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Lackey v. Scott
Citations: 52 F.3d 98; 1995 WL 244112Docket: 95-50267
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; April 27, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is considering an appeal from the State of Texas to vacate a stay on the execution of Clarence Lackey, a death row inmate. The district court had imposed the stay based on disagreements among reasonable jurists regarding the application of the abuse-of-the-writ and nonretroactivity doctrines to Lackey's second habeas petition, as well as the merits of his claim. The court vacates the stay, reaffirming that the nonretroactivity doctrine prohibits Lackey's claim, which argues that executing him after a prolonged incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Lackey was convicted of capital murder for the 1977 kidnapping and murder of Diane Kumph. His initial conviction was reversed, but he was retried and again sentenced to death. In his first federal habeas petition, Lackey contended that his execution after a lengthy prison term violates the Eighth Amendment, a claim he raised for the first time on appeal, which the court did not consider. His second petition reiterates the Eighth Amendment argument, focusing on the procedural default by the State as the reason for the alleged violation. The Court of Criminal Appeals previously denied this claim. The appellate court reviews the district court's stay under 28 U.S.C. § 2251 for abuse of discretion, noting that a stay can only be granted if substantial grounds for relief exist. The court underscores that federal courts cannot apply new constitutional rules retroactively to past convictions, as established by the Teague v. Lane precedent, which also applies to novel applications of existing rules. Lackey's situation does not meet either of the narrow exceptions to the nonretroactivity doctrine. Lackey's proposed rule does not exempt any primary conduct from prohibition or affect factfinding. The district court acknowledged a debate among reasonable jurists regarding the applicability of Teague to Lackey's case since he could not have raised this claim on direct appeal. Lackey contends that the delay by the State has resulted in a violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding his punishment. The Supreme Court mandates nonretroactivity on collateral review to uphold the finality of state criminal judgments, which serves as a deterrent. Teague has only two narrow exceptions, and previous rulings indicated that granting Lackey relief would necessitate establishing a new rule. The district court found a debate on whether the grounds for relief in Lackey's successive petitions are identical under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b), but this issue is unnecessary to resolve since both claims require the same Teague analysis. Both claims challenge the state court's judgment based on postconviction facts, leading to the conclusion that the nonretroactivity doctrine precludes Lackey's current claim. The district court's stay of Lackey's execution is deemed an abuse of discretion, and thus, the stay is vacated. Even if Lackey's petition were not an abuse of the writ and had merit, the nonretroactivity doctrine would still prevent the district court from issuing a stay.