Mavourneen Doherty v. City of Chicago, Graham C. Grady, Judith C. Rice
Docket: 95-1297
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 28, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Mavourneen Doherty, who operates a not-for-profit providing space for charitable bingo games, filed an amended complaint against the City of Chicago and its officials, alleging a conspiracy to violate her Fourteenth Amendment rights. She claimed the defendants improperly required her to obtain a Public Place of Amusement (PPA) license for one bingo hall and denied zoning certification for another. The district court dismissed her complaint, ruling it failed to state a valid claim.
Doherty has operated bingo halls in Chicago for over ten years, licensed by the State of Illinois. In September 1993, her existing bingo hall at 3500 North Milwaukee Avenue (Location "A") was closed by Judith Rice, the City's Director of Revenue, citing a lack of a PPA license, despite Doherty's assertion that her non-profit status exempted her from this requirement. Additionally, she was charged a $700 license fee, which she contended was excessive and not imposed on other bingo halls, resulting in significant business loss.
In 1993, she also sought to open a new bingo hall at 5820 North Milwaukee Avenue (Location "B"). During a meeting with Alderman Patrick Levar, he indicated no objections as long as the operation met city zoning requirements.
Defendant-appellee John Grace, pastor of St. Tarcissus Church, opposed the proposed bingo hall by Ms. Doherty, citing concerns that it would disrupt his church's bingo games and fundraising efforts. He mobilized community opposition through flyers suggesting the hall would attract undesirable elements and met with Alderman Levar to dissuade the lease. Prior to signing the lease, Ms. Doherty sought zoning certification from City Zoning Administrator Graham Grady for Location "B," which was zoned "B-4" but denied on October 1, 1993. Ms. Doherty argued that other bingo halls operated under similar zoning. Following the denial, Alderman Levar proposed an ordinance to change zoning regulations, effectively barring the bingo hall's operation at Location "B," which Ms. Doherty claims was intended to thwart her plans.
In response, Ms. Doherty filed a claim in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the need for a PPA license at Location "A" and the zoning certification denial for Location "B." She contends these actions were politically motivated, given her lack of affiliation with the Democratic party. The district court reviewed her original complaint, interpreting it as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, focusing on claims of procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection. The court found Ms. Doherty had alleged a property interest in both locations but failed to sufficiently plead a constitutional violation. Specifically, she did not demonstrate she had utilized state law remedies or that such remedies were inadequate, which undermined her procedural and substantive due process claims. Additionally, her equal protection claim was deemed insufficient for not establishing disparate treatment based on group membership.
The court dismissed claims against the City of Chicago, Director Rice, and Administrator Grady without prejudice. Alderman Levar was granted absolute immunity for his legislative actions, leading to the dismissal with prejudice of claims related to his zoning ordinance proposal, while other claims against him were dismissed without prejudice. Reverend Grace was implicated in a conspiracy with Alderman Levar, but due to Ms. Doherty's failure to state a constitutional violation, claims against him were also dismissed without prejudice.
In her amended complaint, Ms. Doherty sought to address the deficiencies noted by the district court, but the court found that the amended pleading still lacked sufficient detail. As a result, the case was dismissed with prejudice. The court determined that Ms. Doherty did not adequately allege that available state remedies were ineffective in protecting her rights, particularly concerning Location "A," where her assertion of inadequacy was deemed conclusory. Regarding Location "B," Ms. Doherty's lack of standing to appeal to the Zoning Board was noted, but the court found that the Board’s rules did not limit appeals solely to property owners or lessees.
Ms. Doherty's equal protection claim, alleging discrimination based on her political beliefs, was dismissed as well, with the court finding insufficient connection between her non-affiliation with the Democratic party and her inability to obtain the necessary permit. The court affirmed that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide a clear statement of the claim to be sufficient and that dismissal is warranted only when it is evident that no facts could support the claim for relief.
Finally, the court agreed with the district court’s requirement that Ms. Doherty needed to demonstrate the inadequacy of state law remedies to establish her due process claims.
Procedural due process claims involve a two-step analysis: first, determining if the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest, and second, assessing what process is due. In this case, the district court recognized Ms. Doherty's alleged property interests in obtaining zoning certification and operating a bingo hall. The focus shifts to the second step, where due process is a flexible concept that adapts to specific circumstances, emphasizing the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The Supreme Court has clarified that a pre-deprivation hearing is not always necessary, particularly when post-deprivation remedies are available, as established in Hudson v. Palmer. Here, the Court stated that an unauthorized deprivation by a state employee does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy exists. Consequently, plaintiffs must utilize state law remedies or show their inadequacy to support a procedural due process claim. Ms. Doherty failed to challenge the adequacy of Illinois's remedies in her appeal, leading to a conclusion that she waived this argument. Thus, her procedural due process claim lacks merit.
A decision was reached with reluctance, emphasizing a preference for resolving appeals based on case merits rather than procedural issues. The court reiterated that under Rule 28(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant must articulate the issues for litigation with supporting legal authority and reasoning. The court stressed that it is not its role to construct legal arguments for represented parties.
Regarding Ms. Doherty's complaints, the court found that her alleged deprivation arose from "random and unauthorized" acts, thus entitling her only to post-deprivation remedies. The court concurred with the district court that Ms. Doherty failed to adequately allege the inadequacy of state law remedies for her claims related to two locations.
For Location "A," her claim that available remedies were inadequate was deemed conclusory and insufficient, particularly as she did not explain why she couldn't pursue her claim in Illinois state courts. For Location "B," the court noted that Illinois law and the Municipal Code of Chicago provide comprehensive remedies for challenging the denial of zoning certification, including the right to appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals, which does not limit the right of appeal to property owners. Ms. Doherty’s assertion of lacking standing was unpersuasive.
Additionally, the court pointed out that Ms. Doherty had only preserved a portion of her claims on appeal, as her brief did not meaningfully address substantive due process analysis for Location "A," resulting in a waiver of that claim. For Location "B," her complaint presented only vague contours of a substantive due process claim, lacking clarity in her submissions to the district court and her appellate brief.
The discussion highlights the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court on substantive due process claims related to land-use decisions that are arbitrary and lack a substantial connection to public health, safety, or welfare. Several cases illustrate that federal courts do not serve as zoning boards, and a rigorous legal standard is necessary. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that a land-use decision was arbitrary and irrational, alongside either a separate constitutional violation or an inadequacy in state law remedies to establish a substantive due process claim.
While some circuits suggest that political bias in land-use decisions could lead to substantive due process claims despite adequate state remedies, others argue such issues should be analyzed under the First Amendment. Notably, the plaintiff must show either inadequate state remedies or an independent constitutional violation to pursue such a claim. In the current case, the plaintiff, Ms. Doherty, failed to demonstrate these prerequisites in her submissions, as she did not indicate any inadequacy in state remedies or systemic bias preventing her from seeking relief in state courts. The excerpt emphasizes that federal courts typically refrain from intervening in local planning disputes, as local agencies are more suited to address these issues.
An independent constitutional right to be free from political bias in land-use decision-making is acknowledged, but the plaintiff, Ms. Doherty, has not provided specific allegations to support her claim. She failed to demonstrate that the decision-maker was aware of her political non-affiliation or that other politically affiliated individuals received similar zoning certifications. General assertions of bias are deemed insufficient for constitutional protection under substantive due process or the First Amendment; concrete facts are necessary. Although a heightened pleading standard for Section 1983 claims against local governments is not required, the court emphasizes the need for adequate factual allegations to clarify the basis of the complaint.
The district court dismissed Doherty's Equal Protection claim regarding discrimination based on her political non-affiliation, a matter she did not contest on appeal, resulting in waiver of the issue. The judgment from the district court is affirmed. Ms. Doherty's amended complaint includes allegations about past interactions with the city, such as the 1984 condemnation of her bingo hall and subsequent rezoning efforts that affected her operations. The City of Chicago raised a waiver regarding one location but discussed the merits of a due process claim for another. However, the court found this discussion does not constitute a waiver of waiver. The court noted that the City’s counsel acknowledged the absence of a clear argument regarding the inadequacy of Illinois remedies in the appellant's brief, stating that addressing the merits was done cautiously. Ultimately, the court declined to assume arguments on behalf of the plaintiff that were not explicitly made.
Ms. Doherty fails to clarify why her claim regarding Location "B" cannot be pursued in state courts, despite having previously challenged a rezoning affecting her bingo hall at Location "A" in state court successfully. The district court acknowledged public records submitted by the parties without transforming the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. The complaint alleges discrimination against Ms. Doherty, who is not affiliated with the Democratic Party in Chicago. She claims to be part of a minority class that conducts business in the city and faced several discriminatory actions: her first bingo hall was taken through condemnation, her second hall was rezoned to prohibit operation (later overturned), and she encountered licensing issues that were ultimately deemed inapplicable. Additionally, her application for Zoning Certification at Location "B" was denied, while her bingo hall at Location "A" was closed in 1993 for non-compliance with a licensing requirement that had been ruled irrelevant to her business. The courts have not specified the conditions under which they would consider such causes of action, with prior cases indicating that political interference often stemmed from personal animosity towards applicants.
