Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; January 31, 1991; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Tampam, Inc. appeals a circuit court order that awarded significantly lower attorney fees than requested. The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by not granting fees for work on a claim in its complaint and by using a lower hourly rate for fee calculation. The court affirms the lower award.
On October 24, 1988, Tampam filed a second amended complaint alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ogle County officials, claiming improper assessment and taxation of its farmland due to encroaching public roadways and misclassification of wasteland. The plaintiff contended that the county's assessment practices violated due process and equal protection rights, seeking recovery of improperly paid taxes, prevention of future collections, and attorney fees.
Count II of the complaint, concerning an administrative review of a Property Tax Appeal Board decision, is not part of this appeal. Prior to trial, Count I was settled through a stipulation addressing the improper taxation of encroaching roadways and wasteland, leading to reduced assessments and tax refunds. The stipulation was approved by the court on May 2, 1989, but issues regarding field assessments and land classifications remained unresolved.
Tampam filed a petition for attorney fees totaling $74,694, requesting $190 per hour for lead counsel (while with Bell, Boyd, Lloyd) and $150 per hour as a sole practitioner, with an additional request for local counsel fees at $95 per hour. The court ultimately awarded a lesser amount, leading to the current appeal.
The court awarded attorney fees totaling $16,346, incorporating a 35% reduction due to the rejection of the roads and highways claim as a viable section 1983 claim, which was found to be factually and legally distinct from the wasteland claim. Compensation rates for lead counsel were reduced from $190 and $150 to $95 per hour, and additional deductions of $3,000 for lead counsel and $800 for local counsel were made based on case complexities and outcomes. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the fee award on March 21, 1990, but allowed for an additional fee for preparing the petition for fees and expenses. The plaintiff appealed the fee orders from September 27, 1989, and March 21, 1990, under Supreme Court Rule 304(a).
During oral arguments, the court sought legal authority regarding wasteland's exempt status without a contributory value assessment, but no statutory authority was cited. The court clarified that its review was limited to issues raised by the appellant and responses from the appellees, and it expressed no opinion on the propriety of agreements made by the parties. It noted that attorney fees in civil actions are recoverable under section 1988, allowing the prevailing party to seek reasonable fees, with the trial court having discretion in determining the fee amount based on the "lodestar" method. This involves multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, which the court may adjust.
Twelve factors must be considered by the trial court when determining attorney fees under section 1988, including: (1) time and labor required, (2) complexity of legal questions, (3) necessary skill level, (4) impact on attorney's ability to take other cases, (5) customary fees, (6) fee structure (fixed or contingent), (7) time constraints imposed by the client or situation, (8) the amount at stake and results achieved, (9) attorney experience and reputation, (10) case undesirability, (11) length of client relationship, and (12) fee awards in analogous cases (Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.). If the court decides to reduce hours or rates, it must provide a clear justification (Tomazzoli v. Sheedy).
The court ruled that the plaintiff's public roads challenge was not viable under section 1983, as Ogle County's road width guidelines were merely preliminary assessments, not constitutional claims. The trial court concluded that any due process challenges related to taxation on exempt land were invalid, as Illinois offers sufficient post-deprivation remedies, referencing Parratt v. Taylor, which held that the due process clause was not violated when state procedures were not followed, provided there was a remedy for the loss. The plaintiff argued that subsequent cases (Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and Hudson v. Palmer) narrowed Parratt's applicability to unforeseeable state actions, but the court disagreed, stating Parratt remains relevant for actions affecting a class of plaintiffs, not just individual instances. The Logan case involved an employee's claim of unlawful termination due to disability, highlighting procedural timelines for resolving such disputes.
The commission failed to schedule a necessary conference within the 120-day statutory period, resulting in a loss of jurisdiction to address the employee’s complaint, as ruled by the Illinois Supreme Court in Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n. However, the court found no violation of the employee's due process or equal protection rights due to the availability of reasonable procedures for filing complaints. The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed this decision, emphasizing that a property interest cannot be extinguished without providing the owner an opportunity to assert their claim, distinguishing this case from Parratt, where a random act by a state employee was at issue.
The court noted the employee was challenging state procedures that nullified his entitlement rather than merely the commission's error. In the context of Tampam's grievances against the state, it misinterpreted its objections to the assessor's practices as challenges to the legal procedures for rectifying those practices, a view unsupported by existing case law. Tampam also misread the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hudson, which addressed an inmate's rights regarding property destruction during a search and concluded that adequate post-deprivation remedies negated due process violations.
In Beverly Bank v. Board of Review, the court found that taxpayers could not claim a due process violation for increased assessments if they failed to pursue state-provided remedies for excessive taxation, even if the actions were illegal under state law. The principles from Beverly Bank and the related Supreme Court rulings are relevant to the current case, where the state’s improper calculation of road widths affecting the plaintiff's property does not complete the deprivation until the established post-deprivation remedies are exhausted.
Plaintiff failed to utilize legislative remedies, precluding a due process claim. The court correctly deemed the public roads claim non-viable under section 1983. Tampam contends that even if the due process claim fails, its equal protection claim warrants attorney fees under section 1988, citing Beverly Bank. However, in Beverly Bank, the court only found sufficient allegations of equal protection violations without determining entitlement to attorney fees. For section 1988 recovery, a party must achieve prevailing party status, which requires proof of intentional discrimination, as established in Roche v. County of Lake. Although Tampam alleged equal protection violations, the record lacks evidence of intentional discrimination, and the court made no findings to that effect. Therefore, Tampam does not qualify as a prevailing party for attorney fees. Tampam's argument for fees related to the public roads issue being connected to the wasteland claim is rejected, as the two claims are distinct and evidence of one does not support the other. The trial court correctly separated these claims. Lastly, the exclusion of 35% of the attorney's time from the fee calculation was deemed reasonable and within the trial court's discretion, with appellate courts applying a deferential standard to such decisions.
A trial court is required to either specify hours to be eliminated or reduce the attorney fee award to reflect the plaintiff's limited success. This principle, derived from Texas State Teachers Association, applies not only when a plaintiff wins on some claims but also in cases where attorney fees are available for only certain claims. The trial court provided a comprehensive analysis of its fee award, concluding that only 65% of the attorney time spent was reasonably attributable to the wasteland challenge due to its overlap with other issues. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in this determination.
Regarding the fee awarded for the settlement of the wasteland claim, the plaintiff argued against the hourly rate of $95 set by the court, referencing Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., which suggests using an attorney's own rate over the local forum rate. However, the court clarified that Chrapliwy does not support the plaintiff's argument, as it emphasizes judicial discretion in evaluating the reasonableness of billing rates, especially when local attorneys may provide equivalent services at a lower rate. The trial court noted that local attorneys could competently handle the case and concluded that it could make this assessment based on its experience without needing additional evidence. The affidavits from the plaintiff’s attorneys were deemed insufficient to counter the trial court's conclusion.
Local counsel's affidavit asserts that no attorneys in the Fifteenth Judicial District would accept the case, while out-of-town counsel claims a lack of private attorneys in western Illinois willing to take it. There is no evidence that either attorney sought local representation. The court thoroughly analyzed this situation, concluding it did not abuse its discretion. The plaintiff argues that the awarded fees fall short of covering attorney overhead and may deter competent counsel from pursuing civil rights cases. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Blum v. Stenson established that attorney fees under section 1988 should be based on prevailing market rates rather than overhead costs. The court correctly applied local rates for fee calculations. The plaintiff also contends that the trial court improperly reduced the attorney fee award by $3,000 for lead counsel and $800 for local counsel, but the court justified these reductions based on case involvement and results achieved. Any adjustments to the lodestar figure must reflect specific factors and market value, as outlined in Lynch v. City of Milwaukee. The trial court provided clear reasoning for the reductions, and no abuse of discretion was found. Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County is affirmed.
