Judd v. Rodman

Citation: Not availableDocket: 95-8888

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; February 12, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Lisa Beth Judd filed a lawsuit against Dennis Rodman, claiming he wrongfully transmitted genital herpes to her. The jury ruled in favor of Rodman, leading Judd to appeal the decision on the basis that evidence regarding her prior sexual history, her employment as a nude dancer, and her breast augmentation surgery should have been excluded under Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rodman contended that Rule 412 was not applicable and that Judd had waived her right to appeal by not objecting during the trial.

During the pretrial phase, Judd sought to exclude this evidence through motions in limine, which were denied by the trial judge, who indicated a need for further evaluation at trial. The judge noted that while the evidence might not relate to liability, it could be relevant for damages. At trial, Judd objected to the admission of evidence related to her nude dancing, but the objection was overruled, and she ultimately testified about her past, including her nude dancing and sexual history. Rodman also questioned her about her breast augmentation surgery, to which Judd objected based on relevancy, but this objection was similarly overruled.

The jury found in favor of Rodman, and Judd appealed the final judgment. The appellate court emphasized that it reviews the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion and will only reverse if substantial prejudice is shown. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, indicating no abuse of discretion occurred in admitting the contested evidence.

Rule 412, amended in 1994, governs the admissibility of evidence related to an alleged victim's sexual behavior and predisposition in civil proceedings involving sexual misconduct. Generally, such evidence is inadmissible unless its probative value significantly outweighs potential harm and prejudice, as outlined in Rule 412(b)(2). The rule has primarily been applied in cases of rape and sexual harassment, leaving its applicability to cases involving the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases unaddressed by courts. In the present case, the district court did not definitively rule on Rule 412's applicability but sealed related motions in limine as per Rule 412(c)(2). 

The court found that any potential error in admitting evidence concerning Judd's breast augmentation surgery, prior sexual history, and nude dancing did not substantially prejudice the case, thus not requiring a detailed analysis of Rule 412's applicability. Judd's appeal on the exclusion of breast augmentation evidence was waived because she failed to object specifically under Rule 412 during trial, relying instead on Rule 402 and a relevancy objection. Similarly, her claim regarding the admission of prior sexual history was insufficient for appeal as she did not make a timely objection at trial, which is generally required for preserving an issue for appeal. Although a motion in limine might preserve an error under certain conditions, the court indicated that Judd's situation did not meet those criteria.

In Reyes, the court established that a motion in limine can preserve an objection to evidence when the movant presents the evidence as a trial strategy to mitigate its prejudicial effect. In Judd's case, she introduced her prior sexual history on direct examination after her motion in limine to exclude it was denied. The court ruled this was a valid trial strategy, meaning Judd did not waive her objection. The court clarified that an objection to one's own testimony is nonsensical, allowing for the offensive use of damaging information to fall outside the requirement for a timely objection. Judd's motion in limine effectively preserved her appeal on this matter.

For reversal, Judd needed to demonstrate that a substantial right was affected by the evidence's admission. Rule 412(a) generally excludes evidence of an alleged victim's other sexual behavior, but Rule 412(b) allows exceptions when the probative value significantly outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Judd argued that her prior sexual history should have been excluded as the prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. However, the case hinged on whether she contracted genital herpes from Rodman, with expert testimony indicating that the virus can be dormant. Thus, evidence of prior sexual relationships was deemed relevant to Rodman's liability, and the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.

Regarding Judd's employment as a nude dancer, she contended it should be excluded under Rule 412(a)(2) as evidence of sexual predisposition. Despite objecting to this evidence in both a motion and at trial, she failed to show it affected a substantial right. The district court could have admitted the nude dancing evidence if it found the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. The court determined it was relevant to Judd's emotional distress damages, as her feelings about her body image were significant to the case. 

Ultimately, the court affirmed that the admission of evidence related to Judd's breast augmentation, sexual history, and nude dancing did not constitute reversible error. Even assuming Rule 412 applied, Judd did not preserve her objection regarding the breast augmentation, and while she preserved her objection to the other evidence, it was found to be more probative than prejudicial. Any potential errors in admitting evidence did not affect her substantial rights, leading to the affirmation of the lower court's decision.