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Meyer v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
Citations: 200 Ill. App. 3d 601; 146 Ill. Dec. 422; 558 N.E.2d 385; 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 928Docket: No. 1—88—2914
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 27, 1990; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Petitioners Willard and Elaine Tipsord, Randy and Nancy Wolford, Carl and Imogene Chase, Dorothy Robbins, Windell and Judy Kessinger, Delmar and Mary Alsene, and Juan and Guadalupe Hernandez appeal a Cook County circuit court order that denied their motions to intervene in the liquidation proceedings of North American Asbestos Corporation and for a change of venue. The corporation, which had been dissolved in 1978, was involved in over 500 lawsuits related to asbestos injuries. In 1981, a liquidating trust was established and Mary G. Oppenheim was appointed as the receiver. During these proceedings, Charlotte Hammond obtained a judgment against North American and initiated garnishment proceedings, leading to litigation involving the Receiver in higher courts. In 1985, the court invited claims against North American's assets, with a deadline of October 18, 1985; however, the Petitioners did not file any claims. Other claimants, including Keene Corporation, filed claims and the court ultimately dismissed all except for Keene’s. Delora Stewart also obtained a judgment and attempted to garnishee the Receiver's funds, but the court ruled in favor of the Receiver. The Petitioners, who had not been part of the receivership action nor filed any claims, later sought a change of venue and intervention, which the trial court denied, leading to this appeal. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that the denial of a change of venue is not appealable. The proceedings concluded with a final order for asset distribution to Keene and termination of the receivership. Petitioners appealed the trial court's denial of their motion for a change of venue, claiming error. However, the court found that a litigant has an automatic right to one change of venue based on bias or prejudice of the judge, but this must be supported by specific allegations if the judge has already ruled on a substantive issue. In this case, the court ruled that claims not filed by October 18, 1985, were barred, affecting the Petitioners since their claims were untimely, and they were not considered actual parties to the receivership action. Even if they were deemed parties, their late venue change application waived their automatic right. The Petitioners' motion relied on a general assertion of prejudice against their counsel without providing specific supporting evidence. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion was deemed appropriate. Additionally, Petitioners did not argue the denial of their motion to intervene, leading to a waiver of that issue. The circuit court's judgment was affirmed.