Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; May 28, 1987; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Defendant-appellant Charles Mendez appeals his convictions for two counts of dealing in heroin, classified as Class B felonies. Mendez became acquainted with confidential informant Keith Crizer in late 1981. On January 4, 1982, Crizer attempted to purchase heroin from Mendez, who initially claimed he did not have any available. The following day, Mendez contacted Crizer to arrange a sale, leading Crizer to inform the police. Mendez sold Crizer a gram of heroin for $100, which Crizer then turned over to the police. Although the initial transaction was overheard by officers through a transmitter, the recording malfunctioned. Crizer later arranged a second purchase on January 6, which was successfully recorded. Mendez was arrested, and after a mistrial in 1983, he was convicted in a 1986 trial.
On appeal, Mendez raises four issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of an unavailable witness from his previous trial, infringing on his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (2) whether the court wrongly accepted a tape recording that Mendez claimed was inaudible; (3) whether the State established an adequate chain of custody for two heroin exhibit packets; and (4) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts.
Regarding the witness testimony, Mendez objected to the admission of Charles Brown's prior testimony on grounds of unavailability but later contended it violated his confrontation rights. The court referenced the Spence v. State case, which outlines criteria for admitting prior testimony based on the witness being under oath, the defendant having legal representation, the prior trial being recorded, and the defendant having the opportunity for cross-examination. Mendez’s argument for continuity of counsel was addressed, clarifying that while it occurred in Spence, it is not a stipulated requirement for admitting testimony from prior proceedings. In Mendez's case, all Spence criteria were met.
Brown's prior testimony was deemed admissible under established legal requirements. Mendez contended that a tape-recording of a second drug transaction was inaudible and that its admission to the jury was erroneous. Admissibility of such recordings is evaluated based on clarity and whether they contribute meaningfully to the jury's understanding, as outlined in *Lamar v. State* (1972). The trial court has discretion in this determination, which can only be overturned upon finding an abuse of that discretion. Although Mendez objected, arguing parts of the tape were unclear, the court noted jury instructions against speculation. A review showed only the first few seconds of the tape were questionable, and overall, it did not lead to speculation. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the tape.
Mendez also challenged the chain of custody for two packets of heroin, focusing on their handling between trials. However, the evidence established a proper chain from purchase to analysis, as clarified in *Smith v. State* (1983). The State does not need to eliminate all tampering possibilities but must show the evidence remained largely undisturbed. The heroin was secured by police and properly sealed by the toxicologist, who confirmed the integrity of the evidence at trial.
Finally, Mendez questioned the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction. The court reaffirmed that it does not assess witness credibility or weigh evidence but considers only the evidence favorable to the State. Mendez's claims regarding the credibility of a key witness were dismissed, and the court noted other evidence supporting his conviction. The trial court's verdict was affirmed.
