Sibenaller v. Milschewski

Citation: 379 Ill. App. 3d 717Docket: No. 2-07-0414

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; February 26, 2008; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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The United City of Yorkville enacted an ordinance to annex certain property under section 7.1—8 of the Illinois Municipal Code. Property owners in the annexed territory, represented by intervenors North Star Trust Company, Fox Valley Moraine, LLC, and Eric and Diane Schanze, were involved in the case. Plaintiff Katherine Sibenáller and others submitted a referendum petition to the City, asserting that a vote on the annexation was necessary under section 7.1—6 of the Code. Sibenáller then filed a mandamus complaint against City clerk Jacquelyn Milschewski to compel her to forward the petition to the Kendall County clerk for scheduling a referendum.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the referendum requirement of section 7.1—6 did not apply to annexations conducted under section 7.1—8. The court noted that section 7.1—8 does not require electors' approval for annexation, as it allows landowners and a majority of electors in the area to petition for annexation, making the annexation final upon the City’s approval. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, clarifying that the annexation process under section 7.1—8 is distinct and does not necessitate a referendum as outlined in section 7.1—6. The court highlighted the procedural requirements for annexation outlined in section 7.1—8, which involve a written petition from landowners and electors, followed by a majority vote from municipal authorities.

Section 7.1—8 does not mandate a referendum for annexation ordinances. The plaintiff argues that section 7.1—6 requires a referendum, which allows corporate authorities to order one if they favor annexation or permits a petition from electors if the authorities either reject annexation or do not order a referendum. This petition must be signed by electors equal to 10% of the votes cast for mayor in the last election, and the municipal clerk must certify it for an election. If a majority favors annexation, the decision becomes final, either from the corporate authorities or the electors, and the territory is annexed. Conversely, if the vote is against annexation, no further action on the petition is permitted.

The plaintiff interprets "the vote" in section 7.1—6(a) as any vote on annexation, including those by corporate authorities under section 7.1—8. The defendant and intervenors argue that "the vote" specifically refers to votes under section 7.1—5, which deals with court-approved annexations. They contend that if the legislature intended to require referenda for section 7.1—8 annexations, it would have explicitly stated so in that section. Additionally, they cite the case Swinger v. Municipal Officers’ Electoral Board, where the appellate court determined that section 7.1—8 does not provide for a referendum and deemed section 7.1—6 inapplicable to such annexations. The court noted that the village should have dismissed the referendum petition as null.

The parties dispute whether the comments in Swinger constitute precedential judicial dicta and their correctness, but resolution of the first issue is unnecessary as the interpretation of the Code in Swinger is accepted. Under section 2.619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be dismissed for legal insufficiency or because it is barred by affirmative matter. The current issue focuses on whether the complaint adequately states a cause of action, as per the standard that allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The review is de novo. Mandamus serves as an extraordinary remedy compelling a public officer to fulfill a nondiscretionary duty. The plaintiffs' mandamus complaint hinges on their interpretation of the Code, necessitating a discussion of statutory construction rules aimed at ascertaining legislative intent primarily through the statutory language, which must be applied straightforwardly if unambiguous. The statute must be interpreted as a cohesive whole, with contextual meanings for specific terms. In cases of ambiguity, legislative history may be referenced. The defendant points out that section 7.1-8 does not allow for a referendum on nonjudicial annexations, suggesting that the legislature's silence on the matter indicates no intent to require voter approval for such annexations. Section 7.1-8 explicitly states that only a majority vote of corporate authorities is necessary for annexation, and the process concludes with the recording of the annexation ordinance, indicating that the vote itself suffices to complete the annexation without further conditions.

The plaintiff argues that section 7.1-6(a) of the relevant legal code implicitly mandates a referendum for annexation votes, despite section 7.1-8 not mentioning one. The plaintiff interprets "the vote" as referring to any vote on annexation, including those by municipal authorities under section 7.1-8. However, this interpretation is rejected for several reasons. First, "the vote" is defined as a specific and limited term, contrary to the plaintiff's claim that it implies any vote. Statutory construction principles indicate that the definite article "the" specifies a subject, while "a" or "any" generalizes it, as illustrated in case law. Thus, "the vote" signifies a limited intent by the legislature regarding when a referendum is required.

Second, the argument's weakness is further illuminated by examining article VII of the Code as a whole. Sections 7.1-2 through 7.1-5 outline the steps for initiating annexation, commencing with an ordinance or petition and followed by necessary hearings. The procedure for submitting a judicially approved ordinance or petition to a referendum is distinct and follows these sections. Specifically, section 7.1-5 details procedures post-approval, mandating a vote by municipal authorities recorded as "ayes" and "noes." This vote is effective after 30 days unless a referendum is ordered or a petition for a referendum is filed, highlighting that the processes for referendums and votes by municipal authorities are separate and contextually specific.

Section 7.1—6 outlines the process for obtaining a referendum on annexation, applicable when corporate authorities vote in favor of annexation or when residents petition after the authorities reject annexation. It clarifies that "the vote" referenced connects back to prior sections 7.1—5 and 7.1—4, establishing that the territory in question must be specifically described in a circuit court order. The interpretation emphasizes a coherent reading of Article VII, asserting that it would be unreasonable for readers to consider “the vote” as ambiguous or unrelated to the defined context. Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, indicating that no right to a referendum existed. Additionally, arguments regarding insufficient factual pleading for the referendum petition were deemed unnecessary to address. The defendant's sanctions petition was voluntarily dismissed, confirming jurisdiction for the appeal.