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David Wayne Spence v. Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
Citation: 80 F.3d 989Docket: 94-20212, 94-20213
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; March 29, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
David Wayne Spence was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for the 1982 murders of three teenagers: Jill Montgomery, Raylene Rice, and Kenneth Franks. After being denied habeas corpus relief by a federal district court, Spence appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no reversible error. On July 13, 1982, Spence and his accomplices encountered the three teenagers at Koehne Park, where they socialized before Spence turned violent. Following an argument with Jill over an attempted sexual advance, Spence threatened Kenneth, claiming he would retaliate for a perceived wrong. Instead of going to a store as initially planned, Spence drove into a wooded area, where he forced the teenagers to undress at knifepoint. He then raped Jill while Kenneth was forced to watch, after which he raped Raylene. Spence brutally attacked both Jill and Kenneth, ultimately stabbing them to death, and then assaulted Raylene. After killing the three, Spence and his accomplices discarded the bodies at Speegleville Park. Spence exhibited a chilling demeanor, boasting about the murders and taking money from the victims. The Court of Appeals upheld his convictions based on the evidence and the proceedings of the lower courts. The bodies of Jill, Raylene, and Kenneth were discovered the day after their murders. Following extensive investigations with no clear suspects, the Waco Police Department declared the case inactive in September 1983. Officer Truman Simons continued to pursue the case independently after transitioning to a jailer position, and with the encouragement of newly elected district attorney Vic Feazell, he eventually obtained confessions from Gilbert Melendez, implicating himself and Spence. In November 1983, Gilbert and Anthony Melendez, Spence, and Muneer Deeb were indicted for the murders. Spence was tried first for Jill Montgomery's murder in July 1984 in McLennan County, resulting in a death sentence affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Following a habeas corpus application, relief was denied. In September 1985, Spence was convicted for Kenneth Franks' murder in Brazos County, again receiving a death sentence, which was also upheld by the appellate court. In December 1991, Spence filed federal habeas corpus petitions for both convictions, which were initially denied. He subsequently requested to alter the judgments, leading to a consolidated evidentiary hearing focused on claims of suppressed exculpatory evidence. Despite extensive depositions and hearings, the district court reaffirmed its denial of habeas relief. The current court is reviewing the appeals for both cases, addressing the claims related to Kenneth Franks first, then those concerning Jill Montgomery. The court conducts a de novo review of legal conclusions and checks factual findings for clear error, meaning a factual finding is deemed clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is firmly convinced a mistake has been made despite some supporting evidence. In evaluating Spence's claims regarding the murder of Kenneth Franks, it is essential to understand the trial evidence. Spence's conviction was supported by testimony from Gilbert and Tony Melendez, who had pleaded guilty to lesser charges in exchange for their cooperation. The State presented expert evidence linking Spence to bite injuries on the victim and included incriminating statements made by Spence. Spence’s defense focused on the lack of direct evidence tying him to the crime, inconsistencies in the testimonies of the Melendez brothers, and the unreliability of forensic evidence. The defense also aimed to show that Gilbert's truck was inoperable during the crime and that witnesses did not recall seeing Spence's group with the victims. Spence argues that his conviction is unconstitutional due to several alleged violations: (1) the State's failure to disclose benefits given to Gilbert Melendez for his testimony, (2) the presentation of knowingly perjured testimony by Gilbert and David Puryear, (3) the suppression of police reports that could implicate other suspects, (4) the denial of a hearing on the reliability of the State's forensic evidence, and (5) the district court's failure to consider the cumulative effect of these issues. Specifically, Spence asserts a Brady violation, claiming the State did not disclose benefits affecting Gilbert Melendez's credibility, which is crucial since the case relied heavily on his testimony. To establish a Brady claim, a habeas petitioner must prove three elements: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the petitioner, and (3) the evidence was material. The Supreme Court clarifies that evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have changed the trial's outcome, with a "reasonable probability" defined as enough to undermine confidence in the verdict. This assessment considers the cumulative effect of suppressed evidence rather than evaluating each piece individually. Fifth Circuit rulings have emphasized that the materiality of Brady evidence largely depends on its value relative to the prosecution's evidence. If a witness's testimony is strongly corroborated, undisclosed evidence may not be deemed material. Additionally, if undisclosed evidence is merely cumulative, it does not constitute a Brady violation. In the case concerning Gilbert Melendez, Spence argues that the State failed to disclose information regarding Gilbert's inducements for cooperation, promises regarding parole, and special treatment while in jail. However, the court finds this evidence immaterial, noting that Gilbert's testimony was substantially supported by other evidence, including corroborative testimony from his brother and consistency with forensic findings and other witnesses' statements. The undisclosed evidence regarding Gilbert is largely cumulative of what was already presented to impeach his credibility. Gilbert acknowledged his prior convictions for assault with intent to murder and aggravated sexual assault, as well as being charged with three counts of capital murder. He accepted a plea bargain, receiving two life sentences in exchange for testimony against Spence, aiming to evade the death penalty. During the trial, Spence's lawyer highlighted inconsistencies in Gilbert's testimony compared to his earlier statements, which he admitted were partially false due to concealing his brother's involvement. The jury was well-informed about Gilbert's criminal history, inconsistencies, and motives, with defense counsel stressing his unreliability in closing arguments. The State provided additional evidence of Spence's guilt, notably through Tony Melendez's testimony about the murders. The Dallas County medical examiner corroborated the gruesome details, identifying multiple stab wounds and bite marks on the victims that were inflicted shortly before their deaths. Spence made admissions of guilt shortly after the murders, including a statement to Regina Ann Rosenbaum about taking girls to Lake Waco and raping them, and to David Puryear, where he expressed gladness about the murders. A forensic expert linked the bite marks to Spence, with even his own rebuttal expert unable to definitively rule out Spence's involvement. Regarding Spence's Brady arguments, he claimed the State failed to disclose its initial offer of immunity to Gilbert, which influenced Gilbert's testimony. However, this argument was deemed unpersuasive. Gilbert's initial immunity offer was contingent on him providing complete truth about the murders, which he did not do. Consequently, after misleading investigators, he faced the choice of either cooperating with the risk of capital murder charges or accepting a plea deal, which he explained to the jury. Even if the immunity offer influenced Gilbert initially, it was deemed immaterial to the jury's assessment of his truthfulness after learning about his plea bargain. Spence claims the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose oral promises made by deputy sheriff Truman Simons and district attorney Vic Feazell, which purportedly assured they would not oppose Gilbert's parole. The State acknowledges these promises but argues they are not material, as no reasonable jury would doubt Gilbert's self-incriminating testimony given his guilty plea to two life sentences based on such uncertain assurances. Additionally, Spence's claim regarding Gilbert receiving unsupervised visits with his girlfriend in jail is deemed immaterial; no reasonable jury would find this would change their perception of Gilbert's long-term testimony. Spence also alleges a violation of Napue v. Illinois, asserting the State did not correct perjured testimony from Gilbert and David Puryear. The court emphasizes that a new trial is warranted only if there is a reasonable likelihood that perjured evidence could have influenced the verdict. The district court found no clear error in determining that neither Gilbert's nor Puryear's testimonies were perjured. Specifically, Spence argues Gilbert's 1993 federal habeas deposition contradicts his trial testimony, which the district court found more credible. Given the serious consequences Gilbert faced, the court concluded he had no incentive to fabricate his testimony. Furthermore, recantations are viewed with suspicion, supporting the district court's findings. The discrepancies in the trial testimonies of Gilbert and Tony primarily relate to their individual roles in the murders, yet both accounts align significantly regarding the overall sequence of events involving Spence's actions, including acts of torture and sexual assault. This similarity suggests a lack of fabrication in their testimonies, countering the notion of a conspiracy by Simons or Feazell to wrongfully convict Spence. Gilbert's testimony was further supported by additional evidence, reducing the likelihood of knowingly false testimony by the state. Regarding David Puryear's testimony, Spence claims it was perjured, particularly focusing on Puryear's depiction of a knife and two girls. The district court found no clear error in concluding Puryear did not commit perjury, despite an affidavit from Puryear's brother-in-law suggesting otherwise. This affidavit was deemed inadmissible hearsay, and Puryear had previously expressed his willingness to testify against Spence without seeking a deal. Spence's argument that Puryear's initial omission of the bandana during a police interview indicated perjury was rejected, as it might simply reflect reluctance to engage at that moment. Spence also argued that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose police reports that could have implicated other suspects. The district court determined these reports were not material since they would not have been admissible at trial, a conclusion contradicted by Fifth Circuit precedents highlighting that undisclosed evidence could aid the defense in identifying admissible witnesses. Although the district court's error regarding the materiality standard was acknowledged, it was deemed harmless. Finally, the court clarified that Brady's materiality standard is not merely about the sufficiency of evidence but rather whether the suppression of evidence undermined confidence in the trial's outcome, requiring a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. The district court's opinion did not alter the Brady standard, which requires a petitioner to demonstrate that suppressed evidence is material enough to likely change the trial's outcome if disclosed. Specifically, Spence's claims focus on undisclosed police reports implicating Terry 'Tab' Harper in Kenneth's murder and suggesting a drug deal was a motive. However, the court rejected Spence's assertion that the State violated Brady by withholding these reports, stating that even if the reports were admissible, they did not undermine confidence in the jury's verdict. Investigating officers unanimously concluded that the murders were not drug-related and that Harper had an alibi, despite allegations of his involvement. Spence's reliance on witness statements alleging Harper bragged about killing someone lacks corroborative evidence. Moreover, had Spence utilized these reports at trial, the State could have countered with evidence exonerating Harper. Additionally, Spence argued that the State failed to disclose reports indicating Kenneth Franks' drug debts and ties to Harper. These reports were deemed inadmissible and not material, as they would not substantiate a defense theory based on a drug deal. The autopsy found no drugs in Kenneth's system, and police found no witnesses to support claims of his drug-related activities. The nature of the murders and the lack of evidence pointing to drug motivations further supported the conclusion that the nondisclosure of the reports did not affect the jury's confidence in its verdict. Cumulative effects of withheld evidence must be assessed collectively rather than on an item-by-item basis, as established in Kyles v. Whitley. In this case, the withheld evidence—relating to Gilbert Melendez's testifying incentives, police reports on Tab Harper, Kenneth Franks's drug use, and Koehne Park witnesses—was evaluated against the overall strength of the state's case against Spence. Unlike in Kyles, where the cumulative effect significantly impacted the verdict, here the defense's position remains largely intact due to the strong testimonial evidence from Tony Melendez and the unchallenged statements from Spence. The withheld evidence does not substantially undermine the existing testimony or create a reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury's decision. Furthermore, Spence contended that the district court failed to hold a hearing regarding the admissibility of testimony from the State's forensic odontologist, Dr. Homer Campbell, and improperly excluded his expert reports. These arguments were rejected, as a petitioner must present factual allegations that could lead to relief. The court is not obliged to accept speculative claims or hold a hearing when the record is complete or when only legal claims that can be resolved without additional evidence are raised. Spence argues that the district court should have held a hearing regarding the admission of Dr. Campbell's testimony, as he believes it violates the Eighth Amendment's requirement for 'heightened reliability' established in Johnson v. Mississippi. However, Johnson is deemed inapplicable here since Spence does not claim Dr. Campbell's testimony is false, but rather disputes its weight. Spence's attempt to relitigate this issue is considered untimely, given that he introduced his own expert, Dr. Gerald Vale, at trial, who criticized Dr. Campbell but could not exclude Spence's teeth as a match for the bite marks. The court found that the evidentiary issues were adequately addressed in state courts, showing no violation of due process. Additionally, Spence's argument regarding the exclusion of reports from five other odontologists who deemed Dr. Campbell's testimony unreliable is rejected, as he submitted these reports after the discovery deadline without justification, and the district court acted within its discretion in excluding them. Spence's claim for relief based on cumulative errors is also denied. The cumulative error doctrine allows for relief only when errors in the trial court fundamentally undermine the fairness of the trial. The court found that Spence failed to demonstrate a lack of fundamental fairness, noting that evidence challenging a witness's credibility was not material, and that he did not prove his claims regarding false testimony or the impact of police reports mentioning other suspects. The admission of Dr. Campbell's testimony was found not to violate constitutional standards, and the overall trial record did not suggest a suspect verdict. Consequently, the district court's denial of Spence's habeas corpus petition related to his conviction for Kenneth Franks's murder is affirmed. A brief summary of Spence's claims regarding Jill Montgomery's murder indicates that the evidence in this trial differed from that in a subsequent capital murder trial, with no eyewitness or co-defendant testimony presented in the first prosecution. The state's case centered on a purported murder-for-hire plot orchestrated by Muneer Deeb, co-owner of a Waco convenience store, motivated by jealousy over 16-year-old Gayle Kelley. Evidence indicated that Spence, a friend of Deeb, was allegedly coerced into attempting to kill Gayle to enable Deeb to collect on an accidental death insurance policy he had taken out on her. Kenneth Franks, a friend of Gayle and an adversary of Deeb, was the actual murder victim. Gayle testified that she would have likely been with Kenneth at Lake Waco on the night of the murders had she not been restricted at the Methodist Home. No physical evidence linked Spence to the victims, with the only forensic testimony being that of the state's odontologist, who controversially claimed that Spence's dental impressions matched bite marks on victim Jill Montgomery. The prosecution's case heavily relied on Spence's own incriminating statements, including claims of having been at the lake on the night of the murders and a vague confession to a friend. Witness testimonies from individuals associated with Deeb and Spence further supported the murder-for-hire narrative, including arguments between Spence and Deeb regarding Gayle's murder and Spence's assertions about raping two girls at Lake Waco. Inmate testimony bolstered the prosecution’s position, as several inmates reported that Spence made incriminating remarks while incarcerated, all denying any inducements for their testimonies. The defense challenged the credibility of the murder-for-hire theory, highlighting the lack of financial incentive for Deeb to murder Gayle and arguing that Spence could not have mistaken Jill for Gayle. Defense attorneys aimed to undermine the incriminating statements made to various individuals and questioned the motives of inmate witnesses, suggesting potential deals with the prosecution influenced their testimonies. Puryear's testimony regarding a bandana was used to suggest that Truman Simons spread rumors in the McLennan County jail, which helped inmates fabricate stories about Spence related to the Lake Waco murders. The inconsistencies between inmate testimonies from Snelson and Ivy about their motives for speaking with Spence were highlighted. Spence argues that the State failed to disclose that the inmate witnesses received special privileges for their testimony, knowingly presented false testimony, suppressed evidence implicating others in the murders, and that the district court did not adequately assess the cumulative effect of these violations. He asserts that the district court erred in not granting a hearing on the forensic odontologist's testimony. Spence claims the State violated Brady by not revealing the privileges granted to inmate witnesses. The district court's analysis of the materiality of this evidence was criticized for being result-oriented. Although the court acknowledged some Brady violations, it deemed the errors harmless. Spence's argument about a "piecemeal" evaluation of his claims was undermined by the court's rejection of the premise that all seven inmate witnesses received undisclosed benefits. Specifically, the court found that only Snelson and Ivy received such privileges, dismissing claims regarding Puryear and Sypho as unfounded. Recantations from two witnesses six years later, claiming they received privileges, were viewed skeptically, as courts typically regard recanting affidavits with caution. The trial record indicated thorough questioning of all inmate witnesses about agreements with the State, with each denying any benefits for their testimonies. Witnesses Snelson, Ivy, and other inmates claimed that inmates testifying against Spence received privileges in exchange for their testimony; however, conflicting law enforcement testimonies make it challenging to deem the district court’s factual findings as clearly erroneous. The court's examination of Charles Sypho is pivotal; Spence alleged that Sypho received conjugal visits as an inducement for his testimony, a claim based on affidavits from other inmates, yet Sypho testified that he received no such inducements. The district court found no clear error in this determination. Similarly, the court rejected Spence's assertion that David Puryear received undisclosed assistance for his testimony, which was based on hearsay and contradicted by Puryear's unsolicited letter to the prosecutor affirming he had no deal for his testimony. While the district court acknowledged that Snelson and Ivy received undisclosed privileges, this evidence was deemed immaterial under Brady v. Maryland. Both witnesses were effectively cross-examined by the prosecution, and even if the jury had known about the inducements, it was unlikely to have affected the verdict. The undisclosed evidence in this case is distinguishable from Giglio v. U.S., where the credibility of the sole witness was critical. In Spence's case, the prosecution's case did not hinge solely on Snelson and Ivy's credibility; Spence made admissions of guilt to others, including neighbor Dorothy Miles and Regina Ann Rosenbaum, who testified about Spence's confessions and demeanor post-murder. Furthermore, forensic evidence corroborated the testimonies of the inmate witnesses, with medical and odontological evidence linking Spence to the crime. Evidence was presented linking Spence to the murders, including testimonies from Todd Childers and Clifford Oliver about Spence's whereabouts the night of the crimes. The court determined that the state's failure to disclose certain privileges for inmate witnesses was not materially significant. Spence's claims of perjury, based on allegations that the State knowingly presented false testimony from inmate witnesses, were not substantiated. The court did not accept Spence's theory of orchestrated false testimony against him and found inconsistencies in witness statements without concluding that perjury occurred. The court noted that claims of mass-manufactured testimony lacked support from depositions of law enforcement officers, and any conspiracy to fabricate testimony could have been addressed during the trial. Even assuming false testimony from certain inmates, the court found no constitutional error, as their testimony was deemed cumulative given the substantial evidence against Spence, including his own admissions and other forensic evidence. Lastly, Spence argued a Brady violation regarding undisclosed police records implicating other suspects, claiming the district court applied an incorrect standard in its evaluation. Nondisclosure claims concerning reports about Tab Harper and Kenneth Franks's alleged drug dealing are dismissed as invalid. Spence's new argument asserts a Brady violation due to the State withholding police reports implicating James Russell Bishop and Ronnie Lee Breiten in the murders. The State acknowledges it did not disclose a report of a witness seeing a man resembling Bishop threatening Kenneth over drug debts and a report suggesting an acquaintance between Bishop and Breiten. However, Spence's Brady claim is rejected as the information is neither exculpatory nor material. Spence’s argument regarding materiality relies on the premise that Kenneth's murder was drug-related, which has been disproven. Forensic odontological evidence excluded Bishop as a suspect based on dental impressions that did not match bite marks found on victims. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals states that a single dissimilarity in dental comparisons definitively eliminates a suspect. The undisclosed report indicating Bishop and Breiten’s potential acquaintance is deemed immaterial, as it merely notes Bishop cashed a paycheck at a store where Breiten's wife worked two days before the murder, a connection too weak to affect Spence's conviction. Furthermore, since Bishop is eliminated as a suspect, the assumption of Breiten as a co-conspirator is also undermined. Cumulatively, the significance of the undisclosed evidence, including the police reports and privileges granted to certain individuals, does not diminish confidence in the jury's verdict. The State's case relies heavily on incriminating statements made by Spence to multiple witnesses, alongside consistent testimony from inmate witnesses and supporting evidence for the murder-for-hire theory. The undisclosed information does not weaken the State's case nor provide a basis for challenging the credibility of the testimonies against Spence. Spence's theory that Kenneth and Jill were murdered due to Kenneth's alleged drug dealing lacks credible support. Odontological evidence has exonerated Bishop as a suspect, and a police report suggesting Breiten's acquaintance with Bishop does not substantiate Spence's conspiracy theory regarding the murders. Spence argues that the district court erred by not holding a hearing on the admissibility of testimony from the State’s forensic odontologist, Dr. Campbell, and by excluding his expert reports challenging Campbell's testimony, but this argument mirrors a previously rejected claim regarding Kenneth's murder. Additionally, Spence's assertion that the cumulative effect of his allegations warranted a different trial evaluation is dismissed; the court found that he received a fundamentally fair trial and that the undisclosed evidence regarding Snelson's and Ivy's credibility was not material. Spence's claims under Napue and Brady regarding police reports were not substantiated, and the admission of Dr. Campbell's testimony was found not to violate the Eighth Amendment. The district court's judgment denying Spence's habeas corpus petition related to Jill Montgomery's murder is affirmed. The court thoroughly reviewed evidence and proceedings, dismissing Spence's claims of insufficient factual analysis and maintaining that the district court acted transparently in evaluating the case. Spence's claims of police report non-disclosure related to his presence at the scene of the murder were also not substantiated. Evidence presented was deemed immaterial as it merely duplicated defense testimonies from multiple individuals who visited the park and noticed neither the defendants nor any screams. In contrast to the Johnson case, where false evidence was the sole documentary evidence relevant to sentencing, ample evidence supported Spence's guilt. The defense's attempt to link James Bishop and Ronnie Breiten to the murders faltered when Breiten's stepmother, who had previously accused him, recanted and refused to testify. The state trial court found insufficient evidence to connect Bishop or Breiten to the murders at Lake Waco. Spence's assertion that credibility determinations regarding inmate witnesses could not be made due to a "paper hearing" was unfounded, as he had previously agreed to develop the evidentiary record through depositions and affidavits. Concerns about the inadequacy of "trial by affidavit" were less significant given the context of the case. By trial time, several key witnesses had been released from prison, while others remained incarcerated. Spence's discussions regarding the murder of “Gayle” suggested he was aware of plans related to Gayle Kelley. Testimony from Puryear regarding a bandana implicated Spence circumstantially. Although some officers criticized Simons's investigative methods, none claimed he had influenced inmate testimonies. The district court incorrectly ruled that undisclosed police reports were not material due to their inadmissibility at trial, as inadmissible evidence can still be material under Brady standards; however, this error was ultimately deemed harmless.