United States v. Juan H. Lomeli

Citations: 76 F.3d 146; 43 Fed. R. Serv. 1005; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1756; 1996 WL 45007Docket: 95-2056

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; February 6, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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Juan Lomeli appeals his conviction for conspiracy to sell cocaine and related charges, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during an allegedly improper search of his vehicle and by denying a mistrial after a government witness mentioned his prior drug conviction and referred to him as an aggravated felon. 

On March 15, 1994, law enforcement officers were surveilling Lomeli's vehicle as part of an operation to investigate drug trafficking. After Lomeli entered a car driven by a confidential informant (CI) and both vehicles attempted to leave, police activated their lights to stop Lomeli's car. During the stop, his passenger, Jesus Perez, was seen reaching for something in the rear of the vehicle before being arrested. Lomeli was arrested shortly after. 

Officer Savik, who transported Lomeli's car to the police station, conducted a "visual search" of the vehicle by shining a flashlight into the back seat but did not find anything. Following this, the CI informed officers that Lomeli's car contained secret compartments, prompting a more thorough search at the station where officers discovered firearms and weapon paraphernalia. 

Lomeli filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle, claiming the searches were unconstitutional. However, the district court denied the motion, ruling that the initial search was merely a protective sweep and the subsequent search constituted a lawful inventory search in accordance with police regulations. Lomeli was indicted on multiple charges, including conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine, firearm offenses, and illegal re-entry as a deported felon.

Warrantless inventory searches of vehicles in police custody are permissible under the Fourth Amendment, based on reduced privacy expectations and important governmental interests, including protecting property, preventing claims of lost or damaged items, and ensuring officer safety. However, these searches must adhere to regulated procedures to prevent them from being a pretext for investigatory motives. Evidence obtained during an unregulated inventory search may be suppressed. The Oak Lawn Police Department has established a general order requiring officers to inspect vehicles post-arrest, covering the passenger compartment, trunk, and unlocked containers. While the policy mandates searches at the arrest scene, it allows for discretion, which raises questions about its regulation when conducted at the police station. Although discretion is permitted, it must align with the purposes of inventory searches and does not necessitate a rigid "all or nothing" approach. The general order is deemed sufficiently regulatory as long as officers exercise discretion appropriately.

Officer Savik's testimony affirmed that he had discretion under departmental policy to postpone an inventory search due to poor lighting conditions, opting instead to conduct a thorough search at the station to avoid missing items, which supports the fundamental purposes of such searches. The district court found this reasoning credible, leading to the denial of Lomeli's motion to suppress evidence. Lomeli did not present sufficient evidence to undermine Officer Savik's credibility or the district judge's ruling.

Lomeli's appeal also contested the denial of a mistrial after improper testimony regarding his prior drug conviction. Although Lomeli initially sought to exclude mention of the nature of the conviction, he later agreed to stipulate to it. The court instructed the government to avoid references to the conviction being aggravated or drug-related. However, a witness mistakenly referred to Lomeli's prior offense as drug-related and aggravated, prompting defense motions for mistrial, which were denied. The court instead provided a curative instruction, reinforcing that the witness's inaccuracies should be considered when assessing credibility. The appellate review of the mistrial denial is based on whether the trial court abused its discretion, with the presumption that juries can effectively follow judicial instructions.

The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying a mistrial. The jury was adequately instructed regarding improper testimony from a government witness about Lomeli's prior felony, which was characterized as both aggravated and drug-related. The judge clarified that the witness was mistaken and allowed the jury to consider this when assessing credibility. Additionally, the indictment was redacted to remove references to Lomeli's prior drug conviction with both parties' consent. The misstatements occurred early in a six-day trial, minimizing their potential impact, especially since Lomeli had already stipulated to his prior conviction.

While the government witness's statements about Lomeli's involvement with a drug offense and status as an aggravated felon contradicted prior instructions, the court's correction that the witness was "mistaken" was ultimately harmless error, benefiting Lomeli. The judge's reference to the witness's mistake aligned with the pretrial agreement prohibiting mention of Lomeli's drug offense.

The analysis assumes the statements about the aggravated and drug-related nature of the prior felony were improper, based on the judge's pretrial ruling rather than established legal doctrine. The court found no inherent impropriety in admitting additional facts about a prior conviction beyond its felonious nature, as such details were relevant to Count Four, which charged Lomeli with re-entry after deportation due to a felony conviction. Therefore, if these details were deemed inadmissible, it would have indicated a clear error in denying the Motion in Limine. Conversely, if the additional facts were seen as admissible, the trial judge's decision to deny a mistrial would be justified.

A general prohibition against admitting facts beyond those necessary to prove an element of an offense may be supported by prior decisions, such as United States v. King. However, the preferred approach is to grant trial judges discretion regarding the admissibility of facts related to prior convictions when proof of such convictions is an element of the charged offense. This discretion helps reconcile conflicting outcomes in the Circuit concerning the prejudicial impact of admitting such facts, as seen in cases like King and United States v. Lowe. Reviewing for abuse of discretion aligns with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permit judges to exclude relevant evidence due to unfair prejudice and to manage the admission of prior convictions for impeachment. The conclusion is that trial judges have the authority to admit or exclude evidence, as demonstrated in Lomeli's trial and supported by case law, including United States v. Yannott and Rush v. United States. The ruling is affirmed.