United States v. Williams

Citation: 9 F. App'x 516Docket: No. 00-2482

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 21, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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James Williams was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846 and 841(a)(1)) and one count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). He received a life sentence for Count 1 and 20 years for Counts 2 and 3. Williams appeals, arguing the evidence for Count 1 was insufficient as he only had a buy-sell relationship with a coconspirator. He also contends that his life sentence violates the ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, as the drug quantities were not included in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The indictment from August 1998 charged Williams with conspiracy related to a drug distribution scheme from December 1996 to July 1997, involving four coconspirators in Illinois and Arkansas. Counts 2 and 3 involved his role in the murder of his roommate, Jerome Townsend, to steal his drug supply. Trial evidence showed Williams acted as a leader in the Gangster Disciples gang, supporting younger members in drug distribution by providing drugs, connecting them with suppliers, and helping them financially.

Carlos Branch, who regarded Williams as a father figure, testified about their relationship and drug transactions. After bonding Branch out of jail in December 1996, Williams took him to meet Vernell Berry, a drug supplier. Williams provided Branch with crack cocaine to sell, and they made multiple trips to Mt. Vernon for purchases. When Williams could not accompany Branch, he arranged for others to facilitate the drug transactions. Testimony indicated that Williams directed Branch on purchases and secured discounts on drugs from suppliers.

Berry occasionally informed Cole about Williams and Branch's intentions to purchase crack cocaine, while at other times, they arrived unannounced, yet Cole consistently sold them drugs. Cole admitted to giving Williams a .38 caliber gun. Berry, who later testified for the government, revealed that he traveled to Arkansas with Williams and Branch to acquire crack cocaine, receiving payment in gasoline and drugs. On these trips, Branch typically obtained two to three ounces, occasionally as much as seven to nine ounces. Branch was arrested on federal drug charges in July 1997, shortly after purchasing two ounces of crack in Arkansas, which he instructed Williams to dispose of from jail.

Several members of the Gangster Disciples testified about their drug dealings with Williams. Frederick Goosby stated that Williams provided him with two ounces of crack and additional powder cocaine after his prison release, leading to ongoing purchases. Cedric Neal reported receiving crack from Williams upon his release in March 1997. Witnesses also implicated Williams in the murder of his roommate, Jerome Townsend. Both Branch and L.C. Richardson testified that Williams orchestrated a robbery of Townsend, suspecting him of cooperating with law enforcement. They recounted how Williams instructed them to bind and strangle Townsend, after which he took Townsend’s belongings and disposed of the body in a cemetery.

During his testimony, Williams denied various allegations, including drug dealings and involvement in the murder. He claimed ignorance of crack cocaine and distanced himself from Berry and Branch's activities. The jury convicted Williams on all counts. His Presentence Report (PSR) calculated his drug quantity at 1,213 grams of crack, but ultimately based the offense level on the murder committed to further the drug conspiracy. The probation officer recommended a 2-level increase for obstruction of justice due to Williams’s false testimony, categorizing him as a Level 43, Category VI offender, leading to a sentencing range of mandatory life imprisonment. Williams objected to the PSR, challenging the credibility of the witnesses and the obstruction increase, while generally contesting all calculations related to his drug involvement.

Williams objected only to the obstruction points during sentencing. The court deemed the government's witnesses credible, determined that Williams committed perjury, and identified him as a principal in Townsend's murder. The court concurred with the Presentence Report's guideline calculations. Count One of the indictment charged Williams with involvement in a cocaine and crack conspiracy with others. On appeal, Williams challenges the evidence supporting his conviction, asserting that the government did not demonstrate more than a buyer-seller relationship between him and Cole. He argues that to convict him, the jury needed to find that he and Cole had an agreement to redistribute cocaine, which he claims was not proven. 

The government counters that Williams waived his buyer-seller argument by not including it in jury instructions. Nevertheless, Williams maintains that his sufficiency argument is valid, having made a Rule 29 motion for acquittal during the government's case, although he did not renew it after presenting his own case. His subsequent motion for a new trial was filed over seven days after the verdict, which typically forfeits the sufficiency argument on appeal. This leads to a plain error review standard, applicable only if his conviction constitutes a manifest miscarriage of justice. 

Williams exhibits a misunderstanding of conspiracy law, as he appears to concede that evidence supports a conspiracy between himself, Berry, and Branch to resell drugs. The law states that conspiracy is based on an agreement that does not require knowledge of all conspirators or their identities. The government is not obligated to prove specific conspirators, and the argument that a lack of evidence against every co-defendant invalidates a conviction is incorrect.

Conspiracy law centers on agreements rather than groups, requiring only proof that a defendant joined the alleged agreement, regardless of specific coconspirators. In this case, Williams's admission of conspiring with Berry and Branch suffices, rendering Cole's specific role less critical. There was substantial evidence demonstrating that all coconspirators, including Cole, collectively aimed to distribute crack cocaine. Williams's argument that his interaction with Cole was merely a buyer-seller relationship fails, as conspiracy necessitates an agreement to engage in criminal activity beyond simple drug transactions. Evidence supporting a conspiracy includes large drug quantities, ongoing cooperation, and standardized dealings.

The trial evidence indicated that Williams facilitated Berry's connection with Branch for crack distribution and that Cole was integral to this conspiracy, supplying drugs when Berry was unavailable. This cooperative relationship met the criteria for establishing Cole as a coconspirator. The document also addresses Williams's claim of sentencing error under Apprendi v. New Jersey, which stipulates that a higher sentence for drug offenses requires the drug type and quantity to be charged and proven to the jury. Williams did not raise this issue during trial or sentencing, and thus it is subject to a plain error review, which evaluates whether any error affected his substantial rights or the judicial process's integrity.

An error occurred regarding the sentencing of Williams under conspiracy statutes 846 and 841(a)(1) because the drug quantity was not charged in the indictment or determined by the jury. However, the absence of a quantity allegation in the indictment is deemed irrelevant in a plain-error analysis. Williams's claim fails because he cannot demonstrate that the error significantly affected the fairness or integrity of the judicial process. If it is evident beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have concluded that Williams distributed more than 50 grams of crack, then the error does not warrant overturning the judgment.

The determination hinges on whether the evidence of the conspiracy's drug activity overwhelmingly supported that it involved more than 50 grams of crack. The district court found that Williams was responsible for over 1,213 grams of crack based on trial evidence and the Presentence Report (PSR). Although the evidence was not as compelling as in some precedent cases, it surpassed the insufficient evidence in Westmoreland and Noble, where drug quantity was heavily contested and based on limited, unreliable testimony. 

In contrast, credible witness testimonies supported the claims against Williams, including Branch's account, which alone established his accountability for at least 293 grams of crack. Testimonies indicated multiple sales and transactions involving significant quantities of crack, including a trip where Williams and Branch obtained nearly 200 grams and another where they purchased approximately 225 grams. Additional witnesses corroborated their drug transactions with Williams, further strengthening the evidence against him. The overall assessment suggested that a judge confident in the preponderance of evidence for larger quantities would also find the established amounts credible beyond a reasonable doubt.

Williams was overwhelmingly implicated in the sale of over 50 grams of crack cocaine, making a conviction unavoidable for any reasonable jury. The court affirmed this decision, noting that the primary issue was whether Williams forfeited his sufficiency argument on appeal by not renewing his Rule 29 motion at the end of the evidence presentation. Waiver implies an intentional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture indicates a failure to assert rights in a timely manner, which is subject to plain error review. Even if Williams had not forfeited his argument, the standard of review is highly deferential, requiring that evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The determination hinges on whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.