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Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. United States
Citation: 9 F. App'x 457Docket: No. 99-2444
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; May 16, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (SSM) is appealing a District Court decision that denied its motion to prevent the Department of Interior (DOI) from taking land into trust for gaming purposes by the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians (LTBB). The District Court, presided over by Judge Robert Holmes Bell, granted summary judgment for the defendants but left unresolved the critical issue of SSM's standing to sue, which is necessary to establish federal jurisdiction. The background details the legislative history of the LTBB, including their recognition as a federally recognized tribe through the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Act. Key findings by Congress include the LTBB's descent from signatories of historical treaties, their continued political and social existence despite prior denials of federal reorganization, and their eventual recognition in 1994, which granted them rights and benefits associated with federally recognized tribes. The Act also stipulates that the area within 70 miles of their reservations is considered part of their reservation for federal service delivery purposes. The case will be remanded to the District Court to resolve the standing issue, critical for determining whether federal jurisdiction exists in this matter. Congress mandated the Department of the Interior (DOI) to acquire real property in Emmet and Charlevoix Counties for the benefit of the Little Traverse Bay Bands (LTBB), as outlined in 25 U.S.C. 1300k-4(a). Following this directive, LTBB purchased land in Emmet County, which included an old bowling alley intended for renovation into a casino. The DOI approved this land trust on August 27, 1999, establishing that the acquisition fell under the exception to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) prohibiting gaming on newly acquired lands, as it pertained to the restoration of lands for a federally recognized tribe. The DOI published its final determination in the Federal Register on September 2, 1999, allowing for a 30-day public notice period before the land's acceptance into trust. SSM responded by filing a lawsuit under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) within that notice period, initially in the District of Columbia but later transferred to the Western District of Michigan. SSM raised two main challenges: the DOI's obligation to accept the property into trust and the applicability of the 'restored lands' exception of IGRA regarding gaming. Judge Bell addressed the issue of standing, emphasizing that SSM needed to demonstrate a legally protected interest affected by the trust decision. He noted that SSM claimed economic harm due to the LTBB casino's operations but did not find SSM had standing on either issue. Ultimately, he stated that resolving the standing question was unnecessary since the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the merits of SSM's claims. The Court assumes the Plaintiff has standing for this case. Judge Bell ruled that the Department of the Interior's (DOI) interpretation of the LTBB Act, which mandates taking land into trust, was a reasonable and non-arbitrary interpretation. Similarly, the DOI's determination that the property qualifies for the "restored lands" exception to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was also deemed reasonable. The Supreme Court's precedent indicates that federal courts should not assume jurisdiction to resolve cases on their merits, as this practice, referred to as hypothetical jurisdiction, violates principles of separation of powers and results in non-binding advisory opinions. Standing is essential for jurisdiction, requiring three elements: a concrete injury, causation by the defendant, and a likelihood of redress through the requested relief. Judge Bell did not specifically address these standing factors in SSM's claims. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court to determine standing. If the appellant is found to have standing, they may face challenges on the merits. The Plaintiff-appellant only contests the ruling that LTBB is a restored tribe and that the property is restored land, asserting that standing was not addressed in the district court. However, the court emphasized that it is obligated to ensure jurisdiction, regardless of whether standing was raised by the parties.