Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission
Docket: No. 2-08-0722WC
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; May 21, 2009; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Clinton Dwyer filed a workers’ compensation claim against Circuit City Stores, Inc. for a right leg injury, which he claimed was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. An arbitration hearing resulted in awards for medical expenses ($60,306.83), temporary total disability benefits ($182.62 per week for 12 4/7 weeks), and permanent partial disability benefits ($164.36 per week for 70 weeks, reflecting a 35% loss of use of the leg), while denying penalties and attorney fees. Circuit City appealed to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, which upheld the arbitrator’s decision with one dissenting opinion. Circuit City then appealed to the McHenry County circuit court, which reversed the Commission's ruling, stating that the Commission incorrectly applied the “personal comfort doctrine” and deemed Dwyer’s injury non-compensable. Dwyer subsequently appealed, asserting that the doctrine was applicable, should extend to injuries incurred while assisting a coworker, and that his injuries arose during employment. The court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, reinstating the Commission’s decision. A medical report from Doctor Walter Virkus indicated that Dwyer had developed pain in his right hip, attributed to a pre-existing bone cyst exacerbated by recent physical activity in landscaping. Following a period of rest and monitoring, Dwyer reported no ongoing pain. Doctor Virkus advised caution against ignoring symptoms that could lead to a serious injury.
Dwyer resumed normal activities, including work at Circuit City, under Doctor Virkus's permission after a prior medical issue, without seeking further medical care until the accident on March 6, 2005. He worked in an installation bay adjacent to a hallway containing vending machines and washrooms open to the public. Dwyer frequently used the snack vending machine, which had a history of malfunctioning. When items got stuck, he would shake the machine or repurchase the item, having not seen any employee disciplined for similar actions. There were no posted protocols for handling stuck items, but a procedure existed for reporting lost money, which Dwyer had never experienced.
On the day of the accident, Dwyer assisted a coworker, Jessica Hubner, in retrieving a stuck bag of chips. After unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the item by shaking the machine, Dwyer struck the machine with his shoulder after taking a half step forward. The arbitrator noted Dwyer's posture during this incident. When questioned by Circuit City's counsel, Dwyer confirmed he did not take a running start but rather a single step before making contact with the machine. Following the impact, Dwyer experienced severe pain in his right hip and was subsequently taken to the hospital after Hubner notified the store manager.
X-rays indicated that Dwyer had an impacted, slightly displaced fracture of the right femoral neck, resulting from an impact to the hip. He was urgently referred to Rush University Medical Center, where Dr. Virkus performed surgery on March 6, 2005, to address the fracture and a pre-existing cyst in the femoral neck. The surgical procedure included open reduction and internal fixation, curettage of the cyst, and bone grafting. Dwyer remained hospitalized until March 9, 2005, when he was discharged with crutches, a leg brace, and medication prescriptions. Dr. Virkus provided follow-up care and restricted Dwyer from work until May 10, 2005, after which he could return with limitations on lifting and the need for frequent rest. Circuit City was unable to accommodate these restrictions, prompting Dwyer to seek a full-duty release, which he obtained and resumed regular work on June 2, 2005. By April 6, 2006, Dwyer was cleared of further medical care but reported ongoing hip issues, such as pain when sitting on hard surfaces, difficulty crossing his legs, and discomfort due to weather changes. Before the injury, he was active in baseball and jogging, but experienced pain attempting to run shortly before arbitration.
Jessica Hubner, a coworker, testified about the incident on March 6, 2005, when she sought Dwyer's help with a stuck vending machine. She described Dwyer’s actions, noting he may have struck the machine lightly before taking a few steps back and jumping into it to dislodge the stuck bag of Fritos. Hubner stated that shaking the machine was her initial instinct, and confirmed no Circuit City guidelines advised against such actions. She clarified that neither the money nor the Fritos belonged to Dwyer and that he was merely assisting her during work hours.
Jennifer Ritter, the store director at Circuit City, testified regarding an incident on March 6, 2005, where Jessica Hubner informed her that Dwyer was injured and required an ambulance. Ritter characterized Dwyer’s method of trying to retrieve stuck chips from a vending machine as “improper” but acknowledged that customers had previously experienced similar issues. The store had a protocol to refund customers in cases of stuck products, which Ritter stated was communicated to employees. However, she had never received reports of employees shaking the machine, nor had she seen or disciplined anyone for such actions.
Ritter admitted that if employees could dislodge products by shaking the machine, she would not have been informed of the problem. There was no established policy forbidding employees from shaking the machine. Dwyer was not on break when he approached the machine, which Ritter viewed as a violation of company protocol, yet she did not discipline him for this.
The arbitrator later addressed whether the "personal comfort doctrine" applied to Dwyer’s case, concluding it did not, as Dwyer was assisting a colleague rather than seeking personal comfort and was not on break. The arbitrator noted that while shaking the machine was not an explicitly stated policy violation, there was acknowledgment of ongoing issues with the machine. Evidence showed that Hubner had shaken the machine before seeking Dwyer’s help, and that Circuit City was aware of the vending machine's problems. The arbitrator found that Dwyer’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and determined that his injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, concluding that the accident was compensable according to Illinois Appellate Court precedent.
The Commission upheld the arbitrator's ruling, with one commissioner dissenting, asserting that the personal comfort doctrine was inapplicable because Dwyer was not on break nor seeking personal comfort, and his actions were deemed unreasonable and unforeseeable. Circuit City appealed to the McHenry County circuit court, which sided with the dissenting opinion and reversed the Commission's ruling. Dwyer subsequently appealed this decision.
The Act states that to be compensable, an accidental injury must arise out of and occur in the course of employment. The "arising out of" criterion relates to the injury's origin and connection to employment risks, while the "in the course of" criterion pertains to the timing, location, and circumstances of the injury. The personal comfort doctrine allows employees to engage in personal comfort activities within the scope of their employment, unless their actions are deemed unusual or unreasonable. Illinois Supreme Court precedents affirm that personal comfort acts are incidental to employment, provided they do not expose the employee to unreasonable risks. However, the personal comfort doctrine does not address the "arising out of" requirement, which must be separately satisfied for a claim to be compensable.
The Commission determined that Dwyer’s injury occurred during his employment. Reversal of the Commission’s decision requires evidence contrary to law or factual findings against the manifest weight of the evidence. The factual determination is considered against the manifest weight only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In this case, Circuit City provided a vending machine for employee use, with testimonies indicating it was intended for employee convenience. A defect in the machine led to Dwyer’s injury, as he needed to dislodge a stuck product, establishing a causal link to his employment. Thus, the Commission’s finding regarding the injury's origin is upheld.
However, the Commission's application of the personal comfort doctrine to Dwyer’s case is incorrect, as this doctrine applies to employees seeking personal comfort themselves, not to those assisting others. A more suitable doctrine, the "good Samaritan doctrine," is relevant here. In Ace Pest Control, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that an employee who stops to assist a stranded motorist is still within the scope of employment if such actions could be reasonably foreseen by the employer. This principle was further supported in Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Industrial Comm’n, where an employee was injured while rescuing someone, establishing that similar actions fall within employment scope.
In Johnson v. Industrial Comm’n, 278 Ill. App. 3d 59 (1996), an administrative assistant was injured while attempting to prevent roughhousing by her boss's sons against his niece during a Mexican yacht cruise. The court found her actions to be reasonable and foreseeable, thus within the scope of her employment. The decision referenced previous cases, such as Ace Pest Control and Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, which established that an employee's departure from work duties to assist others is compensable if deemed foreseeable. In this case, the Commission determined that the assistant’s actions in coming to the aid of a coworker were foreseeable, even if the urgency was less than in prior cases.
The vending machine involved was provided for employee use, and it was established that products frequently became stuck. Testimony indicated that both management and employees were aware of this issue, with employees often shaking the machine to dislodge items. Specifically, Hubner, the coworker in need of assistance, had previously attempted to shake the machine herself before seeking help from Dwyer. The foreseeability of one employee aiding another in this context was affirmed.
Dwyer's actions were scrutinized to determine if they exceeded the bounds of foreseeability and scope of employment. He attempted to shake the machine but ultimately struck it with his shoulder after a brief approach, resulting in his injury. An arbitrator noted Dwyer's posture during this action, suggesting he was in a defensive stance. Ultimately, the case hinges on the determination that Dwyer’s effort to aid Hubner was within the realm of reasonable foreseeability associated with his employment duties.
During testimony, Hubner described an incident where he attempted to dislodge a machine by taking two or three steps back and then jumping sideways into it to give it a nudge. He clarified that he did not run towards the machine but walked, indicating that it was not feasible to run due to the limited space. This action, though involving leaving his feet, was deemed reasonably foreseeable as a reaction after unsuccessful attempts to shake the machine. Dwyer corroborated Hubner's account, stating that he did not exceed reasonable behavior in assisting Hubner.
The Commission found that Dwyer's actions fell within the scope of employment, and thus, their decision was upheld as consistent with the evidence, contrary to Circuit City’s claims. The court reversed the McHenry County circuit court's judgment and reinstated the Commission’s decision, asserting that the focus should be on foreseeability rather than the presence of an emergency. Circuit City's reliance on legal precedent regarding personal aid was deemed misaligned, as the cases cited involved different circumstances, primarily where injuries occurred outside work hours. This case, by contrast, involved actions that were foreseeable and insubstantial in nature.
