Roland Pinsky Jennie Pinsky and Eileen Fedowitz, Brian K. Doehr v. Robert K. Duncan and Joseph Golden Insurance Agency, John F. Di Giovanni
Docket: 94-7394
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; March 21, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Brian K. Doehr appeals a judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut that denied his motions for damages and attorney's fees in a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant John F. Di Giovanni. The court found that Di Giovanni had violated Doehr's due process rights by attaching his real property without notice or hearing, as allowed under Connecticut's prejudgment remedy statute. However, the district court refused to award damages, citing a lack of evidence that Di Giovanni knew or should have known the statute was unconstitutional or acted with reckless disregard for Doehr's rights. Additionally, attorney's fees were denied since Doehr did not prevail on the damages issue, and no grounds for fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 were found.
The background involves an altercation in March 1988 between Doehr and Di Giovanni, resulting in injuries to Di Giovanni, who later sued Doehr for assault and battery, amending his complaint to include negligence. A jury awarded Di Giovanni $5,600 in 1992, ultimately recovering $3,422.34 after applying the collateral source rule. Prior to serving Doehr, Di Giovanni obtained permission from the court to attach Doehr's residential property as security for a potential judgment, based on an affidavit asserting that Doehr had assaulted him. The Connecticut statute allowed for this attachment without notice or hearing, contingent upon an affidavit indicating probable cause for the claim.
In August 1988, Doehr and others initiated an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that their real property was attached without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing, violating due process rights under Connecticut's section 52-278e(1). The plaintiffs claimed that this statute allowed for prejudgment remedies without bond or extraordinary circumstances, solely based on property ownership. The complaint included allegations against Di Giovanni and others, asserting that the defendants acted in concert with state officials, including a Superior Court Judge and a sheriff, to obtain ex parte attachments.
The plaintiffs sought permanent injunctive relief to prevent property attachments without demonstrating special circumstances, a declaratory judgment regarding due process and equal protection violations, as well as actual and punitive damages, including attorney's fees. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that section 52-278e was consistent with federal due process requirements, as it involved judicial oversight, allowing defendants to challenge the attachment in a prompt post-seizure hearing.
On appeal, the court reversed this decision, stating that the statute violated due process by permitting ex parte attachments without extraordinary circumstances and lacking a bond requirement. The concurring opinion disagreed with the bond issue but not its constitutional implications. The appellate ruling highlighted the significant impact of property attachments on landowners, emphasizing that the right to a prior hearing outweighed the state's interest in delaying it. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, affirmed the appellate ruling, and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the Due Process Clause was violated by the state statute allowing such attachments without prior notice or hearing.
Four members of the Court determined that due process necessitates the posting of a bond for property attachment, although this does not replace the requirement for a pre-attachment hearing or evidence of exigent circumstances. The majority opinion highlighted that the plaintiff lacked an existing interest in Doehr's real estate when seeking attachment, and his motives were solely to secure assets for a potential future judgment. No claims were made that Doehr intended to transfer or encumber his property, which would have justified bypassing a hearing. Without such allegations, the plaintiff's request to burden Doehr's property rights lacked sufficient justification.
The case was remanded for further proceedings aligned with the Supreme Court's opinion. Subsequently, on December 4, 1992, the district court vacated its previous judgment, granted summary judgment favoring the plaintiff regarding the constitutional deprivation, and directed the filing of a motion for damages. Doehr filed a motion for damages along with a supplemental request. Di Giovanni opposed and cross-moved to dismiss Doehr's claims for damages and attorney's fees. On August 27, 1993, both parties agreed to submit the damages issue based on Doehr's affidavit.
On March 1, 1994, the district court denied Doehr's motions for damages, ruling that there was no evidence that Di Giovanni either knew or should have known that the attachment statute was unconstitutional, nor did he act with reckless disregard for Doehr's rights. The court also stated that the misuse of an ex parte attachment statute does not constitute a valid cause of action under Section 1983. Doehr's motion for reconsideration was also denied on March 11, 1994.
Doehr later applied for attorney's fees, detailing the time spent by his attorney. However, on August 23, 1994, the district court denied the fee request, noting that although interim fees were granted in 1990, Doehr had not succeeded in his damages claim and thus was not entitled to further compensation. The court found Di Giovanni's actions reasonable in context, as they mainly sought dismissal of Doehr's claims.
The appeal contests the district court's rulings regarding damages and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which holds individuals liable for depriving citizens of constitutional rights under state law. The Supreme Court's decision in *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.* established that a private party could be liable under § 1983 if they acted with state officials in an unconstitutional manner. However, the issue of qualified immunity for private parties acting jointly with state agents was not addressed in *Lugar*. In *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, the Court defined an objective standard for qualified immunity for government officials, protecting them from liability unless they violated clearly established rights.
In *Wyatt v. Cole*, the Court ruled that private individuals conspiring with state officials do not enjoy the same good faith immunity as public officials. The decision emphasized that the rationale for qualified immunity—such as encouraging public service and decision-making—does not apply to private citizens. The Court noted the potential for private defendants to assert a good faith defense against § 1983 liability but left that issue undecided.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit determined that private defendants could only be held liable under § 1983 if they acted in bad faith regarding the unconstitutional state procedures, meaning they must have known or should have known of the statute's unconstitutionality. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit adopted a more stringent standard for private defendants invoking ex parte prejudgment statutes, requiring proof of malice and awareness of the statute's constitutional issues for liability under § 1983.
The Third Circuit aligns with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of "malice" in the context of constitutional due process, suggesting it reflects a creditor's awareness that their actions infringe upon a debtor's rights. The Supreme Court's decision in Wyatt confirmed that Section 1983 establishes a form of tort liability similar to malicious prosecution and abuse of process, both of which address unjust harm from the misuse of governmental processes. At common law, malicious prosecution required proof of malice, lack of probable cause, favorable termination, and damages. Modern legal texts differentiate malicious prosecution from abuse of process, the latter involving misuse of a legally justified process for an ulterior purpose. Doehr's claim arises from an ex parte civil proceeding initiated by Di Giovanni to attach Doehr's property, which concluded favorably for Doehr when the statute was deemed unconstitutional, thereby fitting the definition of malicious prosecution. To succeed in his 1983 damages claim, Doehr must prove lack of probable cause, malice, and damages, with the burden of proof on him. The definition of probable cause at the time of Section 1983's enactment required a reasonable belief in the facts supporting the claim, and modern interpretations similarly emphasize a reasonable belief in the validity of the claim based on the facts or legal advice received.
Common law permits reliance on a statute until it is declared invalid, as affirmed in Birdsall v. Smith, where it was established that individuals can act under the assumption of a statute's validity unless they know it to be unconstitutional. Malice in legal actions involves an intent to achieve a wrongful purpose, often demonstrated through improper motives or actions taken with reckless disregard for another's rights. In cases of malicious prosecution, malice can be inferred from the lack of probable cause. However, reliance on an attorney’s advice may negate claims of malice.
Claims for malicious prosecution can extend to damages from improper attachments, including loss of property and credit. In this case, Doehr alleges that Di Giovanni delayed releasing an attachment based on an unconstitutional statute, which could support a claim for damages if other elements of malicious prosecution are met. The district court's dismissal of Doehr's claims regarding wrongful attachment is contested, especially in light of the precedent set in Lugar, which allows for a 1983 claim regarding the misuse of an attachment statute post-declaration of unconstitutionality.
A new rule governing damage claims for due process violations under 1983 is announced, necessitating a remand for further consideration, as existing knowledge of the legal requirements may not have been available to the parties. This remand will allow for the presentation of further evidence by both Doehr and Di Giovanni, as the prior stipulation was inadequate for proper resolution.
The district court ruled that Doehr was not entitled to attorney's fees related to damages since he did not succeed on that issue. The appellate court determined that the question of attorney's fees should await the outcome of the damages issue on remand. It noted that Doehr could potentially be eligible for nominal damages, similar to the plaintiff in Carey v. Piphus, which may qualify him as a prevailing party for attorney's fees under Farrar v. Hobby and Ruggiero v. Krzeminski. Doehr also argued that the district court erred in denying his claims for attorney's fees and costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, alleging that Di Giovanni's motions were frivolous. However, the court found that Di Giovanni's actions were reasonable, as they aimed to dismiss the damages claim, and thus, the district court appropriately denied the fee requests due to a lack of adequate justification.
The judgment of the district court was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Senior Circuit Judge Oakes concurred but expressed concerns regarding the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the selection of malicious prosecution as the analogous common-law tort. He acknowledged that while historical common law is relevant in assessing the immunity of state officials, he questioned whether it should define the entire body of constitutional tort law under § 1983. He suggested that a functional interpretation might be more appropriate when analyzing constitutional tort elements, rather than being strictly bound to historical definitions.
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 supports a broad and evolving interpretation of the Act. The analysis of relevant torts is limited, with insufficient consideration of historical common law torts analogous to Section 1983 actions. Instead of aligning the current case with malicious prosecution or abuse of process, it aligns more closely with actions for unjustifiable ancillary proceedings, recognized in several jurisdictions in 1871. Such actions only require favorable termination of the ancillary proceeding without necessitating any impropriety in the principal proceeding. Jurisdictions allow claims for wrongful attachment without needing to demonstrate improper purpose or lack of probable cause. The author argues that the case fits better within the framework of unjustifiable ancillary proceedings than malicious prosecution and suggests remanding the case accordingly.
