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United States v. Frey

Citation: 5 F. App'x 514Docket: No. 00-1579

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; February 28, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Indiana attorney Bruce Frey was found guilty by a jury of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951) for his involvement in a scheme with Thomas Hubbard to extort James Lambert, a firearms dealer facing felony charges. Frey and Hubbard convinced Lambert to pay $20,000 for a plea bargain that would prevent felony convictions, allowing him to retain his federal firearms dealer's license. Lambert, who co-owned a hunting and fishing store, was facing four felony charges after a series of incidents, including a suicide attempt and drug possession. 

After meeting Frey at his store post-release from jail, Lambert sought assistance with his legal troubles. Frey claimed to have connections with local prosecutors and asserted that Lambert’s previous criminal history necessitated the payment for a favorable outcome. He cautioned Lambert about the risks of felony convictions on his ability to operate his business and instructed him to use Hubbard as an intermediary, advising against informing his retained attorney, David Payne, of Frey’s involvement.

In December 1994, Lambert disclosed Frey’s extortion attempt to Payne, who arranged for Lambert to record conversations with Frey and Hubbard under police supervision. Over several months, Lambert made payments totaling $20,000. The investigation failed to establish a direct link between Frey, Hubbard, and the prosecutors, but the deputy prosecutor reassessed Lambert's case, leading to a misdemeanor plea. Ultimately, Hubbard pleaded guilty, while Frey's conviction resulted from the recorded conversations presented at trial.

Frey's appeal challenges the interpretation of the Hobbs Act, arguing that the victim must fear harm directly caused by the extortioner. He claims that since he did not threaten Lambert and there was no corroboration of his ties to the prosecutor, Lambert's fear was unreasonable and more indicative of opportunism than victimhood. However, established case law clarifies that in extortion involving the wrongful use of fear of economic harm, the victim's fear does not need to be instigated by the extortioner; it can be preexisting, with the extortioner merely exploiting it. The court references past rulings, asserting that it is unnecessary for the government to prove that the extortioner created the victim's fear. The court found sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Lambert reasonably feared economic harm due to the potential impact of a felony conviction on his firearms business. Lambert's awareness of this risk and Frey’s repeated emphasis on avoiding such a conviction demonstrate that Frey exploited Lambert's fear. Consequently, the judgment of the district court is upheld.