due to a tie vote (4-4) by the Council on the zoning change ordinance application and the Council's inaction within ninety days, the ordinance must be granted under IND. CODE 36-7-4-608(f). Consequently, summary judgment was awarded to the Owners. 

Evansville appealed, contending that the trial court misinterpreted the Council's tie vote as a failure to act. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the tie vote indeed constituted a failure to act rather than a denial. The court analyzed Indiana Code sections relevant to the legislative process, determining that a tie vote does not satisfy the requirement for a majority decision necessary for approval or rejection of the ordinance. The court highlighted that under the statute, if the Council fails to act within the specified ninety days after certification of the proposal, it automatically takes effect as if adopted. Evansville argued that a majority of those present (a quorum) was sufficient, but the court found that a majority of all elected members must vote for the ordinance to pass.

Evansville's interpretation of "vote of at least a majority" is incorrect. There is no authority supporting the idea that this phrase solely establishes a quorum requirement. Research indicates that such language has been consistently interpreted to mean that either the affirmative must receive more votes than the negative or vice versa. Historically, common law requires a majority of a quorum to either pass or defeat an ordinance, as established in cases like State ex rel Walden v. Vanosdal and Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rushville. This principle was reaffirmed in the 1986 case of Board of School Trustees of South Vermillion School Corporation v. Benetti, where the court ruled that a majority of the quorum sufficed unless the legislature specified otherwise. The court provided examples from statutes governing city and county legislative bodies, which explicitly state that a majority vote refers to a majority of all elected members. This statutory language modifies the traditional common law requirement, paralleling the language in the current issue, which also mandates action by a majority of all elected members of the body.

The Legislature intended to establish a clear process for the Council’s actions regarding ordinances. A majority vote is necessary for the Council to either adopt or reject an ordinance, as outlined in I.C. 36-7-4-608 and I.C. 36-7-4-609. The Council's failure to achieve a majority in either direction resulted in the ordinance not being adopted or rejected. Consequently, because the Council did not act within the ninety-day period specified in I.C. 36-7-4-608(f)(4), the ordinance automatically became law. The trial court correctly determined that Evansville could not impose its own rules conflicting with state statutes, and therefore, the court's decision was affirmed. Additionally, the home rule statute, I.C. 36-1-3-6, prohibits local governments from enacting conflicting ordinances. If a specific procedure is mandated for exercising a power, it must be followed.