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Megan S. Roulette v. City of Seattle, a Washington Municipal Corporation Norman Rice, Mayor of the City of Seattle Patrick S. Fitzsimmons, Chief of the City of Seattle Police Department

Citations: 78 F.3d 1425; 96 Daily Journal DAR 3125; 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1481; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1803; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4596Docket: 94-35354

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 17, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves a challenge to a Seattle ordinance that prohibits sitting or lying on public sidewalks in commercial areas during specified hours. The plaintiffs, including homeless individuals and advocacy organizations, argue that the ordinance violates their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, particularly focusing on First Amendment and substantive due process claims. The district court upheld the ordinance's constitutionality, leading to an appeal reviewed de novo by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court ruled that the ordinance does not target expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, as sitting is not inherently expressive. While the court acknowledges that facial challenges to laws regulating speech can be permissible, the ordinance in question does not fall within this scope as it regulates conduct rather than speech. Furthermore, the ordinance is defended as a measure to ensure public safety and economic vitality, though the dissent raises concerns about the lack of narrow tailoring and alternative measures to achieve these objectives. Ultimately, the court finds that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, upholding the city’s regulation as lawful. The dissent emphasizes the need for rigorous scrutiny of restrictions on public forum activities, highlighting potential impacts on street musicians and public demonstrations.

Legal Issues Addressed

Facial Challenges to Ordinances

Application: The court emphasizes that facial challenges to laws are limited to cases where the statute directly regulates expressive conduct, which was not demonstrated in this case regarding the sidewalk ordinance.

Reasoning: The possibility that sitting might be expressive is insufficient to support their facial challenge. The Court notes that while facial challenges to laws regulating speech are generally more permissible under the First Amendment, they have traditionally been applied to statutes that directly regulate spoken words or clearly expressive conduct.

First Amendment Protection of Symbolic Speech

Application: The plaintiffs argue that the Seattle ordinance facially violates the First Amendment by prohibiting sitting as a form of symbolic speech. However, the court finds the ordinance does not target expression, as sitting is not inherently expressive conduct.

Reasoning: The Seattle ordinance does not target expression; it merely prohibits sitting or lying on sidewalks, actions that are not inherently expressive.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

Application: Plaintiffs argue that the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause by targeting homeless individuals, but the court upholds the ordinance as serving public safety and economic interests.

Reasoning: The plaintiffs argue that the ordinance is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, claiming it aims to remove homeless individuals from public view. The city defends the ordinance as a necessary measure for public safety and economic vitality.

Narrow Tailoring of Ordinances

Application: The court debates whether Seattle's ordinance is narrowly tailored to address safety and economic concerns without unnecessarily infringing on free speech rights.

Reasoning: Even assuming Seattle's interests in safety and preventing urban blight are substantial, the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to achieve those ends.

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

Application: The dissent criticizes the majority for not analyzing the ordinance under traditional time, place, and manner standards, which require restrictions to be narrowly tailored and leave open alternative communication channels.

Reasoning: The dissenting opinion raises concerns about the majority's requirement for plaintiffs to prove that the ordinance restricts integral expressive conduct and criticizes the lack of analysis under traditional time, place, and manner standards.