96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 545, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 883 Anthony Dewayne Mitchell Also Known as Mustafa B. Shabazz v. Clarence Dupnik, Sheriff of Pima County, Anthony Dewayne Mitchell v. Clarence Dupnik, Donald Robare and Michael Garland, Anthony Dewayne Mitchell v. Clarence Dupnik, David Bosman and Richard Fimbres
Docket: 93-16517
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 25, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Mustafa B. Shabazz (formerly Anthony D. Mitchell) is the plaintiff in a series of appeals against Pima County Sheriff Clarence Dupnik and several deputies, stemming from actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding alleged constitutional violations during his incarceration at the Pima County Adult Correction Center from February 1991 to September 1992. Shabazz faced disciplinary measures leading to his placement in administrative segregation, which entails stricter restrictions compared to the general population.
The appeals involve multiple district court judgments, with the Ninth Circuit Court affirming some decisions, reversing others, and remanding for further proceedings. In one claim, Shabazz alleged that corrections officer Donald Robare violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment during three disciplinary hearings by not adhering to required procedural safeguards. Specifically, Shabazz claimed that Robare failed to tape record at least one hearing, did not allow him to call witnesses, and did not provide written findings post-hearing, all of which contravened Jail policy and resulted in his unjustified segregation for nineteen days.
The court granted Shabazz's motions to file a late response and to strike an affidavit from the County defendants' petition for rehearing. The court withdrew its previous opinion and unanimously denied the County defendants' petition for rehearing and their suggestion for rehearing en banc, indicating no further actions would be taken by the full court on the matter.
Robare's motion to dismiss the claim was denied by the court, which ordered the Jail to conduct three new hearings with appropriate safeguards and to resentence Shabazz. As a result, Shabazz's segregation time was reduced by seven days. Since he had already served the longer sentence, no further segregation was imposed. The district court granted Shabazz summary judgment on Robare's liability, setting a damages trial.
In a separate claim, Shabazz alleged that corrections officer Michael Garland violated his constitutional rights by improperly searching his legal documents in violation of Jail policy. The court also granted summary judgment against Garland, leading to a trial for damages. Following the trials, Shabazz was awarded $1,000 against Robare and $550 against Garland, both in their individual capacities.
In a second action under section 1983, Shabazz sued Sheriff Dupnik, Major Bosman, and other deputies, alleging nine constitutional violations related to the disciplinary system. The court dismissed all but two claims against the Sheriff. The first claim asserted a due process violation due to a policy preventing inmates from calling witnesses during hearings, while the second claimed a deprivation of a protected liberty interest for not receiving disciplinary findings after hearings. Summary judgment was granted in Shabazz's favor on both claims, resulting in $4,500 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages against the Sheriff in their official capacities, and $250 in compensatory damages against each in their individual capacities.
Shabazz represented himself during these actions and required access to the Jail's law library. However, while in administrative segregation, he could not access the library directly. The Jail provided limited access through a paging system, allowing inmates to request legal books. Shabazz sought greater access to legal materials, but his motion was denied, though the court ordered the Jail to publish its legal access policy. This policy was implemented by Dupnik in September 1992, coinciding with Shabazz's transfer to the Florence State Correctional Facility to serve his sentence.
On October 6, 1992, the district court found the Jail's newly published policy regarding exceptions to book and delivery-time limits for segregated inmates to be constitutionally inadequate, lacking clarity on the factors considered for granting exceptions. The court mandated the Jail to provide a satisfactory policy. Following a hearing, on March 17, 1993, the court deemed the Jail's revised library access policy insufficient and rectified it by drafting an injunction detailing the 'exceptions' policy.
The appellate review of the district court's summary judgment is conducted de novo, assessing whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the law was correctly applied, particularly regarding overlapping claims from Shabazz’s cases.
Shabazz argued that his constitutional rights were violated when he was not allowed to be present during a search of his cell, including his legal materials. Generally, inmates have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells, and even pretrial detainees lack a Fourth Amendment right to be present during such searches. Shabazz asserted that a Jail regulation could create a constitutionally protected liberty interest, referencing the Jail's policy which permits unannounced inspections but allows inmates to be present during searches of their legal papers. The district court recognized this as creating a protected liberty interest, leading to summary judgment against Garland, but this decision was reversed on appeal.
The court noted that a state prison regulation can establish a liberty interest only if it includes substantive predicates guiding official decisions related to the individual and employs mandatory language about the outcomes. The Supreme Court's ruling in Sandin v. Conner shifted the analysis away from the previous substantive predicates approach, emphasizing the need to evaluate the nature of the interest purportedly created by the state rather than merely searching for specific wording in regulations.
Shifting the focus of liberty interest inquiries from the language of prison regulations to the nature of deprivations, the Court has inadvertently prompted prisoners to seek mandatory language in regulations to establish entitlements to privileges. Consequently, courts have drawn negative inferences from such language, which diverges from the core concerns of the Due Process Clause. The Sandin decision redefined the assessment of liberty interests, emphasizing the severity of hardship relative to normal prison life, specifically defining liberty interest as "freedom from restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship."
In the case of Shabazz, a pretrial detainee, the reference to "ordinary incidents of prison life" pertains to those serving sentences. However, the cell search conducted was not punitive and aligned with general security measures permissible for pretrial detainees. Thus, applying the Sandin framework, Shabazz's claim holds little merit. Although a regulation was violated by not allowing him to be present during the search of his legal papers, the inspection was within the established rights of the jail, and his absence did not constitute a significant constitutional violation. Therefore, the judgment against Garland was reversed.
Regarding Shabazz's claim about witness testimony during disciplinary proceedings, the defense argued that he had no liberty interest against disciplinary segregation, as established in Sandin. However, this argument fails to consider that Shabazz was a pretrial detainee, not a convicted prisoner. While Sandin determined that prisoners do not have a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation, it is essential to recognize that disciplinary actions fall within the expected parameters of a prison sentence, which does not apply to pretrial detainees.
Sandin clarifies that its rationale is not applicable to pretrial detainees, leaving Bell v. Wolfish intact. In Bell, pretrial detainees challenged jail conditions as punitive before conviction, but the Supreme Court found no punishment that infringed on their liberty interests under the Due Process Clause, affirming that detainees cannot be punished prior to a conviction. Shabazz's case differs as he contests disciplinary segregation imposed for jail rule violations, not for the crime leading to his detention. The due process elements for prison disciplinary hearings, established in Wolff v. McDonnell, require that inmates be allowed to call witnesses unless it poses undue hazards to safety. Although the Jail’s published policy aligns with Wolff, stating inmates may call witnesses unless impractical for safety, in practice, a blanket prohibition against calling witnesses was enforced. Instead, inmates were required to submit questions for remote witness interviews, which were then considered by the disciplinary committee. Previous rulings, such as Bartholomew v. Watson, established that blanket denials of witness presence violate due process, necessitating case-by-case evaluations of potential hazards. The district court found that the Jail did not assess requests to call witnesses individually, leading to the conclusion that its practices did not meet due process requirements. Consequently, the court appropriately granted summary judgment regarding the Sheriff's liability for infringing on Shabazz’s rights as a pretrial detainee.
The Sheriff cited Baxter v. Palmigiano regarding due process, specifically that inmates are not entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses. While this point is accepted, it is deemed irrelevant to the case at hand. Shabazz alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in disciplinary segregation by Robare, claiming three specific failures: the absence of a tape recording for one hearing, denial of the ability to call witnesses, and lack of written findings from the disciplinary committee. The district court ordered rehearings for all three instances, leading to Shabazz receiving seven fewer days in segregation. However, the court granted summary judgment to Shabazz based solely on Robare's undisputed failure to tape record one hearing, erroneously concluding that this failure alone caused Shabazz's additional segregation. The court identified genuine disputes regarding the other claims, necessitating further proceedings.
Regarding punitive damages, the district court awarded $100,000 against Dupnik, Bosman, and Fimbres in their official capacities, which was reversed as municipalities are immune from punitive damages under Section 1983. The court affirmed the award of compensatory damages against these officers, clarifying that municipal liability extends to them. Finally, the court noted that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and referenced a previously appointed Master who evaluated the Jail's compliance with constitutional mandates, including disciplinary procedures.
During the trial, the court excluded Fimbres' proposed testimony regarding findings of a Master's evaluation, determining that the actual findings constituted the best evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 1002. Fimbres claimed the testimony was intended to demonstrate his good faith in enforcing rules, but the court noted that good faith is only relevant for punitive damages.
Regarding Shabazz's claims for injunctive relief about the Jail's library access policy, the Sheriff argued these claims were moot due to Shabazz's removal from the Jail, which negated any impact on his rights. However, Shabazz contended that the situation was 'capable of repetition yet evading review,' qualifying for an exception to mootness. The court acknowledged that the short duration of an inmate's stay at the Jail could prevent full litigation, thus satisfying the 'evading review' criterion. It also recognized that Shabazz could potentially return to the Jail due to ongoing post-conviction relief efforts, meeting the 'capable of repetition' standard.
Despite these considerations, the court later determined that Shabazz’s circumstances had changed, as his petitions for post-conviction relief were denied, eliminating any expectation of returning to the Jail. Consequently, the court concluded that the issue was moot and vacated the prior injunctive orders. Ultimately, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment against Robare concerning Shabazz's civil rights violations and remanded for further proceedings, while also reversing the judgment against Garland.
Summary: Summary judgment is affirmed against appellants Dupnik, Bosman, and Fimbres for liability concerning the violation of Shabazz's constitutional rights, while the court reverses the punitive damages awarded against them. Compensatory damages are upheld. The district court's orders requiring the Sheriff to implement and publish a library access policy are vacated as moot. However, the Sheriff is allowed to recoup punitive damages if he amends jail policies to address constitutional violations related to witness calling in inmate disciplinary proceedings. The earlier order from October 6, 1992, was withdrawn pending an evidentiary hearing on the Jail's library access policy for segregated inmates. The ruling emphasizes the necessity of a due process hearing for pretrial detainees to ensure disciplinary actions are not unjustly punitive. The appellants’ arguments in their brief inaccurately portray the case regarding the ability of inmates to present evidence in disciplinary hearings. The court previously found the prison's policy unconstitutional, aligning with established legal principles. Arizona law protects public entities and employees from punitive damages, and punitive damages under section 1983 can be awarded for conduct driven by malicious intent or reckless disregard for constitutional rights.
