Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Castorena v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc.
Citations: 237 Ill. App. 3d 702; 605 N.E.2d 584; 178 Ill. Dec. 790; 1992 Ill. App. LEXIS 1176Docket: No. 2—90—1049
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; July 22, 1992; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Plaintiff Josephine Castoreña filed a four-count amended complaint against Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI), the City of Elmhurst, and Don Grotz after being injured as a passenger in Grotz's car, which collided with a dumpster owned by BFI on a City-controlled roadway. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of BFI and the City, resulting in a jury verdict against Grotz, an uninsured motorist, for $164,280. Upon appeal, the appellate court reversed the directed verdict for BFI and the City and remanded the case. The Illinois Supreme Court denied a leave to appeal but later remanded for reconsideration regarding the City, referencing the case of West v. Kirkham. The key issue was whether the trial court erred in granting immunity to the City under section 3–104 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, which protects local entities from liability for failing to provide traffic control devices. The appellate court found that immunity did not apply because evidence indicated the City had prior notice of a dangerous condition due to a similar accident. This conclusion was supported by a distinction from the case of Newsome v. Thompson, where no notice was established. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in West clarified that section 3–104 immunity applies when a municipality fails to provide traffic control devices initially, not when existing devices malfunction, and that the immunity is not contingent on prior notice of a dangerous condition. The special concurring opinion in Castoreña proposed that the City’s liability should stem from its obligation to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition, as outlined in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 3–102(a). However, in the case of West, the plaintiff claimed that Urbana was obligated to install a left-hand turn arrow under the same statute. The supreme court dismissed this claim, highlighting that section 3–102(a) is subject to the qualifications in the statute, particularly section 3–104, which explicitly states that municipalities do not have a duty to provide traffic control devices. This indicates that the responsibility for such devices is excluded from the general maintenance duty in section 3–102(a). The court noted that this limitation aligns with common law, stating that the Tort Immunity Act does not create new duties but codifies existing ones. Furthermore, section 3–104 encompasses both traffic and warning devices, affirming that the City had no obligation to provide these under section 3–102(a). Consequently, the trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict in favor of the City was upheld, while the judgment against BFI was reversed and remanded. The final ruling was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, with judges Bowman and Geiger concurring.