Fred W. Phelps, Sr. And Edward F. Engel v. Joan Hamilton, in Her Official Capacity as District Attorney

Citations: 76 F.3d 393; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7211; 1996 WL 50464Docket: 94-3066

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; February 6, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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Unpublished opinions may now be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue, as long as a copy is attached to the citing document or provided to the court and all parties during oral argument. This change follows a General Order from November 29, 1993, which suspended a specific circuit rule until December 31, 1995. In the case Fred W. Phelps, Sr. and Edward F. Engel v. Joan Hamilton, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a district court's summary judgment favoring the plaintiffs on civil rights claims, which led to an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. However, the Tenth Circuit later reversed this summary judgment, prompting the defendant to appeal the attorney fee award, arguing that the plaintiffs were no longer prevailing parties and challenging the district court's discretion in awarding fees related to a related criminal case.

The plaintiffs, Kansas residents engaged in a controversial campaign against homosexuality, had faced criminal defamation charges against Engel, which were eventually dropped. After Joan Hamilton was elected as the district attorney, she initiated further prosecutions against Phelps for criminal defamation. The plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action seeking to invalidate the Kansas criminal defamation statute as facially overbroad and to enjoin ongoing prosecutions. The district court ruled that Engel had standing, did not need to abstain from hearing the case, and found the statute unconstitutional for lacking an actual malice standard for public concern speech. Following this ruling, defendant Hamilton moved to dismiss the state criminal prosecutions, and the district court issued a permanent injunction against prosecuting the plaintiffs under the statute.

The appellate court disagreed with the district court's ruling that the Kansas statute was unconstitutional on its face, asserting that Kansas courts would interpret it with a narrowing construction and apply an actual malice standard. Consequently, the court upheld the statute's facial validity and reversed the summary judgment favoring the plaintiffs on their facial invalidity claims. Regarding Phelps' argument for an injunction against criminal prosecutions, the appellate court found that the district court did not apply the appropriate standard for assessing whether the prosecution was initiated in bad faith or for harassment, requiring Phelps to provide proof of bad faith for federal intervention. The court remanded this "as applied" claim for further proceedings.

In the current appeal, the defendant contended that, following the Phelps III decision, the plaintiffs did not prevail on any significant issue and thus could not be deemed prevailing parties. The plaintiffs countered with three theories: (1) they had substantially prevailed due to the qualitative relief obtained, including the vindication of First Amendment rights; (2) their lawsuit was a catalyst for the defendant's voluntary actions, such as the dismissal of criminal prosecutions against Phelps and amendments to the Kansas statute; and (3) they were entitled to fees based on substantial interim relief obtained.

The district court had previously awarded fees without disputing the plaintiffs' status as prevailing parties, as the appellate court's opinion in Phelps III was not yet issued. Given that the district court had not addressed the current arguments regarding the plaintiffs' status, and some raised factual issues unsuitable for the appellate court to resolve, the matter was remanded to the district court for further consideration of the plaintiffs' entitlement to fees, rendering the defendant's challenge to the fee amount unnecessary. The appellate court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for consistent further proceedings. The order is not binding precedent except under certain legal doctrines. Section 1988(b) allows for reasonable attorney's fees for prevailing parties in section 1983 enforcement actions.