United States v. Andrew Scott Morin, A/K/A Scott Morris, United States of America v. Andrew Scott Morin, A/K/A Scott Morris

Citations: 80 F.3d 124; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6593Docket: 95-5242, 95-5300

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; April 5, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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Andrew Scott Morin was convicted of murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) and sentenced to 21 months imprisonment. He argued that the planned murder's occurrence outside the U.S. meant it did not violate federal or state laws, a requirement for his conviction. The court disagreed, stating that the intended murder would indeed breach federal law and two Virginia state laws.

In a separate appeal, the government contested the district court's significant downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, which was based on three factors: the victim's wrongful conduct, the unique circumstances surrounding Morin's offense, and Morin's diminished capacity. The appellate court found that the district court erred in justifying the downward departure based on victim misconduct and the offense's circumstances, thus affirming Morin's conviction but vacating and remanding the case for resentencing.

The background revealed that Morin, who had a long-standing relationship with Dr. Armando Soto-Bararra, allegedly became romantically involved with Soto's wife, Raghnild Perstolen, while caring for her during Soto's absence. Morin claimed Perstolen was being abused by Soto, leading him to hire a hitman to kill Soto. He contacted a private investigator, who alerted the FBI, resulting in an undercover operation. Morin attempted to hire the undercover agent, discussing details of the murder and providing money and a ticket for the hit. He was subsequently arrested.

Morin faced charges of three counts of murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. 1958(a) and one count of mailing a threatening communication under 18 U.S.C. 876. During his bench trial, he presented an insanity defense, with a psychiatrist testifying that Morin was delusional and that a claimed affair with Perstolen did not occur. The district court recognized Morin's severe mental illness but determined he understood the wrongfulness of his actions, resulting in a guilty verdict on all charges. Morin's base offense level was set at 32, which was reduced to 29 due to his acceptance of responsibility, leading to a sentencing range of 87 to 108 months. The court identified three factors justifying a downward departure: alleged misconduct by Dr. Soto, the case's unusual circumstances, and Morin's diminished capacity, ultimately lowering his offense level to 15 and sentencing him to 21 months in prison. 

On appeal, Morin contended that the murder-for-hire statute's requirement of intent was unmet because the intended murder of Dr. Soto was to occur in the Philippines. However, the court clarified that the murder would violate both federal and Virginia law. Specifically, under 18 U.S.C. 2332(a), the murder of a U.S. national abroad is a federal offense; the court deemed Dr. Soto a national because he was a permanent resident alien applying for U.S. citizenship, indicating permanent allegiance. Furthermore, under Virginia law, Morin's plan to pay for a murder constituted capital murder, as the conspiracy to commit the act originated within Virginia, satisfying the state's legal requirements despite the intended location of the murder.

The government is not required to prove that Dr. Soto's murder would contravene Virginia's capital murder law, as Section 1958(a) only necessitates a violation of state or federal laws. Virginia recognizes conspiracy to commit capital murder as a separate offense (Va. Code 18.2-22), meaning that even if Morin could not be charged with murder for an act occurring in the Philippines, both he and his assassin conspired to kill Dr. Soto in Virginia, thus committing conspiracy to commit capital murder. The crime is established upon the completion of the agreement, without needing any overt act towards the crime.

Morin's actions violated at least one federal law and two Virginia laws, satisfying the requirements of 1958 for his conviction. Regarding sentencing, after a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Morin's Guidelines range was set between 87-108 months, yet the district court imposed a significantly lower sentence of 21 months due to Dr. Soto's alleged misconduct, unusual case circumstances, and Morin's claimed diminished capacity. 

The court found that Morin viewed Soto as a serious threat to Ms. Perstolen, which it considered significant. However, the Sentencing Guidelines mandate that a victim's misconduct must have significantly provoked the offense, meaning the victim must have engaged in wrongful conduct. The only evidence of wrongdoing by Dr. Soto came from Morin's questionable recollections, influenced by his psychiatrist's testimony about delusions, and unsupported by credible evidence. 

Even if Dr. Soto had wronged Ms. Perstolen, the proportionality of Morin's response is critical, as established by USSG 5K2.10. Previous cases indicate that disproportionate responses, such as Morin's plot to murder Soto, are not justified, especially since Morin did not attempt to avoid confrontation or seek help regarding Soto's alleged behavior. The district court incorrectly applied the victim misconduct guideline as justification for a downward departure in Morin's sentence.

The district court incorrectly determined that Morin's offense did not fall within the heartland of murder-for-hire cases, leading to an inappropriate sentencing guideline application. Morin, convicted of multiple offenses, should have been sentenced based on his most serious offense, murder-for-hire (USSG 2E1.4), rather than the less serious threatening communications guideline (USSG 2A6.1). The court justified its departure by citing factors such as Morin's convoluted plan, naive interactions with the hit man, and the fact that the hit man was an FBI agent. However, these factors are not compelling; Morin's motive appears to stem from romantic rivalry rather than altruism, aligning with typical murder-for-hire motives. Additionally, Morin's knowledge and resources suggest that he could have engaged a real assassin, making his supposed naivete irrelevant. The legal framework recognizes that murder-for-hire plots do not require actual harm to fall within their scope, as outlined in 18 U.S.C. 1958 and USSG 2E1.4. The district court's reasoning fails to justify a departure from the heartland, as Morin's actions reflect a standard murder-for-hire case. The involvement of undercover agents does not diminish Morin's culpability, and thus his plot remains firmly within the murder-for-hire heartland.

The validity of the diminished capacity ground for a downward departure in sentencing relies on the district court's determination that Morin's murder-for-hire plot was "non-violent," as per USSG 5K2.13. If Morin committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity, a lower sentence may be justified, referencing United States v. Weddle. The assessment of whether the offense is non-violent is based on the specific facts of the case, distinguishing it from USSG 4B1.2. There is uncertainty about how the district court's factual finding was influenced by a mistaken belief that Morin's actions were atypical for murder-for-hire cases, prompting the need for remand for resentencing. 

Moreover, two of the district court's reasons for departure were erroneous, and the court failed to clarify how much weight these factors carried in the sentencing decision. Consequently, while Morin's conviction is affirmed, the case is vacated and remanded for resentencing. Additionally, under 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), the elements of the crime focus on the travel or causing of travel in interstate commerce with the intent for murder, along with a pecuniary consideration, which Morin met despite the involvement of an FBI agent in the conspiracy. Virginia law does not permit conspiracy charges against individuals collaborating with undercover agents, but this does not affect the federal statute's applicability to Morin's intent to commit murder through conspiracy.