Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; April 29, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Sammie L. Bradford was arrested for speeding in Decatur, Illinois, where police discovered a loaded firearm in his vehicle. He was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and pleaded not guilty. After the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence during a hearing, a jury found him guilty. Bradford appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, his conviction, and his sentence, but the court affirmed the lower court's decision.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Daniel Hassinger testified that on September 9, 1993, he observed Bradford speeding at 50 mph in a 30 mph zone. After stopping Bradford, the officer learned he did not have a valid driver's license and placed him under arrest. Bradford appeared nervous and fled when Hassinger attempted to cuff him, prompting a chase. During the pursuit, Officer Robert Whitten arrived and, noticing the engine running, turned off the ignition. He discovered a gun beneath the seat and removed it, later finding a fingerprint belonging to Bradford on the magazine. The vehicle was registered to Rose Brown, who confirmed she had loaned it to Bradford. Officers searched her home but did not find him there.
Officer Hassinger requested Coleman to drive back to Brown's residence to pick her up. Upon arrival, Coleman saw Bradford, the defendant, in a parked Oldsmobile and arrested him approximately thirty minutes after his initial arrest. Bradford, a parolee for attempted murder and previously convicted of burglary and rape, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming his arrest was unlawful since he had a valid driver's license, which the officer discovered only after his arrest. However, he did not contest the validity of his speeding arrest.
The district court denied the motion, ruling that the officer acted properly based on his belief that Bradford lacked a valid license. The court also noted that Officer Whitten found the firearm in plain view while entering the vehicle. At trial, Bradford testified that he discovered the gun in the glove compartment of Brown's car and, realizing he could not legally possess it, attempted to conceal it under the driver's seat after failing to contact Brown.
Contradicting her earlier statement, Brown later testified that she was aware of the gun, claiming to have obtained it from a friend. During rebuttal, a firearms dealer testified that the gun was purchased in July 1993, contradicting Brown's timeline. The jury found Bradford guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, leading to a sentence as an armed career criminal due to his prior convictions, resulting in an offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of VI.
The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared by the Probation Officer found no grounds to deviate from the sentencing guidelines, which, given Bradford's offense level of 33 and criminal history category VI, established a sentencing range of 235 to 293 months. The district court sentenced Bradford to 235 months of imprisonment, the minimum of the range, followed by three years of supervised release and a $50 special assessment.
On appeal, Bradford raises several issues: 1) the district court's alleged clear error in denying his motion to suppress evidence; 2) the constitutionality of his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) due to insufficient proof that his firearm possession affected interstate commerce; 3) whether the sentencing judge mistakenly believed he lacked authority to impose a downward departure from the guideline range; and 4) claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not seeking a downward departure based on over-representation of criminal history or a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Regarding the motion to suppress, Bradford argues that a single exchange during the trial indicates he was not speeding, thus making the traffic stop by Officer Hassinger unlawful and rendering the evidence obtained inadmissible. The appellate court notes that it reviews such denials deferentially and typically would consider this issue waived since it was not raised at trial. However, as the government did not argue waiver, the court chooses to address the matter without further pursuit of that defense.
The defendant concedes in his appellate brief that if he was speeding, the officer would have been justified in stopping him. During the suppression hearing, Officer Hassinger confirmed that the radar indicated Bradford was driving at 50 miles per hour in a residential area with a 30 miles per hour speed limit. Bradford admitted to being stopped for exceeding the speed limit and acknowledged that he was ticketed for speeding. At trial, he also confirmed he was stopped for speeding, stating he was not paying attention to his speed due to anxiety about returning a firearm. The court noted that evidence from the trial can support the denial of a suppression motion, referencing precedent from United States v. Longmire. Officer Hassinger testified that he stopped Bradford for speeding and not having a driver's license, reinforcing that the stop was proper based on the evidence presented.
Additionally, Bradford challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), claiming the prosecution did not prove he affected interstate commerce with the firearm. However, Bradford had previously stipulated that the firearm in question had been manufactured in California and had, therefore, traveled in interstate commerce. The court referenced Scarborough v. United States, which established that a minimal nexus to interstate commerce suffices for convictions under this statute. Although Bradford argued that United States v. Lopez redefined the requirements for proving interstate commerce impact, the court found his stipulation sufficient to uphold the conviction.
In United States v. Bell, the court addressed whether the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez undermined the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it a federal offense for a felon to possess a firearm. The court concluded that § 922(g)(1) is constitutionally sound under the Commerce Clause, reaffirming this in a subsequent case, United States v. Lee. Other circuit courts, including the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, also upheld the statute's constitutionality despite Lopez. The defendant, Bradford, stipulated that the firearm in question had traveled in interstate commerce, which weakened his constitutional challenge to his conviction under § 922(g)(1).
Bradford further argued that the trial judge erred by not granting a downward departure in his sentence, citing the judge's acknowledgment of Bradford's absence of criminal activity for nearly two years. The judge expressed concern about the harshness of the mandatory minimum sentence mandated by Congress, particularly since Bradford was not engaged in active criminal conduct at the time of his arrest. Typically, a district court's refusal to depart from the sentencing guidelines is considered an unreviewable exercise of discretion. However, if the judge believes they lack the authority to depart, this becomes a legal issue subject to review.
The Sentencing Guidelines, section 4A1.3, allow for departure if a defendant’s criminal history category does not accurately reflect the seriousness of their past conduct or future criminal risk. The court may consider a departure if the defendant's history is significantly overstated.
A downward departure from sentencing guidelines under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3 is justified only when a defendant's criminal history does not accurately reflect the seriousness of their past conduct. The guidelines suggest such departures are appropriate for defendants with minor misdemeanors who have avoided criminal behavior for a significant time. In contrast, Bradford's criminal history includes serious offenses such as rape, burglary, and attempted murder, with three violent felonies and being on parole during his recent offense. His behavior during arrest, including resisting and fleeing, indicates a disregard for the law, further disqualifying him from receiving a downward departure. The probation officer identified no factors warranting a departure, and the sentencing judge adopted the presentence report, which concluded that Bradford's violent criminal history warranted adherence to the guideline range. The judge's comments regarding the guidelines did not imply a desire for downward departure, and the court acted within its discretion in denying it. Thus, there are no grounds to overturn the court's decision.
Bradford claims ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that his trial attorney failed to request a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3 and did not seek a reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. He argues that these errors prejudiced him and would have led to a more favorable outcome if addressed. To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate two components: first, that counsel's performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second, that this deficiency resulted in prejudice, depriving the defendant of a fair trial. The standard for evaluating counsel's performance is based on prevailing professional norms, with a strong presumption in favor of reasonable professional judgment.
The court notes that Bradford's ineligibility for the downward departure has been previously established, and the failure to request it was within the realm of reasonable professional decisions given his violent criminal history and the trial judge's stance. Regarding the acceptance of responsibility, Bradford's admission of gun possession was deemed insufficient for a reduction because it lacked a demonstration of acceptance of responsibility in the context of his trial. The commentary on U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 indicates that acceptance of responsibility may occur even if a defendant goes to trial, but it primarily relies on pre-trial conduct and statements.
Bradford contested his factual guilt regarding his intent to possess a weapon at trial but did not raise any constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) until his appeal, where he was represented by new counsel. Established case law indicates that a defendant who denies guilt and forces the government to prove its case typically does not qualify for a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, as this requires timely acknowledgment of guilt. In prior cases like United States v. Sanchez, defendants who contested certain charges while admitting guilt on others were also denied such reductions, reinforcing the idea that refusal to accept guilt precludes eligibility. Despite counsel's claims that Bradford accepted responsibility for the weapon's possession, he maintained that the gun belonged to another individual, Brown, which the jury found unconvincing. Acknowledging Bradford for a reduction would undermine the jury's verdict regarding his intent to possess the firearm, and courts are generally reluctant to reassess credibility determinations made by juries unless extraordinary circumstances arise.
The probation officer's Presentence Report (PSR) noted that the defendant, Bradford, initially admitted to the arresting officer that he was aware of a firearm in the vehicle but later recanted this admission. Under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, comment. n. 2, a trial conviction does not preclude a defendant from consideration for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility; however, such determination relies on pretrial statements and conduct. Despite eventually acknowledging knowledge of the weapon, Bradford denied any intent to possess it, resulting in unnecessary resource expenditure for the government during prosecution.
Bradford's behavior before, during, and after the trial, including his consistent denial of intent to possess the firearm found in a vehicle belonging to another, led his trial attorney to rationally decide against requesting a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. This decision was deemed reasonable and unlikely to result in prejudice, as Bradford's refusal to admit intent would likely have hindered the chances of obtaining such a reduction. Additionally, the attorney's choice not to seek a downward departure under 4A1.3 was also a reasonable tactical decision.
Further details included testimony from Officer Hassinger regarding Bradford’s custody, revealing discrepancies regarding Bradford's date of birth and driver's license validity, although he was not charged with any offenses related to this. The firearm involved was identified as a Jennings Arms .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol, with the defendant's fingerprint confirmed on it. On appeal, Bradford contested the legality of his speeding arrest but abandoned the argument concerning his driver's license. The document notes that Bradford testified at trial but not during the suppression hearing, and there were issues regarding the identification of a witness related to the case.
Bradford's criminal history was assessed with three points for each felony conviction, one point for a 1985 marijuana possession, two points for being on parole for attempted murder during his arrest for firearm possession, and one point for committing the current offense within two years of his jail release related to the attempted murder. The legality of an arrest or stop is upheld as constitutional if police actions are within their legal authority. In Decatur, Illinois, the speed limit is acknowledged as 30 mph. Hassinger's arrest of Bradford for driving without a valid license was deemed proper despite Bradford being a licensed driver, as he was not carrying the license due to an erroneous birthdate. The "good faith exception" applies here, as Hassinger believed Bradford was unlicensed. It is suggested that district judges should refrain from publicly criticizing Sentencing Guidelines; such matters should be addressed to Congress. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are typically best resolved at the district court level, but appellate courts may address them if the record is sufficiently developed or if both parties request resolution.
