Leslie Elwin Baker v. Perfection Hy-Test, a Subsidiary of the Marmon Corporation
Docket: 95-6091
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; January 1, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Unpublished opinions may be cited if they hold persuasive value on material issues, provided a copy is attached or furnished to the Court and all parties, as per the General Order of November 29, 1993, which suspends the 10th Circuit Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995. In the case of Leslie Elwin Baker v. Perfection Hy-Test, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's summary judgment favoring the defendant. Baker alleged that he was demoted and constructively terminated in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Oklahoma public policy.
Baker, who was 55 years old, worked as a water pump supervisor until a July 1992 reorganization led to the elimination of his position, which was then filled by a younger supervisor. He was reassigned to a nonsupervisory role on August 17, 1992, and resigned on January 31, 1994, prompting this lawsuit.
The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo, confirming that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court found that Baker failed to file a timely discrimination charge with the EEOC, which is required under the ADEA, and noted there was no indication that he filed with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission. Baker's attempt to file in March 1994 was beyond the 300-day limit following his demotion. He argued that the demotion was part of a continuing violation and that the limitations period should be equitably tolled due to the defendant's conduct, which the court considered as part of its analysis.
To utilize the continuing violation doctrine, a plaintiff must demonstrate at least one discriminatory act occurred within the statutory filing period and that earlier acts were part of an ongoing discriminatory policy or practice. Merely showing that prior acts had a continuing effect is insufficient. In this case, the plaintiff contends that discriminatory actions persisted between his demotion and resignation, citing training a replacement, reduced pay and benefits, night shifts, and training personnel without authority. However, these conditions were deemed the aftermath of the demotion rather than ongoing discrimination. The sole alleged discriminatory act was the demotion itself, necessitating an EEOC claim within 300 days of notification.
The plaintiff also argues for tolling of the filing period, noting it is not jurisdictional and can be tolled if the employee was misled by the employer or authorities. He claims misdirection from his foreman regarding his ability to sue for age discrimination. However, for tolling to apply, employer statements must constitute active deception. The foreman's comments were interpreted as expressing an opinion about the likelihood of success rather than active deception. Consequently, the 300-day deadline was not tolled.
Regarding state law claims, Oklahoma recognizes a narrow exception to at-will termination for discharges against public policy. However, there is no precedent in Oklahoma law extending this exception to wrongful demotion claims. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has been cautious in defining these exceptions, and without contrary guidance, claims of demotion do not fall under the public policy tort exception.
Oklahoma law recognizes a statutory claim for discriminatory constructive discharge, as established in Wilson v. Hess-Sweitzer, Brant, Inc. The court sees no reason to differentiate between constructive and actual discharge within this tort context. However, the plaintiff did not demonstrate constructive discharge in this case. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer creates intolerable working conditions, compelling an employee to resign, assessed from a reasonable person's perspective.
The plaintiff argued that his demotion led to embarrassment and loss of status and benefits, and he had to train a replacement, while colleagues made jokes about him. Nonetheless, employees are expected to respond reasonably to reassignments. The plaintiff's resignation was deemed unreasonable given that he had previously struggled with stress but had remained employed for a year and a half after the demotion. His continued employment and ability to earn over 90% of his pre-demotion pay indicated that his conditions were not intolerable.
Further, he testified that workplace pressure increased due to his perception of still performing a supervisory role, yet he managed his job well and maintained good relations with supervisors. Additionally, he cited a breathing problem as a significant reason for his resignation, suggesting that while work conditions contributed to his decision, they did not amount to constructive termination. The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma was affirmed, and the court noted that the case's procedural aspects regarding timeliness and filing were not addressed due to the ruling on constructive discharge. The court also admonished the plaintiff's counsel for not properly numbering the appendix in court filings.
