Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; December 13, 1991; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Plaintiff Timothy Groark filed a lawsuit for injuries sustained in a collision with defendant Donald Barry's car. Prior to the trial, Barry died, and Linda Anderson was appointed as the special administrator of his estate. During the trial, the court prohibited Groark from testifying about facts that occurred in the presence of Barry under the Dead Man’s Act. The only other witness, John Porter, testified about the incident, which led to Groark's counsel being denied the opportunity to recall him to counter Porter’s testimony. Groark submitted an offer of proof to preserve the disallowed testimony for appellate review. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant. Groark appealed, raising issues regarding whether the defendant waived protections under the Dead Man’s Act and if the trial court's exclusion of his testimony was improper. The court found merit in Groark's appeal, leading to a reversal and remand for a new trial. Key facts included that Groark sustained injuries while attempting to record the license plate of a car, with a central dispute over whether Barry's car hit him or if he kicked the car. Testimony from Groark's medical provider and a police officer was presented, but Groark was restricted from discussing relevant facts due to the Dead Man’s Act.
Plaintiff detailed the circumstances of his injury, including the party, barricades, and his presence in the street. He described seeking medical attention, the severity of his knee injury, the treatment received, the challenges posed by wearing a cast, ongoing pain, and the injury's impact on his life and family. Testimony regarding Barry's car speeding backwards and colliding with the plaintiff was not permitted. After the plaintiff's case, the defendant sought a directed verdict, asserting a lack of evidence linking Barry’s actions to the injuries. The court denied this motion. The defense called four witnesses, including the plaintiff as an adverse witness, Dr. Labanauskas (emergency room resident), Dr. Maskin (defendant's physician), and John Porter (plaintiff’s friend). The plaintiff affirmed that the car hit him but faced restricted cross-examination. Dr. Labanauskas testified that the plaintiff had initially claimed to have kicked the car, while Dr. Maskin opined that there was no injury. John Porter stated that the plaintiff kicked the car and provided details of Barry's driving and the incident's mechanics. However, Porter later contradicted himself regarding the car's speed and fishtailing. He also disclosed a prior conversation with the plaintiff about compensation for his testimony, which he claimed was joking. After the defense rested, the plaintiff sought to rebut Porter’s testimony but was initially denied the opportunity to present this rebuttal. The trial court allowed an offer of proof for the plaintiff's rebuttal testimony, preserving it for review despite the defendant's objection.
Plaintiff's offer of proof included testimony that Barry's car struck his knee, resulting in injuries, and that Barry was driving the car backward at 20 to 25 miles per hour while fishtailing. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant, prompting the plaintiff to file an appeal. The Illinois Dead Man’s Act prohibits parties in a legal action involving a deceased person or someone legally disabled from testifying about conversations or events involving the deceased, with certain exceptions. Notably, if a representative of the deceased introduces such testimony, the opposing party may then also provide testimony about the same. The purpose of the Act is to prevent one-sided narratives regarding events that only the deceased could contradict. The defendant acknowledged waiving some protections of the Act but contended that this waiver did not extend to all aspects of the event, specifically denying that they had presented evidence regarding Barry's conduct prior to the collision, thus arguing that plaintiff's testimony about Barry’s speeding and fishtailing was inadmissible. The appellate court's interpretation of the Act's waiver scope, as seen in Zorn v. Zorn, illustrated that introducing testimony on one aspect can allow opposing testimony on related but distinct matters, emphasizing the need for a balanced presentation of events in court.
The trial court's decision to preclude cross-examination was found to be erroneous on appeal. The appellate court analyzed the meaning of "event" within the context of the relevant Act and determined that it encompassed all incidents and conversations leading to the signing of the deed in the case of Zorn. Consequently, the defendant waived the protections of the Act not only regarding events on the day of the conveyance but also concerning relevant conversations from months prior. The exclusion of the child's cross-examination was deemed a reversible error, as the waiver extended to all pertinent facts preceding the collision.
Specifically, the court noted that plaintiff's testimony regarding Barry's car speeding backward and fishtailing was critical to establishing negligence. The trial court's preclusion of this testimony, whether during plaintiff's cross-examination or through counsel's request to recall plaintiff after another witness, constituted reversible error. The defendant's claim that the testimony in the offer of proof was cumulative was rejected; the court asserted that plaintiff's direct testimony on the fishtailing was not merely repetitive and would have significantly impacted the trial outcome.
Furthermore, the defendant's argument that any errors were harmless was also dismissed, as the exclusion of plaintiff’s testimony materially affected the trial's result. The court concluded that the defendant had waived the Act's protections and that the trial court's actions improperly denied the jury critical testimony. As a result, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial. Judges Gordon and McNulty concurred with this decision.
