Carl Demetrius Mitchell v. Gary D. Maynard, Director of Department of Corrections Tom Lovelace, Inspector General, Department of Corrections Delores Ramsey James Saffle, Warden, State Prison, McAlester Oklahoma James Sorbles Ted Willman, Warden, Mack Alford Correctional Center Michael Crabtree, A/K/A Michale Crabtree Sam Key, Security Major at Mack Alford Correctional Center Michael Taylor Louis Layton, Correctional Officer J. Mike Pruitt, Unit Manager, Oklahoma State Penitentiary Billy Key, Law Library Supervisor, Oklahoma State Penitentiary George Dugan, Correctional Counselor, Oklahoma State Penitentiary Larry Watson, Co I, Oklahoma State Penitentiary
Docket: 94-7108
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 31, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Carl Demetrius Mitchell filed a lawsuit against fourteen prison officials and employees, alleging violations of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Initially, the district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous, but this ruling was reversed upon appeal, leading to a jury trial. Prior to deliberation, however, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, dismissing all claims. Mitchell appealed this decision, raising eight key issues:
1. Eighth Amendment violations related to confinement conditions, medical needs, and excessive force.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence for a disciplinary conviction to meet due process standards.
3. Denial of due process due to non-compliance with Department of Corrections' policies.
4. Error in not removing shackles and leg irons during the trial.
5. Liability of each defendant for their role in the alleged rights violations.
6. Exclusion of testimony regarding retaliation for exercising a protected right.
7. Claim of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law regarding constitutional violations, necessitating only a damages trial.
8. Request for a change of trial judge if a new trial is ordered.
The appeals court reviewed the district court's decision de novo, emphasizing that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when no reasonable jury could find in favor of the party fully heard on an issue. The court's review favors the nonmoving party in evaluating evidence and inferences. The appellate court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its findings.
A comprehensive factual background is essential to understanding Mr. Mitchell's case. Initially incarcerated at the Mack Alford Correctional Center for larceny, Mr. Mitchell actively utilized the law library, assisting fellow inmates, which allegedly led to hostility from prison officials, despite Warden James Saffle acknowledging him as a "model, non-troublemaking prisoner."
On May 13, 1988, a riot erupted in the prison, during which Mr. Mitchell, who was asleep at the time, claims he was uninvolved. He attempted to mediate with the riot's instigators, two White Supremacists, at the urging of guards. Following the riot, nearly 100 inmates, including Mr. Mitchell, were transferred to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary at McAlester.
Upon arrival, Mr. Mitchell was isolated, stripped of his clothing and eyeglasses, and restrained in chains. He was subjected to physical abuse by guards who kicked him while he was down, resulting in injuries. His cell was devoid of a mattress and bedding, leaving him naked in cold conditions. Warden Saffle justified the deprivation of clothing and bedding as a means to prevent potential disturbances. Due to insufficient funding, Mr. Saffle could not provide basic amenities like a water heater, forcing inmates to endure cold showers and inadequate ventilation.
Mr. Mitchell faced severe restrictions, being allowed outside his cell only twice in five months and not receiving his eyeglasses for two months, leading to headaches from his visual condition. Toilet paper was rationed, and he was denied writing implements for grievances, as Saffle claimed these could be misused. Mr. Mitchell formally complained about these conditions in a grievance submitted on June 9, 1988, which Saffle denied.
Mr. Mitchell was formally accused of participating in a riot two weeks after his transfer to McAlester. Initially, only Karl Goodson was named as a witness against him, who did not state that he saw Mr. Mitchell involved in the riot. Relying on Investigator Michael Taylor's assurance that the report did not implicate him, Mr. Mitchell signed the report, waiving his rights to call witnesses and have representation at his hearing. Subsequently, a new witness, Louis Layton, was introduced, who claimed to have seen Mr. Mitchell throwing rocks. However, Layton later testified that he only saw Mr. Mitchell throw one rock during the riot, did not recognize him at the time, and his earlier statement did not incriminate Mr. Mitchell. Layton later produced an unofficial statement that implicated Mr. Mitchell, along with an affidavit claiming he saw Mr. Mitchell throw rocks on a date when Mr. Mitchell was already at McAlester.
The disciplinary hearing was overseen by Michael Crabtree, whose impartiality was questioned by Mr. Mitchell due to his proximity to the riot and previous involvement in Mr. Mitchell's placement in maximum security. Crabtree found Mr. Mitchell guilty based on Layton's testimony. Delores Ramsay, who reviewed misconduct appeals, testified that she upheld the conviction after conducting an additional investigation, as the initial record was inadequate.
Mr. Mitchell claims that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on his Eighth Amendment claims, which include allegations of guard beatings, poor conditions in confinement, and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Each of these claims will be evaluated further.
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation regarding the guards' beating, Mr. Mitchell must demonstrate that the guards acted with malicious intent to cause harm rather than in good faith to restore order. The determination involves balancing the necessity of force against the level of force applied, regardless of whether the guards were responding to a disturbance. Significant physical injury is not a prerequisite for a claim. The facts indicate that after Mr. Mitchell fell, he was beaten by multiple guards wielding nightsticks while using racial slurs, despite his vulnerable state—being naked and shackled. There is no evidence that he posed any threat or disciplinary issue at the time of the incident. A reasonable jury might find that the guards acted maliciously rather than to maintain order.
The appellees argue that Mr. Mitchell's claim should fail because he did not name the specific guards in his complaint. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires the names of all parties in the title of the action, a party not named can still be involved if the complaint clearly indicates they are intended as defendants. However, simply mentioning names in a brief does not suffice for adequate notice. Mr. Mitchell claims he identified the guards during discovery, but he did not provide the relevant trial brief as part of the appeal record. Although he was allowed to amend his complaint to add parties, there is no evidence he did so.
Additionally, Mr. Mitchell did not provide evidence linking the named appellees to the guards' actions. Merely naming the Warden and Director of Corrections does not imply liability, as personal participation is required under § 1983, with no respondeat superior liability. Consequently, since he failed to sue the responsible parties for the beating and did not allege personal involvement of those named in the case, the district court's dismissal of his claims for an Eighth Amendment violation is affirmed.
Mr. Mitchell claims that the conditions in the G-unit, referred to as "the rock," violate his Eighth Amendment rights, directed at Gary Maynard, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections director, and Mr. Saffle, the McAlester warden. The Supreme Court’s decision in Rhodes v. Chapman establishes that no fixed standard defines Eighth Amendment violations regarding prison conditions; instead, courts must rely on evolving societal standards of decency. It emphasizes the need for objective assessments to determine whether conditions are cruel and unusual or simply harsh penalties for criminal behavior.
For a confinement condition to be deemed cruel and unusual, it must be: a) grossly disproportionate to the crime; b) involve wanton infliction of pain; or c) deprive inmates of basic life necessities. The overall conditions must be considered, as multiple deprivations can together violate the Constitution by collectively denying a basic human need, as illustrated in Wilson v. Seiter.
The Eighth Amendment reflects fundamental principles of dignity, humanity, and decency. The Supreme Court's Wilson decision introduced the deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment claims, which requires courts to evaluate both the officials' culpability and the objective harm caused. In the Tenth Circuit, deliberate indifference is determined by whether officials disregarded a known risk of violating prisoners' constitutional rights, without needing to prove intent to harm. The Supreme Court clarified that deliberate indifference involves an official's awareness and disregard of significant risks to inmate health or safety.
Mr. Mitchell experienced severe deprivations during his confinement, including being stripped of clothing, placed in an unheated concrete cell with nighttime temperatures in the mid-fifties, and lacking basic necessities such as a mattress, bedding, prescription eyeglasses, exercise opportunities, writing utensils, adequate ventilation, hot water, and sufficient toilet paper. These conditions persisted for varying lengths of time, significantly deviating from the required "healthy habilitative environment" mandated by the state, as established in Ramos v. Lamm. Mr. Saffle allegedly ordered these deprivations as a response to an emergency situation involving an influx of 435 inmates and previous riots, claiming it was necessary to maintain order and ensure safety. While the court acknowledges the deference granted to prison administrators regarding internal security, it emphasizes that such discretion is not unlimited and does not protect actions taken in bad faith or without legitimate justification. The court must balance respecting the choices of prison officials with safeguarding inmates' constitutional rights, highlighting that valid constitutional claims should not be overlooked.
In this case, Mr. Mitchell alleges various deprivations while in confinement that may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Specific grievances include inadequate heating, insufficient clothing and bedding, prolonged lack of exercise, absence of hot water, denial of toilet paper, removal of prescription eyeglasses, poor ventilation, and lack of writing utensils. Precedents established in cases such as Gregory v. Wyse and Caldwell v. Miller support claims of cruel and unusual punishment related to these conditions. Mr. Mitchell's allegations suggest he experienced these deprivations for periods exceeding those discussed in previous cases.
There is conflicting testimony regarding the timeline of when certain conditions were rectified, with discrepancies ranging from twenty-four hours to five and a half months. The jury is tasked with assessing witness credibility and determining the validity of the claims. The trial court's decision to grant the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law was deemed inappropriate, as the allegations could indeed indicate a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. Consequently, the ruling is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial to resolve factual disputes surrounding the conditions of confinement.
Mr. Mitchell's Eighth Amendment claim concerning inadequate medical care is addressed, specifically regarding the medical attention he received upon entering the G-unit. He asserts he suffered from severe illness, characterized by coldness, shivering, broken fingers, and a lack of access to prescription eyeglasses. The legal standard for Eighth Amendment violations requires demonstrating both an objective serious medical need and a subjective deliberate indifference from prison officials. The Supreme Court's decisions in Estelle and Miller clarify that mere negligence or inadvertent failure to provide care does not meet the culpability threshold for liability.
Mr. Mitchell failed to establish deliberate indifference, as he provided no evidence that prison officials were aware of his medical condition or that he requested care but was denied. Although a guard noticed his condition the following night and called for treatment, Mr. Mitchell himself did not seek help, believing his injuries were not life-threatening. This admission undermines the severity of his claim, suggesting he did not perceive his condition as warranting medical attention. Additionally, regarding his eyeglasses, he did not demonstrate that any official acted with deliberate indifference, as he was eventually examined by an optometrist and received new glasses after voicing his concerns. Furthermore, Mr. Mitchell did not allege personal involvement of the named defendants in the alleged medical neglect, which is a necessary component for a § 1983 claim. Consequently, the district court's ruling on his medical neglect claims is affirmed.
Mr. Mitchell asserts that his disciplinary hearing, which resulted in a finding of guilt for participating in a riot, violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Following the hearing, the disciplinary committee revoked his good time credits and placed him in restrictive confinement. It is established that an inmate's interest in earned good time credits cannot be revoked without minimal due process safeguards. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that prison disciplinary proceedings differ from criminal prosecutions, and therefore, not all rights afforded to criminal defendants apply.
To satisfy due process in disciplinary proceedings, an inmate must receive: 1) advance written notice of charges; 2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, consistent with institutional safety; and 3) a written statement detailing the evidence and reasoning behind the disciplinary decision. If there is any evidence supporting the disciplinary committee's decision, due process requirements are considered met, regardless of the evidence's strength.
Mr. Mitchell claims multiple due process violations, including concerns about the reliability of evidence and adequacy of written findings. However, the review is confined to the three Wolff requirements and whether evidence supports the committee's findings. He does not dispute receiving prior written notice of the charges or having a hearing. He contends he was unable to call witnesses or present evidence due to a lack of specific information regarding the incident but signed a waiver of his rights to call witnesses and did not raise this issue during the hearing. Additionally, he questions the adequacy of the written statement from the factfinder. The committee's report indicated he was found guilty based on an officer's report regarding his actions. Previous rulings have upheld that even reports referencing confidential witness statements can be sufficient if they clearly describe the inmate's conduct and basis for punishment.
Written findings serve three purposes: ensuring adequate review of proceedings, protecting inmates from collateral consequences, and promoting fair actions by officials under scrutiny, as established in Smith v. Maschner. Mr. Mitchell received adequate notice regarding the allegations against him, and the absence of more specific findings did not hinder the review process. Some evidence supported the committee's findings, which led to the affirmation of the district court's directed verdict on Mr. Mitchell's due process challenge.
Mr. Mitchell alleged that his due process rights were violated due to the failure of prison officials to adhere to their own procedures. He specifically contested Mr. Crabtree's role as the decision-maker in his disciplinary hearing, citing the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' policy that prohibits individuals with direct involvement in a case from serving as disciplinary officers. Mr. Mitchell argued that Mr. Crabtree's prior witnessing of the riot and personal property destruction compromised his impartiality.
The critical issue was whether Mr. Crabtree's involvement denied Mr. Mitchell a meaningful opportunity to be heard, which is a fundamental due process requirement. Although Mr. Mitchell claimed Mr. Crabtree's neutrality was compromised, the evidence did not substantiate a violation of policy or demonstrate improper motives. Mr. Crabtree did not witness Mr. Mitchell's participation in the riot, was not involved in the events surrounding it, and did not prepare the offense report. As a result, his presiding over the disciplinary proceeding did not violate Department of Corrections policies or impede Mr. Mitchell's opportunity to be heard.
Additionally, Mr. Mitchell challenged Delores Ramsey's actions during the review of his appeal, but the validity of the prison's internal appellate procedure was not addressed since the determination was found to be supported by some evidence.
Mr. Mitchell asserts that the defendants did not adhere to their own policies, resulting in conditions of confinement that he claims violate his Eighth Amendment rights. However, these conditions will be addressed within the context of his Eighth Amendment claims rather than separately. Additionally, he challenges the district court's refusal to remove his shackles and leg irons during trial, highlighting the court's discretion in making such decisions. The court's choice to shackle him was deemed appropriate, considering the need to protect the jury and court personnel against potential prejudices that shackling might create. Since the case was resolved on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, any claims regarding jury prejudice from the shackles are considered moot, as the jury did not reach a decision on the merits of his claims.
Mr. Mitchell also contends that each defendant should be held accountable for infringing on his constitutional rights, suggesting that he is questioning the defendants' invocation of qualified immunity. The appellate court notes the absence of a complete trial record to ascertain whether the defendants properly raised this defense. Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would recognize. While qualified immunity typically shields defendants from trials and discovery burdens, it must be explicitly asserted to be effective. The court will not consider issues not raised at the district court level. Even if qualified immunity had been properly invoked, it would not shield the defendants from claims related to the conditions of confinement, which could potentially constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Lastly, Mr. Mitchell argues that the district court misinterpreted a pretrial order by limiting testimonial evidence regarding his retaliation claims, which he believes contradicts the law of the case doctrine.
Counsel for the plaintiff is responsible for preparing a pretrial order, which must detail the results of the conference, legal issues, evidence to be presented, and all questions of law. This order supersedes the pleadings and governs the trial unless the court permits a departure. The pretrial order must be approved by all parties involved. In the case at hand, Mr. Mitchell's pretrial order questioned whether the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's confinement conditions violated his constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment. However, the district court determined that the pretrial order did not encompass the issue of retaliation connected to Mr. Mitchell's transfer and confinement, thereby excluding related evidence from trial. Mr. Mitchell contended that "defendant's conduct" implicitly included retaliation, but the court emphasized that such an interpretation would be overly broad and noted that deference is owed to the district court’s application of its own rules. The court clarified that the right to court access is a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment, not related to the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause cited by Mr. Mitchell.
Additionally, Mr. Mitchell asserted that the law of the case doctrine barred the district court from its ruling since an earlier appellate decision had indicated his factual allegations could support a retaliation claim. However, the court rejected this argument, explaining that law of the case principles do not prevent a district court from acting unless there has been an appellate decision on the merits. The earlier ruling merely indicated that Mr. Mitchell could potentially state a retaliation claim; it was his responsibility to substantiate it in court.
The statement clarifies that it does not grant Mr. Mitchell an unconditional right to bring his retaliation claim to trial or confirm that he has established a valid claim. Mr. Mitchell failed to adhere to necessary procedural steps to present his claim to the district court, leading to the affirmation of the district court's decision to bar his claims.
Mr. Mitchell requested that, upon remand, the case be reassigned to a different district judge. Although typically, recusal matters are handled at the trial level under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, the appellate court has the authority to reassign cases independently of these statutes. This authority is supported by the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651) and 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which allows appellate courts to modify or reverse orders as deemed just. However, reassignment is reserved for situations demonstrating personal bias or extreme circumstances.
Mr. Mitchell argues that a fair tribunal is essential for due process and cites comments and actions by Judge Seay as evidence of judicial bias. He points out that after the case was reassigned from Judge Cook—who had previously denied a motion to dismiss the claim—Judge Seay dismissed all prisoner cases he received, including Mr. Mitchell's, which had been deemed non-frivolous. Mr. Mitchell further claims that after a jury trial, Judge Seay granted judgment as a matter of law without permitting jury deliberation, indicating bias.
Despite these claims, the court notes that adverse rulings alone do not justify recusal, referencing prior rulings in Green v. Dorrell and Glass v. Pfeffer. Mr. Mitchell also highlights a specific instance of the judge's behavior, where Judge Seay instructed Mr. Mitchell and his attorney to switch places with the appellees, implying a bias against prisoners.
Judge Seay's decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing before determining that Mr. Mitchell should remain shackled during the trial is highlighted, alongside Mr. Mitchell's references to instances where the judge objected to questions or materials that defense counsel did not contest. While the judge's role includes ensuring a fair trial and the authority to limit testimony or questions to expedite proceedings, Mr. Mitchell questions whether the judge's consistent adverse rulings indicate bias or animosity. An example provided shows Judge Seay interrupting Mr. Mitchell's testimony to emphasize relevance, stating that discussions of past events waste jurors' time.
Mr. Mitchell also points out a perceived inconsistency in how evidence regarding the treatment of past prisoners was admitted—being favored when it benefitted the appellees but denied when it supported his case. He notes that toward the end of the trial, Judge Seay made personal remarks about his attorney, suggesting impropriety. The judge’s comments about Mr. Mitchell's attorney's personal relationship with his wife were challenged as irrelevant by the attorney.
Due to limited record access, the overall context and demeanor of Judge Seay throughout the trial remain unclear. The excerpt emphasizes that both actual bias and the appearance of impropriety must be considered to uphold the requirement for a fair trial, as established by the Supreme Court. It acknowledges that allegations of judicial misconduct should be taken seriously and not dismissed lightly by reviewing courts.
A three-part framework is outlined for determining whether to remand a case to a new judge in the absence of personal bias. The criteria include: (1) the likelihood that the original judge would struggle to set aside previously expressed erroneous views; (2) the necessity of reassignment to uphold the appearance of justice; and (3) the potential for waste and duplication relative to the benefits of maintaining a fair process. In the case at hand, Judge Seay's repeated expressions deeming Mr. Mitchell's Eighth Amendment claims as frivolous raise concerns about the perception of justice. Since the case is being remanded for a new trial, appointing a different judge would not lead to excessive duplication of efforts. This decision aims to ensure Mr. Mitchell receives a fair hearing from an impartial judge, despite no findings of personal bias against Judge Seay. Consequently, the court reverses the district court's ruling regarding the Eighth Amendment claim, affirms all other aspects, and directs that a different judge be assigned for the new trial. Additionally, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is cited, which establishes liability for deprivation of constitutional rights under state authority.
