Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale

Citation: Not availableDocket: 96-4052

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 30, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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Herbert Johnson, a former employee of the City of Fort Lauderdale Fire Department, filed a complaint in 1994 alleging racial harassment, discrimination, and retaliation against the City, a former Fire Chief, and four supervisors. The claims included a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim (Count One), multiple 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (Counts Two to Five), and Title VII claims (Counts Six and Seven). The defendants sought dismissal of the § 1983 claims, arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 rendered Title VII the exclusive remedy for workplace discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The district court denied this motion but permitted an immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) due to substantial legal questions. The Eleventh Circuit framed the issue as whether the 1991 Act displaced § 1983 claims in favor of Title VII and § 1981 remedies for public sector employment discrimination. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the Act did not create such exclusivity, referencing similar decisions by the Fourth Circuit and other courts. Defendants contended that the Act's savings clause for § 1981 and the absence of one for § 1983 implied exclusivity, but the court found legislative history did not support this argument.

A House Committee Report reveals that the new provision containing the savings clause was designed to mitigate the implications of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, which restricted the interpretation of § 1981. However, concerns regarding the scope of § 1981 do not imply that Congress aimed to limit the scope of § 1983. The narrow objective of the § 1981 savings clause prevents any clear inference about Congress's intent concerning § 1983 actions. The defendants argue that the exclusion of a previously proposed provision that would have broadly defined civil rights laws and preserved § 1983 suggests a political trade-off favoring § 1981. Yet, the legislative history surrounding this omission is ambiguous, potentially reflecting concerns about the provision's impact on litigation and statutory interpretation. Thus, the omission does not clarify Congress's intent regarding the preservation or preemption of § 1983 remedies for municipal employees. The defendants also reference Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association and Smith v. Robinson, where the Supreme Court indicated that comprehensive remedial schemes in specific acts implied congressional intent to limit the use of § 1983 remedies. However, the Court emphasized that it does not lightly assume Congress intended to eliminate § 1983 as a remedy for significant equal protection claims, underscoring the importance of understanding congressional intent.

Legislative history surrounding Title VII indicates that Congress intended to allow § 1983 as a concurrent remedy for unconstitutional employment discrimination by municipalities and their employees, rather than preempting it. Circuit courts, including the Fourth Circuit in Keller v. Prince George's County, have consistently interpreted the legislative history of Title VII, particularly the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, as affirming that Title VII was not meant to replace existing § 1983 remedies for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it was understood that Title VII was not the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims, and the 1991 Act did not imply an intent to overturn this precedent.

Congress's findings that additional remedies were necessary to deter workplace harassment support this understanding, and the notion that Congress would provide new remedies while simultaneously eliminating existing ones is deemed illogical. While the defendants argue that allowing parallel claims could undermine Title VII's safeguards, this outcome is considered a consequence of Congress's decision to allow multiple avenues for relief. The argument that prior legislative amendments suggest municipalities were immune from § 1983 liability does not negate Congress's intent to permit both types of claims.

Ultimately, the conclusion is that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not establish Title VII and § 1981 as the exclusive remedies for municipal employment discrimination, thereby preserving the viability of § 1983 claims. The district court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss Johnson's § 1983 claims is affirmed.