People v. Pennacchio

Citations: 214 Ill. App. 3d 195; 573 N.E.2d 297; 157 Ill. Dec. 879; 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 909Docket: No. 2—90—0419

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; May 30, 1991; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Defendant Anthony Pennacchio appeals a six-month periodic imprisonment sentence imposed after he admitted to violating court supervision. He contends that he was not properly admonished according to Supreme Court Rule 402(a), which requires clear communication of the nature of the charges, the sentencing range, and the rights being waived. Pennacchio argues that without proper admonishment, his waiver of the right to a hearing was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, and he asserts that his admission was coerced by an unfulfilled promise. Additionally, he claims that the sentence is excessive. 

Pennacchio was initially convicted of battery in 1988 and placed on two years of court supervision. In December 1988, he was arrested for reckless homicide, leading to a petition from the Du Page County State's Attorney to revoke his supervision. A plea agreement was reached for the homicide charge, which included probation, community service, and a fine. Prior to his plea, an agreement was made with the Du Page County State's Attorney to accept an unsatisfactory termination of his supervision if he admitted the violation and pled guilty to the homicide. 

On January 8, 1990, during the revocation proceedings, the court was not fully informed of the plea agreement terms. The trial judge indicated he was not bound by the agreement and confirmed with the defendant that he understood the consequences of admitting the violation. Following the admission, the judge sentenced him to six months' periodic imprisonment. Pennacchio's subsequent motions to vacate or reconsider the sentence were denied, prompting his appeal. His primary argument centers on inadequate admonishment as per Supreme Court Rule 402 regarding guilty pleas.

The document addresses the applicability of Rule 402 in supervision revocation proceedings, noting the absence of direct case law but finding relevant insights from probation revocation cases. Under the Unified Code of Corrections, a court can defer sentencing and impose supervision conditions following a guilty plea or finding. Successful completion leads to dismissal of charges, while failure allows the court to modify, continue, or revoke supervision.

Supervision revocation proceedings resemble probation revocation in that they are not criminal adjudications; the defendant has already been found guilty. Rule 402 is designed for proper guilty plea entries, but according to the Illinois Supreme Court in *People v. Beard*, it does not strictly apply to probation revocation. The court emphasized that due process doesn't require all Rule 402 admonitions in such cases due to the different nature of admitting a probation violation compared to entering a guilty plea.

While recognizing the qualitative difference between criminal convictions and supervision revocations, the document asserts that basic due process must still be upheld. The U.S. Supreme Court in *Gagnon v. Scarpelli* established minimum due process rights for probationers, who, having been previously convicted, are entitled to fewer protections than those not yet convicted. The Illinois court in *DeWitt* outlined specific due process rights for probationers, including written notice of violations, evidence disclosure, personal hearings, the ability to present evidence, confrontation of witnesses, a neutral hearing body, and potentially counsel assistance.

Illinois statutes provide similar guarantees regarding the due process in probation and supervision revocation proceedings, as indicated by section 5—6—4 of the Unified Code of Corrections. The courts have established that minimal due process is required, meaning that admissions to violations must be made voluntarily. The defendant in this case argues that his admission was involuntary for two reasons: a lack of Rule 402 admonishments and reliance on an unfulfilled promise. 

The trial judge clarified that Rule 402, which governs guilty pleas, does not strictly apply to supervision violations. The judge informed the defendant that he was not bound by any plea agreement and that by admitting to the violation, he waived his right to a hearing. The defendant confirmed his understanding and voluntarily admitted to the violation. 

The defendant's reliance on *People v. Collins* is misplaced, as Collins pertains to guilty pleas rather than supervision admissions. Additionally, the judge's statement that he was not bound by the plea agreement negates the need for a Rule 402(d)(3) warning. 

On the second point, the defendant contends his admission was based on an unfulfilled promise. The court agrees that admissions must be voluntary and cannot rely on unfulfilled promises. Precedent from *People v. Pier* supports the principle that if an admission significantly depends on a promise from the prosecutor, that promise must be fulfilled for the admission to be considered voluntary. Thus, the trial court’s actions were deemed proper in the context of the law regarding admissions to violations of supervision.

The State’s Attorney failed to present the full plea agreement to the judge, suggesting instead that a harsher penalty was warranted. The plea agreement stipulated that the defendant would plead guilty to reckless homicide in exchange for 30 months of probation, 50 hours of community service, and a $500 fine, alongside an admission of violating his court supervision, which would lead to an unsatisfactory termination of that supervision. The defendant met his obligations by pleading guilty and admitting the violation. However, the judge was misled to believe that the supervision would simply be revoked, without knowledge of the plea to reckless homicide. During the proceedings, the assistant State’s Attorney did not adequately inform the court of the plea agreement's details and encouraged the court to impose a stiffer penalty, overlooking that the defendant had already been sentenced for the homicide charge. This failure led to the conclusion that the defendant's admission was involuntary. Consequently, the admission was vacated, the conviction order from January 8, 1990, was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings with a different judge. REINHARD, P.J. and UNVERZAGT, J. concur.